. 39

SURVEY

A JOURNAL of SOVIET and EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

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From 'Falanga' to 'Pax' *Adam Bromke*
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SURVEY

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ON THERMONUCLEAR COEXISTENCE

COMMUNIST doctrine on the nature of war predates by many decades the nuclear age. Inevitably, there was a discrepancy between Soviet ideology, based on the nineteenth-century 'horizon of expectations', and present day military technology. At a time when Mr. Khrushchev displays his 50 and 100 megaton bombs, it is pertinent to recall what 'General' Engels had to say in 1878 about the prospects of the evolution of weaponry [1]:

> The Franco-Prussian War marked a turning-point which was of entirely new significance. In the first place the weapons used had reached such a stage of perfection that further progress which would have any revolutionising influence is no longer possible. Once armies have guns which can hit a battalion at any range at which it can be distinguished, and rifles which are equally effective for hitting individual men, while loading them takes less time than aiming, then all further improvements are more or less unimportant for field warfare. The era of evolution is therefore, in essentials, closed in this direction.

Lenin believed that 'capitalism brings war, as the clouds bring rain'. Being a keen student of Clausewitz, he was influenced by the idea that 'war is a continuation of policy by other means', and was ready to apply it to revolutionary policy. He visualised the future as involving 'a series of most terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states'.[2] For him, as for Marx, violence was 'the midwife of history' and this included not only internal revolutionary violence but also 'revolutionary war' and wars of 'national liberation'.

The nuclear age has introduced a completely new perspective and people were quick to realise it. The relation between ends and means, between the prospective gains and the effect of the use of the new weapons rendered the Clausewitz thesis doubtful if not completely obsolete. Nuclear weapons were envisaged only as a deterrent against aggression, nuclear or otherwise, as a weapon preserving the balance of power, not changing it. The history of the last fifteen years illustrates this: from the loss of the American atomic monopoly, through the reluctance to develop the hydrogen bomb, to the delay in the development of the means of its delivery. For the West, with its defensive mentality, the Bomb posed the dilemma of relying on it, without wanting to use it,

[1] F. Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring)*, London, 1935, pp. 193–194.

[2] Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 4th ed., Vol. 29, p. 133.

to preserve the *status quo*. The Soviet bloc, with its messianic expansionist ideology, was concerned with changing the *status quo*. But revolutionary violence in the nuclear age could easily lead to a situation where the 'midwife of history' becomes its grave-digger. In other words, the Soviet leaders confronted the same dilemma of ends and means as the Western leaders, and even more acutely, considering that they were ideologically committed to revolutionary action. For them the question was not simply to recognise the new realities of the nuclear age, but to find a way out of the dilemma in which its advent placed them. They have not been unmindful of the qualitative change in the character of war, but their ideological commitments made it difficult for them to face squarely the fact that revolutionary action may start off a nuclear chain-reaction. Such an attitude, if articulated and explicit, could in the end lead to the abandonment of the revolutionary ideology itself. Thus the question of nuclear policy involved the very essence of the communist movement, its destiny and historical justification. It is not surprising that the Soviet leaders tried to wriggle out of the dilemma without abandoning the hope of inheriting the earth. Western observers, preoccupied as they are by their own difficulties with the balance of terror, have not paid enough attention to the fact that Soviet leaders had to face similar problems of adjustment. For them, however, the dilemma took the form of a possible atomic holocaust or giving up their eschatological faith.

'Marxist-Leninists consider war as a social-political phenomenon of a historically transitional character', says a recent Soviet work of reference,[3] repeating once again the traditional definition which did not envisage the possibility of a war which may be not transitional but final: the new military technology may not yet have reached the point where the 'end of history' is an immediate possibility, but there is little doubt that this is technically feasible.[4]

THE Soviet debate on the subject was not, of course, conducted openly, as it was in the West; only occasional reflections came to light. But even from such occasional glimpses it is clear that it was basically concerned with the dilemma stated above.[5] Malenkov announced that a new world war 'with the present means of warfare, means the destruction of world civilisation',[6] but the statement was never repeated, and Malenkov had to revise it; ever since, the formula has been that it would

[3] *Filosofskaya Entsiklopediya*, Moscow, 1960, Vol. 1, p. 277.

[4] Cf. Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 144–155 and 510. Kahn comments: 'The thought of a catastrophe or holocaust unleashed by accidental (i.e. nonhistorical) causes might be very unsettling to any Marxists who had a passionate belief in a deterministic theory of history. Instead of saying "It is inevitable that we will take over the world in fifty years", this Marxist will have to add, "Always assuming some capitalist fool doesn't press the button"' (p. 157).

[5] Cf. H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, London, 1959, pp. 65–90.

[6] *Pravda*, 13 March 1954.

result only in the downfall of capitalism and the victory of communism all over the world.

While reasserting this, Soviet spokesmen yet came to admit the damage that would be caused by such a war. It is true they did so with some reluctance, always playing down the possible consequences on Soviet morale of any communist equivalent to the 'alarmist' and 'pessimistic' views of Western commentators. Nuclear war therefore is not worth the prize and should be prevented. Lenin's thesis that wars are inescapable under capitalism was modified by Khrushchev, who pointed out at the twentieth CPSU congress that the thesis was correct before the second world war, but since then the situation has changed: 'As long as capitalism survives in the world, the reactionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies will continue their drive towards military gambles and aggression and may try to unleash war. But war is not fatalistically inevitable'.

This thesis has since been repeated so many times, incorporated in so many major Party documents, that it is unnecessary to elaborate it further. Nor is it necessary to discuss here the Soviet view that atomic wars cannot be limited and that thermonuclear weapons would be certain to be used in any major war. In 1958 *Pravda* (24 May) made the implications of this view explicit and wrote that the new war would be the most devastating in the history of mankind:

> Millions of people would perish, big cities and industrial centres would be swept from the face of the earth and many irreplaceable cultural monuments created by mankind throughout centuries would be contaminated by the atomic fall-out.

Even more outspoken was another of the rare articles explicitly describing the possible consequences of nuclear war. Admittedly writing largely for foreign consumption, the leading Soviet theoretician on nuclear strategy, General Telensky, stated in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (October 1960) that at the very least 500–600 million people would be killed in a nuclear war, even if chemical and bacteriological weapons were not used. 'A global war would probably mean the end of half of mankind, the more active and cultured half at that'. Although capitalism would be overthrown as a result of this war many other things (and human beings) would disappear as well. Therefore it was harmful and inhumane to justify war on the grounds that it would lead to the downfall of capitalism. Another, more recent, publication (August 1961) quotes Professor Linus Pauling saying that bombs on London and New York, on Moscow and Leningrad, would spell the doom of millions of inhabitants. But it criticises a leading Western communist, Professor J. D. Bernal, for his formulation of the problem, which is too close to the Malenkov formula. Bernal is quoted as saying that 'the survivors of nuclear war would envy the dead': although it would not mean the definite end of civilisation, it would signify a slow agony of retreat towards some horrible and primitive form of life for the mutilated and insane remnants of mankind. It would mean that civilisation would be

thrown back by hundreds, perhaps even thousands of years. This appraisal is rejected as 'very pessimistic': 'Mankind will not perish and civilisation will not be thrown back by thousands of years as a result of thermonuclear war', says the Soviet author. '[In such a war] the rotten capitalist system would collapse. However, at the same time hundreds of millions of toilers would perish, and the survivors would have to undergo immeasurable sufferings. Therefore communists, who are humanists and the only representatives and defenders of the interests of the workers, must take a resolute stand against war'.[7]

Yu. Frantsev, a leading Soviet ideologist, made his contribution by pointing out that thermonuclear war would delay the building of communist society and make it much more difficult.[8] This consideration should be all the more conspicuously in mind in view of the new Party programme for the construction of communism adopted by the twenty-second congress. But Soviet spokesmen are very discreet on this point, and avoid drawing attention to the connection between these two kinds of expectations. True, foreign communist leaders, such as Togliatti, have been quoted in the Soviet press, saying that 'we would be lying to the people if we argued that we could come nearer to socialism with the help of war',[9] but this is only in line with the Soviet position. At the same time, in striking contrast to the West, there has been nothing in Soviet publications comparable to the Western studies of probable losses and damage which would be caused by thermonuclear war, nor are the references to the heavy casualties among the 'toilers' ever specific enough to bring home the lessons which might send shudders down Soviet spines. Speculations about *Soviet* losses would adversely affect morale on the 'home front'.

Thus, while specialist studies on the subject remain secret, popular treatment is avoided except in the most general terms. The one popular booklet on *Nuclear Disarmament* by O. V. Bogdanov, published recently, contains a dreary and completely one-sided version of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament, during which the Soviet Union has, of course, been invariably right, acting in the interests of the human race, while the Pentagon and its servile scientists have invariably been wrong, acting in the interests of the warmongers and monopolists. Its assertion that the cessation of nuclear tests 'is just as important as the solution of the other problems connected with preventing the danger of the race in preparation for war', and that 'the Soviet Union has invariably expressed its readiness to stop all nuclear tests at any time if the Western powers would also stop them', now make strange reading.

IN the realm of military thought there have been a number of reappraisals and re-examinations during the last decade which have

[7] S. M. Krylov, *Povyzhshat Bditelnost Narodov v Otnoshenii Voennoi Opasnosti*, Moscow, 1961, p. 18.
[8] *Pravda*, 7 August 1960.
[9] *Politicheskoe Samoobrazovanie*, September 1960, p. 44.

been analysed in detail in Western literature on the subject[10]—occasionally perhaps too much in isolation from the political context.

Soviet military thinkers revised Stalin's doctrine of the 'permanently-operating factors', and more particularly their previous views about a *Blitzkrieg*, which after the Nazi defeat they regarded with scepticism. However, the realisation that the first nuclear strike might have a devastating effect even if it did not cripple the ability of the attacked country to retaliate, induced them to modify their views. During the 1961 summer and autumn crisis Soviet commentators stressed time and again that '1941 must not happen again', an argument used *inter alia* to justify the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests.

This, needless to say, is a dangerous argument, because there seems to be only one way to forestall a sudden attack, and that is to strike first. But the technocratic approach to Soviet policy, restricted to consideration of what the Soviet military analysts are saying, is too narrow; it reduces that policy to a matter of military strategy only, and hence tends to overstress the probability of the 'pre-emptive strike'. It concentrates too much on the logic of pure military doctrine, precluding a broader and more realistic view of Soviet political behaviour, in which military considerations play only a part. Just as the theory of games can only be of limited value when applied to military strategy, because it does not cover psychological considerations, so the probabilities of Soviet action in international relations cannot be deduced from Soviet military doctrine. An understanding of the historical background and the political psychology deriving from it are necessary to analyse the behaviour of Soviet leaders, as well as an understanding of current political and military considerations. Before the war, Stalin's military doctrine was offensive ('We will beat the enemy on his own territory'), but his political strategy was on the whole defensive. This does not imply, of course, that Stalin did not commit political and military errors, or that the retreat to Moscow was simply part of his grand design. Neither should one conclude that, because Stalin's policy was defensive while Soviet military doctrine was offensive, it follows that the present Soviet ruler also has a defensive policy. The present situation of the Soviet Union is quite different from what it was twenty-five years ago. The only legitimate inference from such general reflections and historical flashbacks is that there is no necessary connection between Soviet strategic doctrines and Soviet political actions.

The Soviet leaders themselves are not prone to commit such elementary errors of analysis; they adhere to the Leninist tradition of 'politique d'abord' and to Engels' dictum that 'politics is above strategy'. It is only among some Western commentators that these elementary political principles are insufficiently known.

[10] Cf. Dinerstein, *op. cit*, pp. 167–213, and 'Current Soviet Strategic Ideas' in *Survey*, October 1960, pp. 74–79. See also R. L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, London, 1959.

If the Soviet leaders have made a realistic appraisal of the consequences of a third world war, and if a preventive war seems to be ruled out on 'technical' grounds or on principle (or on both), this has by no means made Soviet foreign policy more conciliatory. On the contrary, on many occasions since the Suez crisis in 1956, menacing atomic warnings have been uttered by Khrushchev. At least a dozen countries have been threatened with nuclear annihilation.

If some explanation can be found for these ominous warnings—and after all Soviet leaders have not so far threatened that they would strike first—there can be no doubt that this 'hard line' has made a world conflict more likely. The overall balance of power has not changed and a nuclear war now would be more, not less, devastating than three or four years ago. If a more aggressive line has prevailed in Soviet foreign policy since the breakdown of the Paris summit in May 1960, and a new militancy found expression in the declaration of the eighty-one communist parties in Moscow in November 1960 and in the first part of the new Party programme adopted in October 1961, they reflect a reassertion of the ideological, expansionist element in communism.

THE dilemma facing Khrushchev is how to preserve revolutionary dynamics despite the danger of world war. So far all communist regimes have come into being in the wake, or as a result of wars; these wars were not instigated by the communists but in the Leninist perspective there is a close connection between war and revolution. Political and military developments have made further progress on these lines illusory; no more wars between 'capitalist' powers can be expected and the communist leaders have themselves ruled out a third world war as an instrument of their policy. Communist parties or their allies may without outside help prevail in a distant country, but their allegiance to the 'socialist camp' will be uncertain, and not many such independent successes can be expected in the near future. This being so, a certain amount of pressure, perhaps a lot of pressure, will be needed to make further communist advances possible. 'Just wars' of national liberation have not been ruled out; on the contrary, they are to be actively encouraged. However, any such war, even in the remoter parts of Africa, Asia, or Latin America, is essentially a 'limited war', and Khrushchev himself repeatedly pointed to the danger of a local war turning into a thermonuclear war.[11] But this is apparently a risk to be taken, for the same Khrushchev (and other Soviet leaders with him) has equally often stressed that on no account should a compromise be made to the detriment of the 'achievements of the working class', for this would be tantamount to betrayal, and communists cannot 'compromise on principles'. The new policy of the 'limited risk' is, in fact, a policy

[11] For instance in his speech at the Higher Party School on 6 January 1961.

from a position of strength, an essay in brinkmanship, to use the familiar terms of the late 'fifties. This policy is based on the assumption that the Western powers will not, for a variety of reasons, be ready to take equal risks, reasons such as national parochialism, short-sightedness, lack of nerve, internal resistance by groups of unilateralists, nuclear disarmers, etc. The activities of the latter have been given wide, though not always truthful publicity in the Soviet Union.[12]

THIS policy faces the West with a seemingly agonising choice: Either to resist, incurring the risk of war, or to give in, to compromise, only to face six or twelve months later, in a more desperate position, a more confident antagonist. Time may be won in this way, but in the long run the risk of war would be increased. The ruler of a non-democratic regime may find it easier to retreat from an exposed position if faced with determined resistance, for he has far less need to take public opinion into account than leaders in democratic countries, and his monopoly of the means of communication makes it possible for him to give his own, and only his own, version to his people. But if the ruler has invested too much of his prestige in certain claims and demands he may find it difficult to climb down without seriously endangering his political survival. This is an old story and the moral has been made only too familiar by experience, recent and not so recent: dictators should be given only a minimum of temptation.

The Soviet policy of the limited risk has been criticised directly and implicitly from both 'left' and 'right'. The Chinese attitude is well known; the Chinese leaders have never said in so many words that war is inevitable, in fact they deny it, although they usually imply in their propaganda and their doctrinal statements that it is quite likely. Chinese spokesmen have never invested heavily in a policy of 'peaceful co-existence' and have always charged their rivals with exaggerating the horrors of modern war: 'The modern revisionists exaggerate the devastation of atomic war and beg for peace at any price.'[13] It is unlikely that this was directed against Yugoslavia, which is not in a position to affect the course of world affairs, although it was the ostensible target of the attack. Since then the Chinese communists have given their signature to the compromise resolution of the 81 communist parties, but they have also made it clear that if it depended on them they would take much greater risks than the Soviet leaders. The Yugoslav leader Edward Kardelj summarised the Chinese view in these terms: 'Co-existence is untenable because war as a revolutionary solution in the international class war is inevitable. Since such a war would be just, one should not spread

[12] Lord Russell is introduced in a recent book by the former London correspondent of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* as a 'very old man who all his life defended the ideology of imperialism' but who has come now 'to greet the ideas born of communism' (V. Silantiev, *Fog rassevaetsia*, Moscow, 1961, p. 156).

[13] *People's Daily*, Peking, 25 June, 1960.

illusions about peace and co-existence. On the contrary, one should prepare for such a war in which we would be the stronger, in which the sacrifice would be worth while, and which would end with the victory of socialism throughout the world.' [14]

After criticising the Chinese attitude, Kardelj declared that even wars waged by 'socialist countries' might be reactionary in character, because they could aim at exporting 'backward political forms'. More far-reaching in its implications, perhaps, is his thesis that the victory of socialism would not automatically bring world peace, that war, or wars between socialist countries, are by no means excluded. Kardelj said he found it difficult to understand how a Marxist could possibly be taken in by such a 'big illusion'.[15]

Kardelj's views were of course strongly resented in Moscow: 'His spurious notion that the policy of the socialist countries could be the source of a new world war is an attack on the whole world of socialism, on the whole international communist and national liberation movement. This attack will cause joy only in the camp of the enemies of peace,' declared *Pravda* (2 September 1960). Apart from vigorous denunciations (Kardelj's views were execrable, his 'lies and calumnies' would be universally rejected), Soviet commentators could point only to the subjective goodwill of the socialist countries: they would not export revolution, they would not compel other countries to accept their particular form of development, there would be no 'antagonistic conflicts' between them. Such professions are, however, at best moral maxims; there *should* be peaceful relations between socialist countries (just as Stalin *should* have co-operated with Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov and the rest of the Bolshevik Old Guard). There *should* be equality and no struggle for power (just as there *should* have been no struggle for power between Khrushchev and Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovitch, Bulganin and the rest). It is of course just possible that communist collectives will prove more peaceful than communist individuals, but this is at best a pious wish and not an 'objective social law'. Moral exhortations are no substitute for political realities, but Soviet ideologists consistently try to confuse them, and most vehemently when the divergence between the two is at its widest in Soviet practice.

IT is interesting to recall in this context the basic phases of Soviet propaganda on the Bomb, nuclear testing, and disarmament. The Hiroshima bomb did not produce moral revulsion in the communist press,

[14] *Socijalizam i rat*, Belgrade, 1960. The more important passages were originally published in *Borba*. See the review in *Survey*, October 1960.

[15] The same illusion underlies much of pacifist and unilateralist thinking, particularly in its extremist form. Those who argue that it is 'better to be red than dead', tacitly assume that 'to be red' would mean 'no more war'. If the assumption is wrong, the bottom falls out of the argument.

which snubbed the Pope for his reservations; the London *Daily Worker* positively hailed it.[16]

In the next period, that of American atomic monopoly, communists were busy spreading the Stockholm appeal, protesting against the inhumanity of the atomic bomb and calling for its prohibition. This did not prevent the USSR from claiming its possession, by backdating it from August 1949 when the first Soviet atomic explosion occurred, to November 1947.[17] This simultaneous exploitation of moral feelings abroad and boasting about the increase in Soviet atomic power was repeated in relation to the hydrogen bomb. The Peace Partisans continued their campaign, while the Soviet leaders claimed priority in its development. Speaking in Birmingham during his visit to Great Britain in 1956, Khrushchev said that 'the first hydrogen bomb dropped from an airplane was exploded in the Soviet Union' (*Pravda*, 24 April 1956). And the late Academician Kurchatov, the father of the Soviet bomb, asserted in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in March 1958 that 'hydrogen arms were first built in the USSR and not in the USA' (*Pravda*, 1 April 1958).

But the 'peace appeals' went on, and the Soviet Union then championed the idea of the permanent suspension of nuclear testing: in August 1959 the Soviet Government announced that it had decided 'not to resume nuclear tests, if the Western powers would not resume the tests of atomic and nuclear weapons. Only if they resumed tests would the Soviet Union consider itself free from the obligation it has taken upon itself' (*Pravda*, 29 August 1959). This pledge has been repeated on several occasions. Speaking to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, Khrushchev once again underlined the solemnity of the undertaking:

> Should any state, in present day conditions, resume nuclear weapons tests, it is not difficult to imagine the consequences of this act. Other states possessing the same weapons would be forced to take the same road. An impulse would be given to resume an unlimited race of nuclear-arms testing of any power and in any conditions. The government which was the first to resume nuclear-arms testing would take a great responsibility upon itself before all the nations. In this connection I want to stress that in order to secure the most favourable conditions for speedily reaching agreement about the prohibition of nuclear tests, the Soviet Government will continue to honour its undertaking and will not resume experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union if the Western powers will not recommence the testing of atomic and nuclear weapons (*Pravda*, 15 January 1960).

There were several more similar pronouncements reiterating this official pledge, while the Geneva talks were dragging on. What was behind the Soviet decision to resume the tests?

[16] The day after the drop it stated: 'The appliance of the new weapon on a large scale should hasten the surrender of Japan'; and after Nagasaki: 'The use of the atomic bomb was an act of charity because it shortened the war and saved human lives'.

[17] Cf. Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*, London, 1960, pp. 121–122.

The explanation is straightforward and was provided in its simplest form in the Soviet Government's statement that it felt obliged to do so in the interests of national security. In other words, taking all things into consideration, the Soviet Government felt that it would shift the balance of power in its favour, and indeed its policy of intimidation during the Berlin crisis leaves little doubt about the connection between the two, or about the purposes of Soviet actions, which are surprising only to those who refuse to look at them in historical perspective.

The same applies to the disarmament negotiations in Geneva, which can be regarded as a focal point reflecting both Soviet policy goals and the needs of Soviet propaganda. In his study of Soviet policy towards international control of atomic energy, Professor Joseph L. Nogee concludes that it 'can be summed up as a struggle to resist what the Soviet élite considered to be a threat to its national interest',[18] a conclusion so obvious from the historical evidence that only a mixture of fear, ignorance, and wishful thinking (factors which Soviet policy constantly exploits) can account for the failure to grasp it. Once it is grasped, however, Soviet policy loses its mysterious character. The historical record is clear: from the discreet Soviet indifference about the first bombs to the campaign to ban the bomb, from the Stockholm crusade against the bomb (once it had been acquired) to the mobilisation of public opinion against nuclear tests, from banning tests during the time necessary for their preparation to the massive testing of Soviet nuclear weapons in disregard of neutralist opinion and to the intimidation of the West by nuclear threats. As far as 'gamesmanship' in international negotiations on nuclear disarmament is concerned, Professor Nogee's conclusion is also amply confirmed by the Soviet resumption of testing:

> If the Soviet Union had announced that its primary objectives were not prohibition and international control of atomic energy, but a rejection of control proposals, a discrediting of the United States and a stall for time, the attainment of these unexpressed goals would have been jeopardised (p. 284).

The relative emphasis as between 'peace-loving' and force has shifted and Khrushchev relies less on persuasion and more on demonstrative warnings that Italian orange groves and the Greek Parthenon may be destroyed.

THE belief that the Soviet version of the policy of limited risk will not lead to unlimited disaster may be over-optimistic. Those who try to maintain the offensive in the global struggle by increasing military pressure, may well set the world on a 'collision course' and be unable in the long run to avoid war, despite its recognised consequences. Rational

[18] Joseph L. Nogee, *Soviet Policy toward International Control of Atomic Energy*, 1961, p. 258. The 'national interest' has to be approached in this case with caution. Writing about the French Revolution, Albert Sorel remarked that revolutionaries always tend to identify their ideology with national interest. This applies even more to communists.

action based on rational calculation may escape their grasp when, at a certain stage, the West will be unable to make any further concessions, while the Soviet leaders may deem it impossible to back down from their self-generated commitment to press home some advantage somewhere in the world. Human rationality is a fragile thing and can only too easily escape control. But there is little the West can do about it, short of unconditional surrender, and even that would not remove the threat of nuclear war from humanity. There is no simple or easy answer to the problem 'how to live with the bomb'; the present historical situation was in a way already implied in both the story of Prometheus and the story of Faust, and there is a chance that the instinct for survival will prevail.

The West can limit the risk of war by minimising the risk of misunderstandings. Any vagueness about Western intentions can only have fatal consequences. The clearer Western policy is, the better the prospects for the preservation of peace. Soviet foreign policy does intend to take risks, but it does not want to take foolish or suicidal risks, any more than the West does. But if the Soviet policy-makers are led to believe that Western intentions are uncertain, or that Western policy will not be pursued with the necessary vigour, or that Western public opinion has been 'softened' to such an extent that the Western governments will hesitate to take a resolute stand, it is only to be expected that they will press their apparent advantages to the utmost limit, or even beyond it, and over-commit themselves. Ambiguity and irresolution only increase the prospects of war. Hence the paradox that it is the self-proclaimed 'enemies of the bomb' in the West who, contrary to their worthy intentions, actually enhance the possibility of thermonuclear war.

A realistic appraisal of Soviet foreign policy, and of its motive forces, is more necessary than ever in the nuclear age. Unfortunately, misconceptions still abound and, strange as it may seem in this year of grace, 1961, some observers of the international scene have not yet realised that for the Soviet leaders 'peaceful coexistence' and 'cold war' are but two different sides of the same coin, both reflecting the communist attitude towards the non-communist world. Fallacies about Soviet foreign policy have varied roots and appear in various forms. Some derive from a mistaken identification of the character of the Soviet state with that of the traditional powers, an identification which disregards the fact that the foreign policy goals of the latter were limited, while those of the former, being based on a 'historical mission', are unlimited; others are simply a projection of Western categories of thought based on empirical tradition on to the quite different (chiliastic) tradition which lies behind Soviet foreign policy; this, in particular, is a constant source of misunderstanding. As a result many false notions have found firm root in Western public opinion: that Soviet intentions publicly proclaimed should not be taken seriously; that doctrinal Party documents do not really matter; that what the Soviet bloc really wants is to consolidate the *status quo*; that Soviet foreign policy is determined by fear of Germany, despite

the fact that the Soviet leaders have only too frequently declared that they are not afraid of the American atomic potential, let alone of any second or third rate power, and have warned such powers that they will not survive a nuclear holocaust.

THERE is a curious air of unreality about the discussions on thermonuclear war and the strategic calculations connected with the thermonuclear arms race. It is not just a question of unwillingness to draw conclusions from the new technological situation or to act, either at the popular or governmental level, in accordance with the constantly expressed fears. Neither is it one of the intellectual inability of the majority to digest the military implications of the thermonuclear breakthrough; if anything, they have been only too strongly implanted in the public mind. Nor, finally, is it a question of refusing to take the disarmament talks at their face value, for this can be easily explained by the scepticism created by past experience of disarmament 'talkatons'.

Apart from the element of 'escape from reality', of regarding one version of the future as too horrible to contemplate, there are two sources of the 'surrealist feeling' about the problem. First, there is the fact that the arms-control approach, with all its arguments about first strike and second strike, pre-emption and escalation, missile gaps and deterrent gaps, seems, for all its limited relevance, almost completely devoid of elements of political analysis, too narrow to envisage realistically the probabilities of Soviet action. Soviet foreign policy cannot be separated from ideological considerations, or abstracted into a strategic formula, in which flesh-and-blood Soviet leaders, like Mr. Khrushchev, act as mechanical brains, infallible in their reasoning and utterly lacking any psychological, social, or ideological background.

Secondly, there is the feeling that in the thermonuclear age military strategy begins to look like a game of chess without a chessboard, that its mental constructions and strategic anticipations are made in a world in which Kafka meets Lewis Carroll, in which the employment of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of their use are envisaged at one and the same time, while the 'generations' of such weapons are already 'obsolete' before they reach the production stage.

The risks of destruction are now so great that for the first time in history those who possess the weapons are scared by them to a degree which inhibits them from engaging in a war for which they are theoretically preparing themselves. Whatever the pronouncements on the subject, the fear of thermonuclear war is a most potent subconscious (if not conscious) element in the situation on *both* sides. With all their doctrinal disputes and their cautious handling of the topic before their own public, the Soviet leaders are as affected by this fear as anybody else, and so of course is the Soviet population. Perhaps the best illustration of this was the answer given by Mrs. Khrushchev to the nuclear disarmers visiting Moscow: 'We know that any nuclear war will destroy us all.

Therefore we are not building any shelters from bombs or fall out' (*Daily Telegraph*, 7 October 1961).

This, of course, does not mean that the Soviet leaders can be converted to the idea of unilateral disarmament if they have not been willing to accept multilateral disarmament and used the talks about it to press ahead with their race for nuclear superiority. They remember that the West did not try to force them into submission when it did possess atomic monopoly; but what if the situation were reversed? Khrushchev's atomic threats, which cannot be implemented so long as the other side can retaliate, would acquire an entirely new political significance if they could. The present situation offers perhaps a foretaste of how the general fear of thermonuclear war can be exploited, how psychological warfare can be waged and concessions won as the price for abandoning more extreme demands. This form of psychological warfare cannot be stopped by unilateral concessions or by the renunciation of weapons which keep the threats in check. Khrushchev has talked about 'hostages' in Western Europe, and it is peoples and not just their 'ruling circles' which are now blamed for failing 'to fall into line with the exigences of the moment. . . . One is forced to this conclusion by the fact that at the elections they vote for the candidates who form governments which pursue a policy of piling up armaments'.[19]

The dilemma is inescapable. For the Soviet Union disarmament control would signify a step towards the acceptance of the international order and thus undermine the universalist character of the communist 'historical mission'. Historically, the clash is between Western political survival and the political survival of the communist ideological premises. The surrender of the West would not banish the spectre of thermonuclear war, as the followers of the 'better red than dead' school of thought fondly imagine; only some form of international arms control, transcending local sovereignties and institutionalised on a global basis, can do that. If the West goes under, it will simply leave the field free for the sovereign communist super-powers to settle between themselves their 'non-antagonistic' (but not non-nuclear) contradictions on a vastly improved, thermonuclear *place d'armes*.

For the West, concentration on the purely military side of the balance of power may also, strange as it may seem, have been a form of escape from reality. Whatever their basic differences, unilateralists and military 'technocrats' in the West have one thing in common: the *political* dimension is conspicuously absent from their thinking. In the nuclear age preoccupation with military strategy may reflect, as much as inadequate military preparation does, lack of political will and deficient clarity of purpose. Political analysts, from Joseph De Maistre to Mao Tse-tung, have realised that victory or surrender is a political and not a military question, and this is even more true of survival in the nuclear age.

[19] *Pravda*, 31 August 1961. This reproof about 'piling up armaments' was made in the official announcement about the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests.

Marxist tradition may have tended to inhibit the Soviet leaders from facing squarely the realities of the nuclear age, but they had the advantage of not neglecting the political aspect of the struggle.

Whatever the actual military relation of forces may be, the Soviet policy-makers incessantly proclaim that a 'new stage' has been reached in which the 'balance of forces' has changed in favour of the 'world socialist system'. This, of course, is as much a description as prescription, intended to promote it still further. As historical determinists, communists may be reluctant to push the button, but they have never been inhibited from giving history a little push along the lines it is supposed to go anyway. And what better proof than a 50 megaton bomb that they are on the side of history and that therefore everyone should jump on its band-waggon before it is too late?

In this they may be wrong. The paradox of unintended consequences is still the most conspicuous aspect of politics; the historical outcome is always in the nature of the case unpredictable, but it remains nevertheless, now as always, a question of political will, even in our age of rapid change in military technology. The assertion of this political will is not just a question of the elite knowing what it wants, and certainly not of the 'push-button experts' bringing on Armageddon or forestalling the Apocalypse. It is a question of the attitude of the mass of the population.

REPORTING THE EICHMANN CASE

William Korey

THE Polish communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, attempted last January to define to his colleagues in the central committee the area of independent decision-making enjoyed by each communist country. That this area can be sharply circumscribed was made plain. Actions by individual communist countries were to be taken—Gomulka stated—'within the framework of the international policy of the socialist camp' and 'should be subordinated to the general direction of action jointly agreed upon'. But within these limitations, each 'socialist country can and should undertake various steps . . . connected with its specific interests and its geographical and political situation'.

A recent illustration of how these varying interests and situations do play functional roles is to be found in the manner in which the press and radio of the Soviet bloc states handled the same major international event —the Eichmann trial. Since the apprehension of Adolph Eichmann in Argentina in May 1960, his case has been a focus of world attention. At one stage, it was the subject of an intense debate by the UN Security Council. The preliminaries of the trial and the trial proceedings received an extraordinary amount of coverage in the Western world and elsewhere. Eichmann's captors and prosecutors were acutely conscious of the significance of the case and handled it accordingly. The trial was to be no mere judicial process. The intention was to demonstrate the evils of genocide by depicting the tragic martyrdom of Jews and to show that anti-Semitism can lead 'in our day to the gas chamber and the soap factory'. Not only were the proceedings televised; some 500 correspondents from all over the world were provided with every means to send their stories on the trial to their home readers.

Some intrinsic features of the Eichmann case were certain to arouse interest in the Soviet bloc countries. Firstly, the crimes with which Eichmann was charged had been committed principally in these countries —the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania. Secondly—and more pertinently—the case offered grist to the communist mill of embarrassing the present West German regime by recalling the horrors committed by Germans under the previous regime. This theme was indeed emphasised by the Soviet bloc countries. In their press coverage they attempted to link Eichmann, directly or indirectly, with the Adenauer government. Yet the striking feature of the mass media treatment in the communist countries was not this common line, but rather the sharp differences in the respective handling of the case. The extent and character of the coverage varied significantly from country to country in the Soviet orbit.

The Soviet Union

THE TREATMENT of the Eichmann case in the Soviet press prior to the opening of the trial on 11 April was relatively scanty; it emphasised an alleged relationship between Eichmann's crimes and the present-day rulers of West Germany; and on the whole minimised Eichmann's crimes against Jews as compared with his crimes against people generally. While these features persisted after the trial began, a new one was added which carried sinister overtones: a charge that Israel had made a 'deal' with Bonn to suppress embarrassing revelations.

On 25 May 1960—the day after the announcement of the capture of Eichmann—the Soviet journal *Sovetskaia Rossiia* carried a brief news item of the event. Then for an entire week, while the Eichmann case was the principal topic of discussion in the international press, Soviet newspapers maintained a black-out of news on the matter.

The silence was finally broken on 1 June by *Pravda* in a short news-dispatch from Athens quoting sources in Bonn to the effect that the West German government was concerned lest Israel's determination to try Eichmann would increase anti-German feelings, and that Chancellor Adenauer had written to Premier David Ben Gurion requesting him not to give wide publicity to the case. The *Pravda* article established the official Soviet line on the Eichmann case.

Six days later, the Moscow evening newspaper, *Vechernaya Moskva*, published the first substantial Soviet account on Eichmann. A lengthy description of Eichmann as 'one of the most bloodthirsty hangmen of Fascist Germany' was accompanied by an accusation that Adenauer was sympathetic to Nazism and permitted 'yesterday's assistants of Hitler, Himmler and Kaltenbrunner' to occupy leading posts in the government, army, and judiciary of West Germany.

On 14 June a long article in *Literaturnaia Gazeta* used the Eichmann case to attack West Germany as a place where 'quite a number of war criminals are hiding' and where 'the ruling circles of the western powers' were 'encouraging' fascist political activity. The article asserted that West Germany was fearful of the revelations that might flow from the Eichmann trial and that Adenauer had sought to obtain Eichmann's extradition both by appealing to Ben Gurion and by seeking intervention from Washington.

In none of the above accounts was there more than passing reference to Eichmann's crimes specifically against Jews. In the lengthy *Vechernaya Moskva* article, for example, no mention was made of Jews. Instead it spoke of 'six million shot, burned in gas chambers'. It did give Eichmann's official title as 'head of the bureau for the solution of the Jewish question'.

A brief spurt of press attention to the Eichmann case came in the latter part of June 1960, during the course of the United Nations Security Council discussions of the Argentine complaint against Israel. *Pravda* on 24 June and *Trud* on 25 June gave prominence to the speeches

of both the Soviet delegate to the Security Council and Golda Meir, Israel's foreign minister. The press made it clear that the Soviet Union was in favour of Israel's right to try Eichmann and criticised Argentina for failing to arrest and extradite war criminals.

In August 1960, one Soviet organ appeared to depart to some extent from the previous line insofar as references to Jews were concerned. *New Times*, a semi-official foreign affairs publication, carried a lengthy story on Eichmann describing in some detail his 'butchery' of Jews. While genocide of Jews was the major object of description and criticism, and Israel's capture of Eichmann was sympathetically portrayed, the article also took the occasion to attack West Germany. It expressed the view that the trial 'could bring disclosures that would compromise many big-wigs in Bonn' and, for that reason, West Germany's politicians were 'very much perturbed by it'.

New Times is, however, not a mass circulation journal within the USSR, and its article did not signal a new approach to the case. Earlier issues of *New Times* had suggested that Israeli authorities, under pressure from West Germany and the United States, were attempting 'to go easy' and 'to play down' the trial. West Germany, it was argued, was fearful of incriminating evidence against some of its leading politicians; and the United States was fearful of the same thing, as well as concerned that revelations about Eichmann's passport would hurt the Vatican. After the summer of 1960, references to the Eichmann case did not appear in the Soviet press.

Two weeks prior to the opening of the trial, *Pravda* reported upon the publication in Russia of a new seven-volume edition of the Nuremberg Trials which the reviewer described as revealing the 'ghastly, unheard-of, thoroughly planned and meticulously executed felonies aimed at the enslavement and extermination of peoples'. Those who may have regarded the publication of the massive work on Nuremberg as portending full press treatment of the Eichmann case were to be sadly disappointed. The political line of the Soviet government to play down Jewish martyrdom and to play up current West German-Fascism was transparent and over-riding. In keeping with this objective, *Pravda* on 8 April—three days before the opening of the trial—used the Eichmann case as a peg for a wide-ranging attack upon West Germany's leaders and particularly the newly-appointed Inspector-General of the Army, Friedrich Foertsch, whom *Pravda* called a 'war criminal'. Some Bonn leaders were said to be 'feeling a chill' because 'maybe Eichmann will say too much'. It went on:

> After all, there is abundant evidence indicating a direct connection between Eichmann's past actions and the occupations of Hans Globke, the Federal Chancellor's present State Secretary. . . . Eichmann probably could tell something as well about other Nazis for whom Bonn has found comfortable jobs.

In the course of this lengthy article, the word 'Jew' did not once appear. Eichmann is identified as the 'killer of millions' or as one 'who

exterminated millions of men, women, and children in the furnaces of . . . Hitlerite death camps'.

The opening of the trial in Jerusalem on 11 April was marked in the Soviet press by a black-out of news. Neither *Pravda* nor *Izvestiia* on that day carried any reference to the occasion. But if the press was silent, Radio Moscow opened a new line, the basic elements of which had been only hinted at earlier. This suggested that a conspiracy existed to prevent disclosure of the true facts about nazism in West Germany. In a broadcast on 11 April, Radio Moscow noted the presence at the trial of a large West German press and observer delegation. It also noted that Eichmann's defence attorney was Robert Servatius, whose 'political complexion' was shown by his zealous defence at Nuremburg of Fritz Sauckel, 'The chief of Nazi concentration camps'. The broadcast stated that Servatius and the Bonn delegation were in Jerusalem 'to fulfil the assignment of the West German government; to prevent the Eichmann trial from turning into a trial of Nazism and to prevent the publication of testimony on the past of a number of Nazi criminals, such as Globke, who now hold high government posts in the Bonn Republic'. A radio commentator darkly hinted that there existed some kind of 'secret understanding' between Bonn and Tel-Aviv, the precise nature of which was not disclosed.

During the next two and one-half weeks, *Pravda* carried no reference to the trial, while *Izvestiia* had one short item quoting an Italian newspaper reference to a 'deal' between Bonn and Israel. No doubt the Soviet leaders were waiting to see whether the prosecution would provide the hoped-for disclosures of connections between Eichmann and Bonn leaders. When none appeared, the press was prepared to reveal the details of the 'secret understanding'. On 28 April *Pravda* asserted that 'the Israeli government, to satisfy West Germany's ruling circles, has made a deal with the revanchist circles of the FGR and is trying to protect other Hitlerite criminals from exposure'. *Pravda* contended that as far back as July 1960, Ben Gurion, after meeting with a representative of the Bonn government in Brussels, 'issued a directive to abridge the publication of the investigation materials in the Eichmann case and to acquaint the FGR government in advance with these materials'. *Pravda* criticised Israel for making possible the appointment as defence attorney of Servatius, who is 'virtually an official representative of numerous fascists' living in West Germany. According to *Pravda*, Servatius was being used by 'the ruling circles of Bonn . . . to exert pressure simultaneously on Eichmann himself and on the court agencies of Israel . . . to conceal instances of criminal activity by former nazis'. It reproved the Israel prosecution for the 'noticeable silence . . . about the past and present' of Eichmann's 'partners in crime'—Oberländer, Schroeder (Minister of the Interior in the Bonn government), Foertsch, General Hans Speidel, and Defence Minister Strauss.

But if *Pravda* expressed 'concern' about the 'marked tendency on the part of Israel's ruling circles' to avoid a 'genuine exposure of the

bloody crimes of the Hitlerite butchers', it hoped that the 'masses' within and without Israel would compel the prosecution to make 'a proper exposure of all those nazi war criminals' so that the trial should not become 'a simple farce in the interest of the dark forces of revanchism'.

Following the *Pravda* blast, the major Soviet mass media organs retreated to the blackout technique. Except for one brief item in *Izvestiia* in early May, the Eichmann trial did not command further attention until 15 May, when Moscow Radio, noting that Globke's name had been mentioned in the trial (on 12 May) as one who had been present at an inter-ministerial meeting in 1941 that decided upon the revocation of the citizenship of German Jews, contended that his name was disclosed only because of 'public pressure'. The radio commentator continued to insist that deals were being made 'between certain representatives of Bonn and Tel-Aviv . . . striving to prevent the Jerusalem trial from becoming a forum for the exposure of former nazis now in power'. He demanded that the names of other Eichmann associates—who have 'found refuge and protection' in Western Germany—should be disclosed.

Three days later, *Izvestiia* summed up the Soviet attitude with a front-page cartoon that depicted Israeli justice in the form of a judge shielding with his long black robe Globke and other unnamed nazi generals and politicians. The caption read: 'Hitlerites under protection in Jerusalem and Bonn'.

After another month of silence, *Pravda* returned to the attack on 23 June. Israel leaders were charged with 'complicity with the Bonn revanchists' by suppressing revelations about 'Eichmann's accomplices who hold high posts in the state apparatus of West Germany'. *Pravda* declared that it was receiving many letters from citizens who 'furiously condemn the governmental and political figures of the west who covertly or overtly have entered into criminal collusion with the successors of the Hitlerite butchers and have extended protection to the nazi criminal Eichmann and his West German accomplices'.

Eichmann's testimony in the late stages of the trial pointing to Globke as responsible for an increase in the authority and activity of his Gestapo bureau evidently pleased the Soviet authorities. On 28 June, *Izvestiia* noted that the 'trial is revealing more and more about the criminal character of many high Bonn officials'. It cited approvingly a Budapest dispatch that 'during the Eichmann trial . . . the criminal face of the Bonn minister Globke has become more and more exposed'. But the satisfaction of the Kremlin officials was not great enough to make them give the Eichmann trial more detailed attention. After 28 June and until the trial ended on 14 August, neither *Pravda* nor *Izvestiia* (nor Moscow Radio) carried a single reference to it. If Israelis could derive some comfort from the fact that they were no longer criticised for the conduct of the trial, they must have been aware that they had not been particularly successful in impressing upon the Soviet public their reasons for bringing Eichmann into court. The extent and character of Jewish martyrdom

were neither defined nor described in the Soviet press; anti-Semitism as the source of genocide was not mentioned. A *New Times* article on 29 July emphasised that the accusers of Eichmann were not the Jews, but rather mankind. And, it argued, Eichmann was guilty not merely of the mass murder of Jews; he (and fascism) were guilty of threatening 'all mankind'. The 'historic justice' of the trial—as the Israelis had envisaged it—was to a great extent lost upon the Russians.

Poland

PRESS TREATMENT of the Eichmann case in Poland provided a striking contrast to that in the USSR. The trial and its preliminaries were extensively reported. Eichmann's organisation of the deportation and extermination of Jews was described in considerable detail, though attention was also paid to the mass annihilation of non-Jewish Poles. While criticism of the current West German government and its alleged links to Eichmann was carried in the press stories, Jewish martyrdom was the dominant theme.

Immediately after Eichmann's capture, scores of articles depicting Eichmann as the murderer of millions of Jews appeared in the Polish press. *Trybuna Ludu,* the leading party newspaper, called his capture 'historic justice'. *Kurier Polski* carried lengthy articles justifying, from a legal point of view, Israel's right to prosecute Eichmann. The Catholic bi-weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* made this characteristic comment:

> The young State of Israel has every right to appear in the name of the whole Jewish people throughout the world. It is right and proper that Eichmann, who was responsible for the greatest crime in history, the crime against the Jewish people, should stand trial before a court of law in Israel.

In December 1960 and January 1961, *Trybuna Ludu* carried five lengthy stories, based upon original historical documentation, of Eichmann's crimes against Jews and Poles. Written by Zofia Krzyzanowska, they blinked no facts in placing the full horrors of the 'final solution' before the Polish people. A key section read:

> Polish territories have a special place in the history of the extermination of Jews. The very first acts of extermination were committed on Polish Jews. In the first phase of the criminal plan the persecutions were directed against both the non-Jewish and Jewish population of Poland.

Aside from a passing reference in the articles to Globke as one who 'provided the necessary legal grounds' for Hitler's extermination programme the overt political anti-Bonn elements were not placed in the foreground.

This approach was modified two weeks before the opening of the trial. Two official Polish communist organs laid greater stress on German fascism and revanchism, and criticised Israel for its handling of the trial.

The change brought the Polish attitude somewhat closer to the Soviet attitude, although significant differences still remained.

Polityka, the party weekly, on 1 April carried a long article entitled 'Trial or Alibi', which contended that the Eichmann trial had to be dealt with in its broader aspects: 'It must be treated, above all, within social and political categories'. The crimes of Eichmann, like those of other war criminals, could not be handled by the usual 'courtroom' method because 'no contemporary society has a law providing adequate sanctions against crimes of such magnitude'. The article then pointed to the Nuremberg trials as an illustration of how the crimes of an Eichmann should be handled. At Nuremberg, *Polityka* stated, not only were individual criminals tried, but a whole system—the Nazi Party, Hitlerite organisations, German militarism, the fascist ideology, German revanchism, all were put on trial and then 'condemned and sentenced'. What the Poles wanted to see in the dock was then suggested:

> . . . The German Federal Republic where thousands of former Hitlerites today hold responsible positions in the state apparatus and Hitler's former Generals command the Bundeswehr. Such things as glorification of the SS, conventions of war veterans, anti-semitic incidents, and armaments indicate that the ruling circles of the German Federal Republic adopt the policy of militarism and revenge.

After criticising Israel for supporting 'the political line of the Bonn government' and for 'its great sympathy for the German Federal Republic', *Polityka* went on to attack the 'sensationalist' manner in which Israel and the Western press were treating the Eichmann case, with 'thriller' stories about the way Eichmann was captured, the bullet-proof cubicle in the court for Eichmann, the underground corridor through which Eichmann was to be led from prison to the courtroom. *Polityka* wondered 'whether the embellishments of such publicity are not intended to black out the fundamental social and political meaning of the Eichmann case' and whether Eichmann as a person was not 'being used as a cover for all those collaborators and accomplices of his who should be appearing with him in the dock'. The article concluded with the strongly expressed view that the trial should 'not become an alibi for Adenauer, Globke and company'.

On 2 April, the bi-weekly organ of the Polish Lawyers' Association, *Prawo I Zycie*, published an article accusing Israel of being a party to a secret agreement with Bonn to divert the Eichmann trial from its initial purpose and course. It noted that 'war criminals' occupied 'high posts' in the Bonn government and that 'if the trial of the arch-criminal Eichmann were properly conducted, it would lead to the incrimination of all who now represent the more or less open continuation of that kind of fascism and militarism which gave birth to such monsters as Eichmann'.

The article went on to contend that Bonn was putting intense pressure on Israel to prevent those 'former followers of Hitler who now

occupy high posts' from being 'compromised', and that the pressure had been effective: 'The Israeli authorities are preparing the case in accordance with suggestions from Bonn'. It had been decided 'to expose several second-rank war criminals and to leave in peace the criminals of higher rank who occupy official posts in the German Federal Republic'.

The new approach did not alter the earlier decision to give the trial extensive coverage and to emphasise Jewish martyrdom. Once the trial began the Polish press, unlike the Soviet press, carried *almost daily* and frequently lengthy accounts of the proceedings. These were in the main *factual* summaries of the arguments and testimony. But at times they were accompanied by an editorial commentary which incorporated part of the new emphasis developed by the party organs in early April. For example, the opening day of the trial was given a full half-page in *Trybuna Ludu* with this editorial comment:

> Eichmann's defender Servatius here assumes the added role of defender of the German Federal Republic. The intention is clear; at whatever cost Eichmann's trial must not become a trial of Hitlerism (which Eichmann's defence tries to present as 'something which exists no longer and has disappeared from the arena of history'); and the names of such Hitlerite criminals as Globke, who occupy high positions in the Bonn Government, must not be mentioned in the courtroom.

But specific criticism of Israel's handling of the trial was not immediately apparent in the press. Indeed, on 14 April, the Polish correspondent in Jerusalem reported that

> In spite of various machinations of Bonn people, the Eichmann proceedings may reveal the names of criminals who still have not been punished and who should at last be reached by the hand of justice.

Only on 29 April did open criticism appear. *Trybuna Ludu*, in addition to its regular factual summary, carried a brief item quoting the East German observer at the trial, Dr Friedrich Kaul, who criticised the 'peculiar restrictions' in the case which prevented the name of Globke from being mentioned. It also carried a short summary of the *Pravda* article of 28 April on the alleged Bonn-Ben Gurion 'deal'. Later articles also contended that Israel was preventing the exposure of West German officials who had presumably collaborated with Eichmann. An editorial in the weekly *Zycie Warszawy* of 3 June, for example, argued that the system that gave birth to Eichmann also spawned others who 'hold responsible posts [in West Germany] and enjoy Adenauer's personal care', and charged Israel with efforts 'to spare these persons'. The same editorial, however, continued to underscore Jewish martyrdom: 'The nazi executioner's hand . . . fell particularly heavily upon the Jewish nation'. Until the trial ended, the emphasis upon both Jewish martyrdom and the evils of anti-Semitism was maintained, but at the same time the Polish press put equally strong emphasis on the complicity of the Bonn government in sheltering the nazi criminals. In fact, the weekly *Polityka*

claimed that it influenced the course of the trial by publishing several excerpts from the tape-recorded conversations between Eichmann, Dr Langer, and A. Sassen, which took place in Eichmann's Buenos Aires home (some of them appeared in the magazine *Life*, but only part was admitted as evidence by the Jerusalem court). In its issue of 24 June *Polityka* wrote:

> It is a fact that the Attorney-General presented 'Eichmann's confessions' as evidence only after they were published in *Polityka*. Would it have happened without our prompting?

Parts of the *Polityka* series on Eichmann and its list of the missing nazi criminals were reproduced by the Soviet *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (without mentioning the source, though this did not prevent *Polityka* from later claiming credit for it).

Hungary

HUNGARIAN PRESS and radio treatment of the Eichmann case was as impressive as the Polish, with frequent and lengthy stories of the Jewish martyrdom. As early as 3 and 5 June 1960, the communist newspaper *Nepszabadsag* carried long lead stories on Eichmann's activities in Budapest, and the trade union journal, *Nepszava*, put out a series of articles on his role in exterminating Jews.

Beginning on 11 January 1961, and for a number of months thereafter, the Hungarian illustrated popular weekly magazine, *Orszag-Villag*, ran a series of articles on Eichmann. Each occupied an entire page and made numerous references to Eichmann's extermination of Jews. A similar series was carried over Radio Kossuth in Budapest. Beginning on 29 March, the station broadcast a daily programme entitled 'His Name is Adolph Eichmann'.

On 25 March, the Hungarian historian, George Ranski, presented to a press conference a detailed, comprehensive account of Eichmann's activities, illustrating his lecture with photographs of original documents. He asserted that Eichmann was responsible for the deportation of 550,000 Hungarian Jews, of whom 400,000 died in concentration camps. *Nepszabadsag* reported the lecture fully the following day.

The Hungarian press also used the trial to present West Germany as a haven for Eichmann's accomplices. It played up the fear in West German circles that the Eichmann case would put West Germany in an unfavourable light, though more attention was given to Austria, Hungary's historic enemy, as a refuge for war criminals. For example, the Budapest daily *Magyar Nemzet* on 21 February published an article on Georg Wilhelm Hoettl, whose extradition from Austria had been asked for by Hungary. Hoettl, the article observed, had been an accomplice of Eichmann in the deportation of Hungarian Jews and was nonetheless shielded by Austria.

From the beginning of the trial, *Nepszabadsag*, like the Polish press, carried daily factual accounts of the proceedings; but its reporting was

more objective and there was less editorialising. Reference to the alleged Bonn-Israeli deal to hush up supposed connections between Eichmann and some Bonn leaders was rare. Indeed, the Hungarian mass media insisted that the proceedings were embarrassing West Germany for, as one Budapest broadcast put it, the trial ' was at the same time a trial of the Bonn government '.

Czechoslovakia

CZECHOSLOVAK press coverage of the Eichmann case, while extensive and revealing (in the sense of providing additional documentation of Eichmann's crimes against both Jews and Czechs) concentrated on the alleged connections between Eichmann and high West German officials. Also singled out for charges by the press were alleged connections between the Vatican and war criminals.

On 28 May 1960, the Czechoslovak communist organ, *Rude Pravo,* reporting on Eichmann's arrest, asserted that the Federal German authorities had tried to suppress evidence of Eichmann's crimes as well as the crimes of other former nazi leaders now said to be occupying high positions in the Bonn government. Three days later, it accused Eichmann of murdering five million German, Austrian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian Jews, and added that many leading Bonn officials would probably be implicated in the trial.

On 3 June 1960, *Rude Pravo,* noting that Eichmann had obtained a Vatican passport before fleeing to Argentina, contended that the Catholic hierarchy had been influenced by ' Adenauer's and Franco's regimes ' and had feared that Eichmann's revelations might ' disclose the World War II collaboration between the Catholic clergy and anti-Jewish nazi and fascist authorities '.

In November, the same paper described an exhibition of documents on Eichmann's crimes in Czechoslovakia designed to show that he was personally responsible for the extermination of 360,000 Czechoslovak citizens, including 200,000 Jews. The issue for 1 February 1961 published documents on the deportation by Eichmann of children from Lidice to Poland, and on 20 February it described, with photographs, the details of Eichmann's crimes against Jewish inmates of concentration camps. This article also took the occasion to note that ' there are many Eichmanns, Globkes, and Oberländers in West Germany today ' who deserve punishment.

One week before the trial opened, *Rude Pravo* adopted the line towards Israel that the Polish party papers had taken a little earlier. On 4 April it criticised Ben Gurion's statement that Eichmann's trial would not impair Israeli-West German relations, and concluded from it that ' efforts aimed at preventing the unmasking of former nazi criminals who occupy responsible posts in Adenauer's government are now becoming more transparent '. It insisted that ' Bonn's state apparatus is over-saturated with nazis of Globke's kind '. On the day the trial opened,

Rude Pravo returned to a violent attack on West Germany, and hinted at an Israel-Bonn deal: 'But some facts indicate that another course has been set for the trial'. By 14 June, the paper was satisfied that efforts to suppress revelations embarrassing to Bonn had failed. On that day it carried a long item stating that 'Israeli and world public opinion' had brought sufficient 'pressure' upon the courtroom to bring about disclosures revealing West Germany as a 'paradise' for 'war criminals'. On 23 June, it took particular note of Eichmann's testimony about Globke and concluded that the latter stood revealed as the 'master mind' of the anti-Jewish crimes.

In general, the amount of coverage of the Eichmann trial in *Rude Pravo* was much less than that given by the Polish and Hungarian party organs. Moreover, the Czech organ was far less factual, with editorial castigation of West Germany almost entirely replacing straight reporting.

Bulgaria and Rumania

THE NEWS MEDIA of Bulgaria maintained almost complete silence on the Eichmann case. Prior to the trial, two very brief references to Eichmann appeared in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, the chief communist paper. On 3 February a short dispatch from London reported that Eichmann would be tried in Israel for the mass killings of Jews in twenty-one European countries. The issue for 11 March reported on the uneasiness felt by Adenauer concerning the possible repercussions of Eichmann's trial upon the attitude of world opinion towards Bonn.

The reporting of the trial itself by the Bulgarian communist press was inconsistent. On 12 April *Rabotnichesko Delo* carried a short factual report on the opening. A second report on 24 April, mainly factual, concluded with a complaint against the Israel press (not, significantly, the Israeli government), which was accused of abstaining 'from the slightest reference to a subject undoubtedly related to the trial, namely to the bonds connecting Adenauer's policy with that of his predecessor Hitler'. Three days later, it carried an editorial attack on West Germany for harbouring former nazi criminals in high positions. Similar attacks appeared on the few occasions when *Rabotnichesko Delo* thought it appropriate to give some space to the trial.

Like Bulgaria, Rumania gave the Eichmann case little attention, but that little was much more anti-German and anti-Israel. Before the trial, the Rumanian News Service mentioned the Eichmann case once only, and this took the form of a violent attack upon the Israel government. On 22 March Radio Bucharest broadcast a news item from Tel-Aviv citing an Israeli newspaper as saying that 'the Israeli government has advised Chancellor Adenauer that it wants to prevent the trial of the war criminal Eichmann from adversely influencing relations between Israel and the German Federal Republic'. The broadcaster commented: 'Covering up Hitlerite murderers who exterminated millions of Jews—that is what preoccupies the mind of influential circles in Israel and of the German Federal Republic'.

For the first few days of the trial, no stories on the proceedings appeared in the main Rumanian communist organ *Scinteia*. However, Radio Bucharest on 11 April put out a short broadcast attacking West Germany and asserting that Globke had made available a ' special fund ' to pay for the services of Servatius. On the 13th it returned to the attack on West Germany, this time alleging that Servatius, ' acting under the influence of West German leading circles, has tried to persuade Eichmann not to reveal his accomplices '. Lesser newspapers in the capital—*Munca*, the organ of the trade unions, and *Rominia Libera*, the organ of the people's councils—carried similar comments.

Scinteia, on 15 April, carried a short factual account of the trial and a week later published a strongly opinionated report emphasising that Globke and ' many other war criminals who occupy high posts in West Germany ' should be tried along with Eichmann. Similar reports appeared sporadically during the course of the trial proceedings.

* * *

THE TREATMENT of the Eichmann case by the mass media in the Soviet Union and the other East European countries shows a fairly wide though perhaps not surprising variety of approach. Some communist countries commented on the trial at great length, others only cursorily. Poland, and to a lesser degree Hungary and East Germany, used the trial mainly as part of their propaganda campaign against the Federal German Republic; the Soviet Union coupled anti-German propaganda with its campaign against Israel and international Jewish institutions. There was a marked difference in the treatment of the trial even by two neighbouring countries such as Rumania and Bulgaria. These differences arise from a variety of factors: the specific geopolitical position of each country, the existence or absence of a sizeable Jewish minority, the degree of involvement in Central European and Middle Eastern politics, and, of course, the internal situation. A more detailed analysis of these factors would unfortunately transcend the scope of the present paper.

FROM 'FALANGA' TO 'PAX'

*Adam Bromke**

THE 'progressive Catholic' movement in Poland is a phenomenon *sui generis*, which finds no counterpart either in the West or, indeed, in any other communist country. The 'progressivists' strongly deny being a religious sect, although some of their views border on a schism and at least on one occasion they have been condemned by the Holy Office. They are not formally a political party, although they possess a political programme and organisation which has been represented both at the national and local government levels. Nor are they merely an economic enterprise, although they run the only large-scale private concern from the Pacific Ocean to the Elbe. The 'progressive Catholics' —or 'Pax' as their organisation is labelled after the name of a publishing house which they own—are engaged in all these activities at the same time, and, as such, they are sometimes described as 'a state within the state'.

There exists still another aspect which makes them a unique group. 'Pax' is the only political organisation in Poland which preserved the inner core of its leadership from the pre-war days.[1] Almost all of its leaders come from the 'national radical' organisation known as the 'Falanga' which originated in the middle thirties as a splinter group from the National Democratic Party. 'Falanga', led by young and ambitious Boleslaw Piasecki, was a quasi-fascist organisation. It was influenced if not by German nazism, certainly by Italian fascism. Its programme was anti-liberal, anti-communist, and strongly anti-semitic; it was radical, totalitarian, and extremely nationalistic. The group had a limited following in Poland, but for a while it won favours from the government which used it as an instrument to split the ranks of the opposition.

During World War II the group preserved its inner unity by establishing a small underground organisation of its own. It formed armed units which were engaged in fighting the Germans and the communist partisans alike.[2] In 1944, when the Soviet army moved into Poland, the units dispersed, while Piasecki fell into Soviet hands. In view of his past record, his fate seemed to be sealed. But not only was his life spared; soon he re-emerged on the political scene in Poland, this time as a leader of the 'progressive Catholic' movement.

* The author is indebted to the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for sponsoring his research on current political developments in Poland, in the course of which this article has been completed.

1 The leaders of the Polish Communist Party had been liquidated in the Soviet Union in the late thirties and replaced with lesser personalities in World War II.

2 It has been said that Piasecki collaborated with the Nazis. See: F. A. 'La Chiesa in Polonia. Apparenze e realtà', *L'Osservatore Romano*, 11–12 July 1960. This seems unlikely. Piasecki's passion for grandiose political schemes virtually excluded a possibility of his being an *agent provocateur* of the Gestapo, and no other form of collaboration with the Germans existed in occupied Poland.

The reasons for the miraculous survival of Piasecki in 1945 are veiled in mystery. The prevailing version is that Piasecki impressed his captors so much that they found it expedient to enter into negotiations with him, and in the result he became an agent of the NKVD in Poland. But to the well-known Polish Catholic writer Stefan Kisielewski, who, incidentally, is a staunch opponent of the 'progressivists', this is an over-simplification, for his conceptions, 'although mistaken and dangerous', present a genuine 'ramification of Polish political thought'.[3] In any case it is safe to assume—as one of the best informed Western observers does—that 'the agreement reached was not of the type concluded between a lower police official and a paid agent'.[4] Political motives were clearly involved on both sides.

What was it that made Piasecki in 1945, against the then overwhelming trend of popular sentiment in Poland, side with the Russians? Apparently he had at the time come to the conclusion that Soviet power was in the ascendancy. 'We are against America' proclaimed one of Piasecki's chief lieutenants, 'because we think that she is going to be defeated in the forthcoming struggle. We are for Russia because we believe that she is going to win. As Polish nationalists we choose our place in the camp which, in our opinion, must ultimately be victorious.'[5] This stand did not represent such a complete about-face as might at first glance appear. It must be remembered that Piasecki's group originated as a secession from the National Democratic Party which had had a long tradition of co-operation with Russia in foreign policy. Although in 1945, on national as well as ideological grounds, the National Democrats found themselves in the forefront of the anti-communist opposition, Piasecki could claim with some semblance of credibility that he was merely following in the footsteps of the Party founders. The adherence to Piasecki's group of some pre-war conservatives linked the 'progressivists' to still another strand in the Polish political tradition, that of Margrave Wielopolski, who in the middle of the nineteenth century had tried unsuccessfully to win autonomy for Poland within the Russian Empire.[6]

WHAT made the communists, in spite of Piasecki's record, accept his offer of co-operation? In 1945, the Polish communists were much too weak to rule the country by themselves. To consolidate their position they eagerly sought any allies who could be effective in subverting the opposition, but who were not able to build a strong popular following of their own. Piasecki's group fell right into this category. It could

[3] Stefan Kisielewski. A letter to the editor of *Kultura*, No. 11/133, November 1958.
[4] Vincent C. Chrypinski, *The Movement of 'Progressive Catholics' in Poland*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958, p. 13.
[5] Quoted by L. Tyrmand, 'Sprawa Piaseckiego', *Swiat*, 18 November 1956. There exists evidence that Piasecki formed these views early in his career. According to well-informed sources he turned down an opportunity to flee to the West in 1946 precisely for these reasons.
[6] Wielopolski's programme still receives considerable attention in 'Pax' circles. In 1957, his policies were analysed in several issues of *Kierunki*.

appeal to some segments of nationalistically-minded youth as well as to certain conservative elements in the country. At the same time, because of their background and the mysterious circumstances in which they had come into being, the 'progressivists' could never gain broad popular support, and thus could not pose a threat to the Communist Party. Possibly the original communist plans with regard to Piasecki did not go beyond these short-term objectives. Once his loyalty was tested, however, he was given new tasks. The communists certainly had no reason to be dissatisfied with Piasecki. If he were not their agent, he did his best to act like one.

The progressivists' big chance to prove their usefulness to the Communist Party actually came only in the very late forties. As the situation of the Church in Poland gradually deteriorated, the position of 'Pax' steadily improved. In the State-Church dispute it sided firmly with the former. At every stage of the prolonged struggle, concerning the restriction of the Episcopate's charitable activities, the confiscation of the Church's property, the prohibition of religious instruction in the schools, or the campaign of intimidation against the clergy, the 'progressive Catholics' supported the government and denounced the hierarchy. Their tactics, however, were not designed to cut themselves off from the Catholic community. On the contrary, on every occasion they loudly affirmed their allegiance to the Church, stressing that they merely opposed the 'political' stand of its leaders. By 1953, when the persecution of the Church reached its climax, 'Pax', in contrast, enjoyed the most prosperous period of its existence.

Side by side with their assault upon the organisation of the Church, the 'progressivists' began intrusion into the body of Catholic doctrine. Piasecki in his book, *The Essential Problems*,[7] and his followers in the articles published in the weekly *Dzis i Jutro*, expounded their creed. 'Reversing the hierarchy of values, they elevated the cause of the Revolution over the worship of God. Religion, instead of being the most noble and sublime means for the achievement of salvation, was to become an intentional measure of securing for the Church a temporal existence in the revolutionary world. Consequently, they required all Catholics including bishops and priests to use Catholicism as a source of inspiration for the building of socialism and to devote most of their time and energy to the realisation of social and economic goals, determined by the atheistic leaders of the State.'[8] This could not be tolerated by the Church and, on 29 June 1955, Piasecki's book and the weekly *Dzis i Jutro* were condemned by a decretal of the Holy Office. The condemnation by no means discouraged the progressivists; on the contrary, it provided them with a pretext to close their ranks and intensify their efforts.

They were handsomely rewarded for their services. By an ingenious device they were provided with substantial funds: in a communist

[7] *Zagadnienia Istotne* (Warsaw, 1954).
[8] Chrypinski, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

country the existence of a virtually capitalist concern was permitted. Pax's commercial and industrial undertakings, while retaining legally their character as private companies, were given the privileges of nationalised enterprises. Above all, they were taxed as if they were not private but state enterprises. Thus, in 1956 Pax made 'a one-hundred-million *zloty* profit, of which thirty-eight million were spent to cover deficits of socio-political enterprises'.[9] At the same time the political importance of the 'progressivists' was steadily enhanced. With the suppression of other Catholic groups, they gained a monopoly position in 'representing' the lay Catholics in Poland. In March 1953 the last genuine group of Catholic intellectuals, on the weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, was disbanded and their newspaper handed over to 'Pax'. With the mounting arrests among the members of the Episcopate, the progressivists moved to consolidate their hold over the clergy. In October 1953, a month after the imprisonment of Cardinal Wyszynski, ties were established with the organisation of the so-called 'priests-patriots'. In July 1955, a few weeks after the publication of the decretal of the Holy Office, the two organisations were merged under virtual leadership of the lay 'progressive Catholics', and Piasecki obtained an instrument for realising his ambitious political schemes.

THE October revolt greatly undermined the position of the progressive Catholics. Indeed, towards the end of 1956 it looked as though the collapse of 'Pax' were imminent. There were several things which seemed to substantiate that belief. First, Piasecki and his followers were compromised by their alleged connections with the security apparatus. The repeated rumours to this effect, which had only recently received stimulus from the revelations of Swiatlo, were now brought into the open. In November 1956 a popular weekly, *Swiat*, published an article written by a well-known writer, Leopold Tyrmand, which unequivocally accused Piasecki of having been 'at the disposal of the Polish Ministry of Public Security'.[10] Since one of the cardinal reforms pledged by Gomulka was the liquidation of the remnants of 'Polish Beriaism', the future of its reputed offspring appeared gloomy.

Second, the release from confinement of Cardinal Wyszynski, and the re-emergence of the *Tygodnik Powszechny* group, made 'Pax' largely expendable for the communists. In the turbulent period following October 1956, it was important for Gomulka to obtain the support of the true Catholic leaders who could exercise effective influence on the masses. Needless to say, relations between the hierarchy and the authentic Catholic intellectuals on the one side, and the progressivists on the other, were anything but affable. The memories of 'Pax's'

[9] *Zycie Gospodarcze*, 7 July 1957. In the same year 'Pax' employed over 4,000 people. Leonard Barszczewski, 'Problemy Gospodarcze Stowarzyszenia "Pax",' *Kierunki*, No. 40 (70), 6 October 1957. Barszczewski rightly points out that 'Pax', unlike the state enterprises, employed many persons who were regarded as politically unreliable, but fails to explain why the security authorities tolerated this unique personnel policy.

[10] Tyrmand, *op. cit.*

attitude towards the Cardinal at the time of his imprisonment could not be erased by declarations of loyalty made upon his restoration to the office. The affair of *Tygodnik Powszechny* was well remembered by the Catholic writers who now recovered their stolen property. Thus, Piasecki could count on little sympathy either from the Episcopate or the lay Catholic leaders.

Third, the progressivists had never been popular among the rank and file of the Polish United Workers Party. The great majority of Polish communists had never consented to nor understood this alliance, Tyrmand wrote. The quasi-fascist or conservative background of the 'Pax' leaders had been regarded with suspicion if not enmity by the genuine proletarian elements in the Party. Their programme of reconciliation between Catholicism and Marxism had been treated with reserve if not contempt by the Party intellectuals.[11] And it was precisely the workers and intellectuals who took the lead in the October revolt.

Lastly, in the intra-Party struggle which preceded the revolt, Piasecki had openly sided with the 'Natolin faction' which opposed the programme of reforms advocated by the supporters of Gomulka. He not only participated in their plot but also in an article published on the eve of the meeting threatened a resort to force to curb the process of democratisation.[12] The article provoked a wave of indignation from communists and Catholics alike. Thus, the defeat of the 'Natolin faction' was also a political defeat for 'Pax', and a personal one for Piasecki. At last, it seemed, his ignominious career had come to an end.

At the end of 1956 the view of Piasecki's imminent fall was widespread in Poland. It was generally believed that a decision to dissolve 'Pax' and to hand over its enterprises to the genuine Catholic groups actually had been made by the Communist leaders.[13] Apparently this belief was shared by some of Piasecki's close collaborators. In November 1956 some of the top progressivists, led by Frankowski, seceded from 'Pax' and established an organisation of their own called, from the name of their publication, *Za i Przeciw*.[14] Even those who remained at Piasecki's side expressed misgivings about their leader's attitude towards democratisation, an unprecedented step for this strongly authoritarian group. 'I would like to make it very clear', wrote the editor-in-chief of 'Pax's' major organ, *Kierunki* (25 November 1956), 'that from the very outset there existed essential differences among the editorial staff of our newspaper with regard to the theses expounded in

11 Apparently the genuine Catholic writers, although politically suppressed, enjoyed far greater respect among the communists. See Czeslaw Milosz, '"Pax" odsloniety,' *Kultura*, No. 3/113, March 1957, p. 99.

12 Boleslaw Piasecki, 'Instynkt Panstwowy,' *Slowo Powszechne*, 16 October 1956; *Kierunki*, No. 23, 21 October 1956.

13 Indeed, in his article Tyrmand speaks of the 'fall of Piasecki' as if this had been an accomplished fact.

14 It is quite likely that this move was not motivated solely by political opportunism. Some uneasiness had existed among the progressivists ever since their condemnation by the Holy Office in 1955. At that time, however, to secede from Piasecki required very considerable courage and only a few individuals dared to do so.

the Piasecki article.' At the same time, the progressivists took an apologetic stand for their past activities, which they attributed to the pressure of 'Beriaism' (*sic*!) and for which they promised 'to account fully and honestly.' As to the future, they declared their unreserved loyalty to the Church and the hierarchy, and pledged their sincere support for the Gomulka programme of political reforms.

At that stage Gomulka's attitude toward 'Pax' appeared ambivalent. The cooperation between the Polish United Workers Party and the genuine Catholic leaders in the parliamentary elections in January 1957 was generally interpreted as a sign of the political decline of the progressivists. But in none of his public enunciations did Gomulka criticise Piasecki. Nor did the dissolution of 'Pax' take place. Nor, indeed, were the concessions to its commercial enterprises withdrawn. Thus the very bases of Piasecki's power, indispensable for his political survival, remained intact.

WHAT made Gomulka spare Piasecki? There is little doubt that had he decided to do so, Gomulka could have dealt the *coup de grâce* to 'Pax'. Even if it were true that in 1945 Piasecki had established some direct connections with the Soviet security network and maintained them until 1956—which in view of the political changes in the Soviet Union was highly unlikely—his protectors could not be so powerful as to restrain Gomulka from exercising his own judgment in this matter. If Gomulka, in defiance of Khrushchev, did not hesitate to remove the Russian Marshal Rokossovski from command of the Polish forces, he certainly would have had little difficulty in getting rid of Piasecki. The reasons for Piasecki's survival were clearly of a domestic nature; the only political explanation that can be offered is that in 1957 Gomulka had already decided that in dealing with the Catholics he would follow the old maxim 'divide and rule'. He probably felt that 'Pax's' continued existence might be useful for the Party as an instrument to split the Catholic political forces.

Another factor, however, also seemed to be involved in Gomulka's decision. It must not be forgotten that Gomulka shared the responsibility for launching Piasecki's post-war political career. After Piasecki's release from imprisonment, it was Gomulka who, at the meeting in Warsaw in September 1945, personally approved the 'progressive Catholic' plan of activity. In turn, after Gomulka's release from arrest, Piasecki was careful not to imperil this valuable connection. Indeed, it is reasonably certain that, like many people associated with the 'Natolin faction', Piasecki in the summer of 1956 approached Gomulka with an offer of support, and this move no doubt helped him to save 'Pax' from destruction.

Assured of political survival, the progressivists regained their composure and by the spring of 1957 had launched a counter-attack. In a speech immediately preceding the plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee—the first since the October revolt—Piasecki condemned the

use of 'socialist camouflage' for anti-socialist schemes and appealed for 'liquidation of factions in the Party'.[15] His attempt to assume the mantle of Party mentor was received with biting sarcasm by the communist intellectuals in *Po Prostu* and other newspapers, but it was they, not Piasecki, who in fact were losing ground.[16] A week later Gomulka denounced 'revisionism' and stressed the need for restoring unity in the Party.

Soon, an even more significant incident took place. In the summer of 1957 Cardinal Wyszynski issued a communiqué forbidding priests to write for 'Pax' publications. The censorship prevented its appearance in any newspaper, including even *Tygodnik Powszechny*. Not only did the Communist Party refrain from turning against the progressivists; it upheld them in their opposition to the Episcopate. The odd alliance between the Party and 'Pax' seemed to have been restored.

Encouraged by these developments, the progressivists intensified their activities. They made determined efforts to extend their influence; in March 1958 they launched a nation-wide campaign of 'moral renovation' aimed at coping with ideological indifferentism 'which undermines the social morality and construction of socialism in Poland'.[17] They also tried to strengthen their organisation throughout the country. At a meeting of 'Pax' activists in Opole in June 1960, special attention was given to the recruitment of young people. Parallel attempts were made to gain recognition in the international sphere. In June 1960 Piasecki attended the Congress of the East German Christian Democratic Union in Erfurt.[18] In December of the same year CDU delegates appeared at the 'Pax' meeting in Warsaw on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the movement, an event celebrated with much fanfare. In his speech at that meeting Piasecki stressed that the experience of the progressivists in Poland might prove to be valuable for some other countries not only inside but also outside the Soviet bloc.[19]

The new expansion of 'Pax' seemed to be carried out with the full approval of the Communist Party. In his speech to the third Party congress in March 1959, Gomulka, although he did not mention 'Pax'

15 Boleslaw Piasecki, 'O socjalistycznym zangazowaniu narodu', *Slowo Powszechne*, 10 May 1957.

16 Jerzy Kossak, 'Semper fidelis', *Po Prostu*, 19 May 1957. The article contains a shrewd remark about the dangers involved in opposing political power with intellectual arguments. In October 1957 *Po Prostu* was forcibly closed down.

17 Zygmunt Przetakiewicz, 'Przeciw Indyferentyzmowi', *Kierunki*, 23 March 1958. Tyrmand's books were singled out for attack. Przetakiewicz's views were ridiculed by the Catholic and communist intellectuals alike. See Kisiel, in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 13 April 1958; Toeplitz, in *Nowa Kultura*, 30 March 1958. Toeplitz sarcastically observed that the slogan of 'moral renovation' was not new, and at one time was employed by Mussolini!

18 It is interesting to note that Piasecki's visit was ignored by the East German communist press. In contrast with some other foreign delegates, whose speeches received considerable attention, the leader of the Polish 'progressive Catholics' was not even mentioned by name in the account of the Congress published in *Neues Deutschland*, 24 and 25 June 1960.

19 Piasecki singled out India and the Arab states as countries where socialist ideas exist side by side with religious sentiments. *Kierunki*, 24 December 1960.

by name, referred approvingly to Catholics who ' explicitly declare themselves in favour of socialism '.[20] Concessions to progressivist enterprises were extended to new economic undertakings. In the elections to the National Councils in 1958, ' Pax ' followers were allowed to run in three hundred districts and towns. This was generally understood as a prelude to their broad participation in the next parliamentary elections as well. Political prospects once again seemed to be bright for Piasecki.

In addition to strengthening their organisation, the progressivists elaborated their ideology. In 1958 Piasecki's new book, *Polish Patriotism*, was published.[21] At the same time an ' Ideological Guide ' for ' Pax ' activists was issued.[22] By 1960 it looked as if the progressive Catholics considered their task in this sphere completed. At the close of that year an editorial article in *Slowo Powszechne* (31 December), summing up fifteen years of activities of the progressivists, praised them for evolving a ' novel theoretical solution '.

THE programme evolved by the progressive Catholics is indeed a novel one. Their ideology may be summarised as communism without Marxism. In the realm of practical politics they accept communism in its entirety. They stress the socialist character of their movement; they even regard themselves as ' a socialist ally of the Party '. In the theoretical sphere, however, the progressivists reject the fundamental tenet of communism, i.e., its materialistic outlook. They overtly profess their allegiance to Catholicism. Consequently, they deny that their political programme derives from Marxism, and claim to deduce it from Polish nationalism.

The starting point of Piasecki's political reasoning is undoubtedly his firm belief in the ultimate victory of communism throughout the world. Having assumed this position, it is logical for him to consider Polish interests not in the traditional terms of an independent national existence, but in terms of their fullest identification with the forces making for that victory. The weightier Poland's contribution to the international communist movement, the greater her role in international affairs. ' The real sovereignty of Poland depends on the objective economic and cultural potential which we represent in the service of the righteous cause of socialism.'

In this context Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union acquires new dimensions. It must be viewed not only as an advantageous alignment

20 *Trybuna Ludu*, 11 March 1959.

21 Boleslaw Piasecki, *Patriotyzm polski*. This is a collection of his articles written in the years 1955–58. Significantly, it includes the controversial article published on the eve of the October revolt; it does not, however, include the article in which Piasecki discussed State-Church relations, which might have led to his book being placed on the Vatican Index.

22 Quoted and discussed extensively in two articles by Juliusz Mieroszewski, *Kultura*, December 1958; October 1960. Mr. Mieroszewski's articles provide a very penetrating analysis of the progressivist programme and political calculations. Although the assumption made, at least in the first article, that Piasecki enjoys support from Moscow is disputable, in all other respects the articles are written with unusual insight.

in view of Poland's geopolitical position, but also as an indispensable link by which she participates in the communist bloc. 'The Polish-Soviet alliance is not only . . . an expression of the real guarantee of the security of People's Poland, but . . . also a vehicle of influence in the socialist camp.' Since Polish influence in the socialist camp is exercised through the Soviet Union, 'the stronger the Soviet Union, the better it is for our Polish interests'. Consequently, Piasecki readily concedes Soviet primacy in the communist bloc.

Although the Soviet leaders are concerned with the policies of the bloc as a whole, reasons Piasecki, and not with the internal activities in each country, in fact the alliance with the Soviet Union affects Poland's domestic affairs as well. In the name of this partnership the Soviet Union expects Poland 'to be a morally reliable member of the socialist camp', and to provide 'a successful example of building socialism'. The deeper the socialist roots in Poland, the firmer her bonds with the Soviet Union. 'Polish patriotism demands', exclaims Piasecki, 'that Polish consciousness become more and more a socialist consciousness'.

It is for patriotic reasons that the progressive Catholics claim to 'participate fully in the building of the socialist system'. Conversely, it is full participation in this process which in their eyes makes them 'an authentic socialist' force. Since patriotism and socialism are synonymous, a patriot by definition is a socialist, and vice versa. A patriot who is not a socialist is a 'reactionary' opposed to the Polish national interest; a socialist who is not a patriot is a 'dogmatist' infected with 'inexcusable and ideologically false . . . cosmopolitanism'.

The progressivists are not only wholeheartedly committed to 'building socialism' in Poland. They also unreservedly endorse all the means which the communists employ to achieve that end. Indeed, they often outbid them, urging the Communist Party to exercise its leadership efficiently. 'We cannot remain passive when the Party is paralysed by internal friction. . . . The Party must rejuvenate itself to perform its leading role.' Progressivist zeal is particularly strongly marked in the economic sphere. It is characteristic that Piasecki views the economic changes which were brought about by the October revolt merely as a 'respite', the purpose of which was 'not to stray from the right road, but to be able to march along it even quicker'. The right road means giving priority to investments in heavy industry, tightening labour discipline, and accelerating collectivisation of agriculture.

Even the attitude to the Church is in line with that of the Communist Party. Here Piasecki's argument rests on the distinction between the Apostolic and political functions of the Church. 'One must be ignorant of history, or be dangerously naive, not to see the political effects of Church activities.' The danger Piasecki sees is that various forces, such as certain Vatican circles, conservative elements among the people, and outright reactionaries, try to exploit the influence of the Church for their own political schemes. 'Polish patriots, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, should decisively reject such attempts, no matter whence they come . . .

we expect the moral effects of the Church's spiritual activities to be such as to assist—far more than they do at present—both quantitatively and qualitatively in the socio-economic building of socialism.' Essentially, Piasecki wants the Church to use its spiritual influence to promote communism in Poland.

Having accepted virtually all aspects of the communist programme, Piasecki repudiates at least one aspect of communist theory, namely, its exclusively materialist character. 'The young communist camp', says the 'Ideological Guide', 'in order to preserve the unity of its ranks, has adhered to the principle of an exclusively materialist outlook. . . . At present the monistic outlook of the socialist camp no longer serves its unity, but may slacken the dynamics of its growth'. To correct this deficiency, Piasecki puts forward his own interpretation of the 'Polish road to socialism.' In Poland, despite the progress of socialism, Catholicism remains the predominant faith of the people. The consciousness of the believers has become more socialist, 'but it has not ceased to be a Catholic consciousness'. As a result, those who participate in the 'building of socialism', are barred from sharing political responsibility, which is retained exclusively by the Communist Party. This 'restricts the socialist activity of society and . . . undermines the Party's links with the nation'.

The problem is to find some way by which Polish Catholics can participate in the political life of the country. Here Piasecki has a ready-made formula. All that is needed is to broaden the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat by formally recognising the 'progressive Catholic' movement as a full-fledged ally of the Communist Party. This, to his great disappointment, has not as yet taken place. Progressivists, however, will spare no effort 'to attain a formal position as the ally of the workers party', for they believe 'that their official role in the government of People's Poland would represent an objective expression of the specific national conditions in which socialism is built in our country'. In short, what this interpretation of the 'Polish road to socialism' amounts to is that Piasecki should be given a place in the government.

WHATEVER hopes Piasecki might have entertained of putting his programme into practice were abruptly dispelled by Gomulka. On 25 January 1961 the two men met and an official communiqué was issued.[23] 'Pax' suffered a major reversal. Its economic as well as political activities were drastically curtailed, and its tax privileges withdrawn. This reduced by perhaps more than half the profits of the Association, and was followed by a sharp reduction in the personnel employed by its various enterprises. This in itself was a serious political setback, but direct restrictions on their political activities were also imposed. Their expectations of broad participation in the parliamentary

[23] *Trybuna Ludu*, 26 January 1961. In addition to Gomulka and Piasecki three members of the Central Committee attended the meeting on the communist side, and for 'Pax' its Vice-President and Secretary-General.

elections of April 1961 did not materialise. They were allotted three seats in parliament, as many as the splinter group *Za i Przeciw*, and fewer than the group linked with *Tygodnik Powszechny*, which got five. Above all, Gomulka expressed his disapproval of their ideology and urged them to refrain from expounding it further. Indeed, since January 1961 'Pax' publications have abstained from discussing their 'novel theoretical solution'.

What made Gomulka at this stage turn against Piasecki? There seem to have been several reasons. First, all the objections raised against Piasecki in 1956, of course, remained valid in 1961. Neither the Catholics, nor, more important, the communists have changed their opinion of him, while behind the scenes a strong group in the Communist Party continued to oppose the expansion if not the very existence of 'Pax'. Second, the vigorous efforts of the progressivists to gain a broader following in Poland proved vain. Their failure to obtain any endorsement from Cardinal Wyszynski alienated them from the overwhelming majority of Polish Catholics. Yet, irrespective of their negligible influence, they aspired to the role of a full-fledged ally of the Communist Party and Gomulka must have found this irritating. The communists were prepared to use Piasecki, but not to co-operate with him. When his demands became too arrogant, they put him in his place.

In the last resort, however, it was Piasecki's own programme which brought about his defeat, for it represents an ideological anomaly from the point of view of both Catholicism and communism. The progressivists proclaim their full allegiance to the core of Catholic doctrine, purporting to revise only the social teaching of the Church. In fact, they go far beyond this. If carried to its logical conclusion, their programme would amount to the complete surrender of Catholicism to communism, the Church becoming virtually an instrument of the atheistic state, and this is a price which Catholicism cannot afford to pay. With respect to communism, they take exactly the opposite stand. They accept *in toto* its socio-economic policies, but reject the theoretical foundations upon which they are based. The approval of the Catholic brand of socialism as an ideological partner of communism would represent a heresy from Marxism-Leninism more grave than the revisionism of Kolakowski or even Djilas!

Blinded by his zest for the paraphernalia of power, Piasecki does not seem to be aware of the delicacy of his position. He was permitted to undertake his political activities because they weakened the resistance of the Polish Catholics to communism. Thus, paradoxically, his continued usefulness for the Party depends directly on the persistence of Catholic opposition. Once this can be effectively subdued, Piasecki's services—irrespective of his contribution to their victory—will no longer be needed by the communists. And should the communists decide to seek a genuine compromise with the Catholics, Piasecki—precisely because of his present role—could not be a party to such an agreement.

This does not necessarily mean the end of Piasecki's career. The conflict between Catholicism and communism in Poland might in one form or another continue for a number of years with neither side gaining a decisive victory. In this essentially unstable situation there still might be room for Piasecki's political manoeuvres. Yet it is safe to assume that, irrespective of Piasecki's personal fortunes, the political role of the progressive Catholics in Polish politics will always remain marginal. This is inherent in the essentially diversionist character of their movement and in the very nature of their ideology. There is room for it neither in a free Catholic community nor in a stable communist system.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

A Summing-up

Bernard Morris

The 22nd congress of the Soviet Communist Party brought the Sino-Soviet conflict into the open. For the first time the long-standing dispute, conducted by means of oblique references in the press and only indirectly reflecting the political rifts behind the closed doors of the communist conclaves, has taken a form of direct and public confrontation between the Soviet and the Chinese position towards the Albanian People's Republic. The Soviet leader attacked the Albanian Party leaders for failing to fall into line with the policy elaborated at the 20th congress in 1956 against the 'cult of personality'. On the contrary, they began to oppose that Leninist policy. The Soviet Party, said Khrushchev, could not 'make a concession on this fundamental point either to the Albanian leaders or to any one else'. This hardly-veiled reference to the Chinese communists evoked a rebuke from the leader of their delegation at the congress, Chou En-lai, who immediately condemned it, saying that 'Any public, one-sided censure of a fraternal Party does not help unity, and to lay bare a dispute between fraternal parties openly in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. It will only pain our friends and gladden our enemies'. There was no attempt to conceal the quarrel from the reading public in Moscow, Peking, or Tirana. Both Pravda *and* Jen Min Jih-Pao *gave the text of Chou En-lai's criticism, and* Zeri i Popullit, *attacking Khrushchev for resorting to 'slanders', praised Chou En-lai's 'correct speech'. Clearly, a new stage has been reached, when the airing of the quarrel is considered unavoidable or even necessary. We publish below a summing-up of the first esoteric stage of the Sino-Soviet dispute as a background to the recent flare-up.—Editors.*

ALMOST a decade ago, the late Franz Borkenau wrote that a profound conflict between the communist regimes of Russia and China is in the long run as certain as anything in politics. He based his prediction on the strength of two arguments. First, it is in the very nature of totalitarian regimes to establish their absolute control as far as they can; they therefore cannot have genuine allies but must seek to dominate. Secondly, the unity of the communist world movement is axiomatic for every Leninist. Hence it follows that the Kremlin must exert control over all communist parties. This thrust of Soviet totalitarianism, Borkenau argued, is therefore incompatible with Mao Tse-tung's clear desire to be a leader in his own right and to preserve Chinese national independence.[1]

1 Franz Borkenau, 'Sino-Soviet Relations', Department of State ERS Paper, Series 3, No. 86, 1 February 1952; and 'Mao Tse-tung', *The Twentieth Century*, August 1952.

Borkenau's prediction met with understandable scepticism, given the record of Stalin's successful manipulation of the national communist parties and the benefits to be derived from a unified world communist movement. In the United States, moreover, analysis of Sino-Soviet relations was frustrated by the emotionalism enveloping the 'China problem', by a stereotyped approach to the international communist movement, and by an inadequate appreciation of the strength of the nationalist impulse—communist and non-communist alike. Also neglected—because it did not accord with the myth of monolithic communism—was the constant tension between Moscow and the communist parties which characterised intra-communist relations throughout the period between the two world wars, to say nothing of the fact that the communist movement was often divided into left, centre, and right positions, all turning on differences over policy.

Nothing was to be lost, perhaps, by ignoring these divisive tendencies in the communist movement during the inter-war years when no communist party outside the Soviet Union was in power. But since 1945 the myth of monolithic unity has been anything but harmless, particularly so where it minimised the power of nationalism to override doctrinal considerations. To be sure, their subordination to the Soviet Union in the name of communist internationalism made the existence of new communist states a relatively unimportant factor in the diplomatic arena, but this situation held only so long as they refrained from challenging the Soviet leadership. When the challenge finally came—as it did first in Yugoslavia, and later in Poland, Hungary, China, and Albania—the ensuing conflicts presented the Western chancelleries with a disconcerting need to review and revise their policies towards the communist world. These conflicts and the attempt to resolve them had, in turn, profound effects on the communist movement itself, altering its structure and laying it open to further divisive trends.[2]

At the present time, the international communist movement is sundered by a three-way split: Yugoslavia on the right; Soviet Russia in the centre; and China on the left. Yugoslavia broke with Stalin strictly on the issue of national independence; its reformist ideological positions were worked out subsequently. Of greater gravity is the Chinese attack on the Soviet leaders over the drift of their foreign policy and the strategy they have imposed on the international communist movement. The Chinese have elected to make the controversy with the Soviet leaders an open one, bidding for support of the communist movement both publicly, through the press and radio, and privately through caucuses, circulars and, in the case of Albania, through material help.[3] The Chinese

[2] Bernard Morris, 'Soviet Policy Toward National Communism: The Limits of Diversity', *The American Political Science Review*, March 1959.

[3] While it would already require a book to cover the literature of the dispute, the substance of the Chinese position is given in three articles commemorating Lenin's 90th birthday: Yu Chao-li, 'On Imperialism as the Source of War in Modern Times, and On the Way for All People to Struggle for Peace', *Red Flag*, No. 7, 1960, NCNA, 30 March 1960; 'Long Live Leninism!' editorial in *Red Flag*, No. 8, 1960, NCNA,

sortie is anything but a defensive action. What Mao Tse-tung appears to be demanding is an equal voice in formulating an international policy for the communist world as a whole. In keeping with communist tradition, however, the arguments have to be cast in ideological terms with each side invoking Lenin to prove its orthodoxy. It is in these basic symbols and doctrines explaining or justifying the various positions that clues are found concerning the strategies and tactics at issue, although this esoteric communication often tends to conceal the prime causes of the dispute. For example, the prominent position given to the ideological debate on the inevitability of war may merely obscure different domestic and foreign policy requirements, personality clashes, and other factors that lie at the bottom of the Sino-Soviet rift. In the brief compass of this paper, I can touch only on the highlights, skipping the debate on the communes, material incentives, and the transition from socialism to communism.

IN broad ideological terms, the Chinese have taken their cue from Lenin's World War I writings on imperialism and war while the Soviet communists—in the best Leninist tradition it might be added—have for all practical purposes scrapped Lenin's theory of imperialism in favour of a policy which they feel is more in accord with the problems confronting them today. Strictly speaking, the Chinese have also departed from Lenin's theory of imperialism, which argued that the nature of capitalist monopoly made inter-imperialist war for the domination of world markets inevitable. The idea of the inevitability of war between the capitalist and communist states was simply a pragmatic response to a new situation—the establishment of the Soviet Republic—which Lenin advanced to counter the hostile intentions of the capitalist states towards the weak socialist state. It is often forgotten that there are two communist doctrines on war: war between capitalist states, on the one hand, and war between capitalist and communist states, on the other. Neither the Chinese nor the Soviet communists take seriously the possibility of major inter-capitalist war. In so far as war between capitalist and communist states is concerned, Khrushchev has tended to discount it; his mentor, Stalin, in 1952 had already stated that war between capitalist and communist states is less likely than war between the capitalists themselves.[4] The Chinese, for their part, hark back to the old Leninist formulas, not because they would particularly welcome a war but because the formulas accord with their ideas about communist relationships with

19 April 1960; and 'Forward Along the Path of the Great Lenin!', editorial in *People's Daily*, NCNA, 21 April 1960. The Soviet reply on this occasion was the speech by O. Kuusinen, *Pravda*, 23 April 1960. The Soviet position on war and related issues may be found in the comment on the 'Communiqué on the meeting of representatives of Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries' (Bucharest, 24 June 1960) by T. Zhivkov, 'Peace! Key Problem of Today', *World Marxist Review*, August 1960, and in references to Soviet statements given below.

[4] J. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, 1952.

the capitalist enemy. The Chinese clearly desire to preserve the revolutionary momentum, with a clear line drawn between the communists and their opponents. It is this attitude that has evoked charges, at least by implication, of 'Trotskyism' against the Chinese from some leading communists.[5]

But a communist movement committed to revolutionary action does not suit Soviet policy at this time; the Soviet leaders are interested in revolution by other means as they made clear at the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956 and reiterated at the Moscow Conference of the 81 communist parties in November 1960.[6] Khrushchev's foreign policy aims at the containment of capitalism, which he regards as already having lost ground to communism. An atmosphere of détente, to follow this line of reasoning, would tend to reduce the cohesion and militancy of the Western Powers, promote the chances of winning over the leaders of the underdeveloped areas, and allow time for the Soviet Union to build up its own and intra-communist economic-military potential, to solve some of its own pressing economic problems, particularly in agriculture, and to improve the living standards of its people. To give sanction to his policy, Khrushchev has introduced the idea of a new historical stage in which the world communist system has replaced imperialism as the decisive factor in determining the course of historical development. Without abandoning the notion that it still is in the nature of imperialism to cause war, he insists that in practice this is cancelled out by the might of the communist camp. 'War is not fatalistically inevitable', in Khrushchev's formula. Or, to put it in plain English, capitalism can exist without causing major wars. It *may* not but it *can*. Peaceful coexistence is thus forced upon the imperialists as a result of the changing balance of power. To placate his left-wing critics, Khrushchev has equated peaceful coexistence with international class war, but this militant verbiage changes nothing of substance; he has long been saying that peaceful coexistence does not exclude political, economic, and ideological warfare.

TO give force to the Soviet Union's strategy of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev emphasised the possibility that communist movements might even take power by peaceful and parliamentary means, though he nowhere excluded circumstances in which the communists would have to use violence for that purpose. The Chinese, with history on their side (let alone quotations from Lenin), stand Khrushchev's argument on its head. They argue that 'imperialism' will not crumble of itself, and that the communist parties must use revolutionary means to seize power.

[5] Khrushchev, *Pravda*, 1 November 1959; Togliatti, *L'Unita*, 24 July 1960; Max Reimann, *Neues Deutschland*, 28 August 1960; and Edvard Kardelj below.

[6] For the 20th CPSU Congress, see Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies—II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath*, N.Y., 1957. The 1960 'Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties' is published in the supplement to *New Times*, No. 50, 1960. Khrushchev's report on the meeting appears in the *World Marxist Review*, January 1961.

The Chinese have also challenged the wisdom of Soviet support for non-communist states and leaders in the underdeveloped areas. Once again the ideological argument borders on the spurious, with each side claiming correctly that its policy is Leninist. One of the most dramatic shifts in Soviet strategy and diplomatic style was written into communist doctrine at the 20th CPSU Congress when Khrushchev recognised that the former colonial areas could be manipulated to improve the Soviet Union's global power position. Conceding in 1956 that the new states of the underdeveloped areas—the 'semi-colonies' of Stalin's days—were politically independent, he launched a campaign of open political seduction and economic support to persuade the new states of the wisdom of a neutralist or, better still, anti-Western orientation. Support of bourgeois nationalist leaders is not new to the communist movement; this was Lenin's policy in 1920. Like Lenin, Khrushchev also allowed for the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie, arguing that it would be anti-imperialist before the withdrawal of the imperial power, and 'reactionary' and anti-communist in its domestic policies once it assumed power on its own. He therefore envisaged a subsequent development—the 'social stage'—when the communists would begin to move against the nationalist leaders. What matters, however, is that his whole policy was geared to the first stage, which is to say that the communist parties in the underdeveloped areas were advised not only to support the foreign policies of nationalist leaders but even to circumscribe their criticism of the leaders' domestic policies.

The Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's policy towards the underdeveloped areas is consistent with their general outlook. They too subscribe to the general formula that the national bourgeoisie can play a dual role, but they do not bank very heavily on its progressive nature either before or after it comes to power. Chinese scepticism is understandable in the light of their relations with Kuomintang and the Comintern's disastrous policy in China in the 1920s. Drawing on their own experience, the Chinese argue that the communist movements should play a more independent role instead of confining themselves to the support of nationalist leaders, and should seize opportunities to take power even at the risk of civil war. They should, moreover, be backed by the power of the communist movement as a whole, even at the risk of war. The Chinese imply that the establishment of communist states has always been attended by violence, and that today the West will limit its counteraction for fear of provoking a general war.

The Soviet leaders attempted a compromise with the Chinese position at the Moscow meeting in November 1960, by introducing the concept of 'independent national democracy' as a somewhat more diversified strategy towards the neutralist states, and by underlining communist support of national liberation wars. The essence of 'independent national democracy' is that in its foreign relations the state is free of Western political and economic control and, internally, it has embarked on a social revolution. 'Democratic' is a key word because these states

are not yet socialist, that is, not yet under communist control, but are nevertheless laying the groundwork for a 'socialist' society. This in no way alters the Soviet policy of support for the neutralist states as a whole; it merely arranges these states on a scale running from the UAR at one extreme which, though politically independent, is regarded as linked with Western capital and committed to repressive policies at home, to Cuba—the model of a national democratic state—at the other extreme, which is politically independent and engaged in an internal revolution.

IN defending their positions against the Chinese, the Soviet communists were handicapped by their relations with the Yugoslav communists which, though not what Khrushchev would want them to be, are not unfriendly. The Chinese used the Yugoslav 'revisionists' as a focus for their attacks, more often than not implying that the Russians were guilty of the sins for which they attacked the Yugoslavs. The Soviet communists are also on record against Yugoslav 'revisionism' but their heart is not in it; the fundamental challenge to their policy comes not from the 'revisionists' or from the rightist-oriented policies of the Italian and Polish communist leaders, but from the 'dogmatists' and 'sectarians'—from the 'left'. No wonder then that Khrushchev's defence against Chinese charges of opportunism and reformism was embarrassed in August 1960 by the publication of Edvard Kardelj's tract on *Socialism and War* which, for all its differences, came very close to the Soviet position on coexistence. But Kardelj went further than any other communist—or most Western commentators, for that matter—in accusing the Chinese of wishing for a revolutionary showdown with the West. Their very rejection of the idea that war can be prevented, Kardelj wrote, may truly make war inevitable. He accused the Chinese of using the peace movement as a mere propaganda tactic instead of viewing peace as an indispensable condition for the progress of socialism. For good measure he denounced them for petty nationalist behaviour in the case of the Indian border dispute and the repression of Chinese businessmen in Indonesia, scoffed at the idea of the commune as an exportable institution for other communist countries, and practically called them Trotskyites. On the other hand, Kardelj incurred the wrath of the Soviet theorists by arguing the familiar Yugoslav thesis that the communists as well as the imperialists may be instrumental in precipitating a war unless genuine international collaboration replaced the policy of formal coexistence between rival blocs.

BORKENAU predicted a Sino-Soviet conflict, but was he right in attributing the root cause to the tendency of totalitarian systems to dominate? Was the Sino-Soviet rift inevitable because Soviet totalitarianism, by definition, cannot tolerate any challenge to its position as leader of the communist movement and supreme arbiter of its doctrine? Or, since all Great Powers have always tried to maximise their power,

should not the conflict be attributed rather to the eruption of national interests in traditional forms?

It is not begging the question to say that separation of the national interest from the ideological and strategic problems of the communist movement is analytically impossible and, perhaps, dangerous. That China and other communist states are behaving in various degrees like traditional nation states is obvious. It can be argued that no elaborate explanation of the rift is required at all, if it were generally recognised that nations now, as always, behave in their own interests to the extent the situation permits. We have needlessly complicated our problem of comprehending these events by giving too high a rating to ideology and by accepting the myth of monolithic communism. China's behaviour, according to this line of reasoning, is analogous to that of any weaker associate in the Atlantic Alliance or, for that matter, in any alliance between states. But the national interest of the Chinese—as of all other states—is conditioned not only by geography, historical ambitions, racial patterns, and the like, but also by the mentality of their leaders, who in this instance happen to be communists. Regardless of how far the erosion of Marxist theory and ideological conviction has gone, communist leaders still think in Marxist categories, still attempt to shape their societies toward goals that are compatible with Marxism, and still hold to an internationalism that may differ in form or method from the ideas of 1919, but is not so different in kind. The relationship between ideology and policy is not, after all, peculiar to the communist world. In the controversy between the Soviet and Chinese communists, the questions of ideology and strategy for the international communist movement are integral parts of the problem.

On another level of analysis, the quasi-Marxist explanation of the Sino-Soviet clash as the result of differing stages of development is difficult to sustain on both historical and logical grounds. This line of argument would have it that China, like the Soviet Union in the 1920s, requires a policy of domestic and international tension to justify sacrifices from its people in order to create an industrial society. The circumstances are not, however, comparable. Unlike the Soviet Union in 1919, China today has the Soviet Union to defend it against its enemies, and a dozen communist states on which, in principle, it could draw for capital, equipment, and technical aid. On logical grounds, the Chinese have much more to gain from Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence than from a policy which might invite reprisals or war. Neither the so-called laws of historical development nor reasonable calculation can satisfactorily explain the Chinese position.

In the political vocabulary of recent years, the Soviet Union offers the West peaceful competitive coexistence—a status quo of sorts—dictated by its domestic policies and the belief that the drift in the underdeveloped areas is away from Western control and influence. 'Why jeopardise the favourable course of events by adventurist policies?' the

Soviet leaders ask. And if, additionally, the economic and social problems besetting the capitalist states contribute to their internal weakness, so much the better.

It is precisely because the Chinese communists accept the Soviet view that the correlation of forces has shifted in favour of the communist system that they advocate a policy of ' liberation ', that is, of more active exploitation of the situation. They have understandably shown little interest in Soviet attempts to negotiate with the West on European problems and on international problems, such as nuclear testing bans and disarmament. They are more interested in giving history a helping hand by aiding the communists in the industrially backward areas with less regard than the Russians for the risks entailed. Similarly, the Chinese want the communists in the advanced industrial countries aggressively to exploit the internal contradictions in the system instead of pursuing moderate policies to complement the Soviet diplomacy of accommodation.

Whatever the explanation of the Sino-Soviet rift—power politics, ideology, or transfigured national interest—the international communist movement will never be the same. Changes in its structure and functioning were already evident after Stalin's death. The tension between monolithism and polycentrism—between centralisation and autonomy—has been characteristic of the movement during the last few years. It is at least possible that the Soviet leaders can meet this problem by institutionalising some process of collective decision-making for the international communist movement or by conferring with the Chinese and others as common problems arise. The statement of ' the 81 ' takes some pains to spell out a procedure for bilateral and multilateral consultation. In addition, by playing down the leadership role of the CPSU and stressing the independence and equality of parties, the Soviet leaders seem to be indicating their willingness to substitute some degree of shared responsibilty for dictatorial rule in the interests of preserving the unity of the communist movement. At the moment the situation in the movement is formal unity and actual cleavage—a condition that can endure for some time, given the shattering implications of a formal break between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Finally, it is not impossible that a two-headed communist movement might develop, with the Soviet and Chinese communists each bidding for the support of the national communist parties, a sort of intra-communist imperialism. In retrospect, Stalin's communist movement was a model of simplicity.

(This article is based on a paper read at a meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Chicago in March 1961.)

MARX, MARXISM, AND ETHICS, II

Eugene Kamenka

MARX, I have argued,[1] came to communism in the interests of freedom, not of security. In his early years he sought to free himself from the pressure exercised by the mediocre German police state of Frederick William IV. He rejected its censorship, its elevation of authority and of religion, its cultural Philistinism, and its empty talk of national interest and moral duty. Later he came to believe that such pressures, such human dependence, could not be destroyed without destroying capitalism and the whole system of private property from which capitalism developed.

At the end of his *Economico-Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, Marx paints a picture of the communist society, the society of true and ultimate human freedom. Sympathetic critics have called it the picture of a society of artists, creating freely and consciously, working together in perfect harmony. In such a society, Marx believed, there would be no state, no criminals, no conflicts. Each man would be caught up in productive labour with other men; the struggle would be a common struggle; the reward would be the work itself. Man would find in his work, and in other men, no dependence and unpleasantness, but freedom and happiness; just as artists find inspiration in their own work and in the work of other artists. Truly free men will need no rules imposed from above, no moral exhortations to do their duty, no 'authorities' laying down what is to be done. Art cannot be created by plans imposed from outside; it knows no authorities and no discipline except the authority and the discipline of art itself. This discipline and authority every artist accepts freely and consciously; it is this and this alone that makes him an artist. No government authority, no patron or overseer, can make him one. What is true of art, Marx believed, is true of all free, productive labour.

This vision of communism remained with Marx all his life. It comes out clearly in the *German Ideology* of 1846, in the notes and drafts he made between 1850–59 (published as *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, Berlin, 1953), in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* in 1875. It runs through all three volumes of *Das Kapital*. It is a vision of freedom, of spontaneous co-operation, of men's conscious self-determination. It is not a vision of economic plenty or social security. Engels may have seen communism that way; Marx did not. Freedom,

[1] In the first section of this article, published in *Survey* No. 35 (January–March 1961). For Marx's earliest ethical views, see also my 'The Primitive Ethic of Karl Marx', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 35 (1957), pp. 75–96.

for Marx, lay in struggle; but in conscious, co-operative struggle. The desire for security under the protection of authority seemed to him mean and base.

Marx's vision, I have argued, rests on a sound if unworked out perception of positive ethical distinctions. The fundamental weakness of Marx's thought lies in his failure to work out the distinction between freedom and servility in positive terms, in terms of the *character* of the processes and movements involved. It is only because Marx glosses over the positive character of social movements and ways of living that he is able to believe in a classless society, in a society in which the *conflict* of movements and ways of living has disappeared. The *transition* to socialism thus becomes something he simply cannot afford to examine seriously: the precise character of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 'values' and ways of living represented by the people in whose hands it would lie, have to be left out of account. Here he is driven back on a crude economic reductionism: the abolition of private property destroys the foundation on which competing interests rest.

SOCIALISM, on Marx's view, would be born out of capitalism. But it would be the society of true freedom and enterprise, in which the capitalist morality had been entirely destroyed. He was right in the first proposition and wrong in the second. Socialism was born of capitalism. But it was not the result of the catastrophic collapse of capitalism. On the contrary, it sprang from the very ideology fostered by capitalism: the concern with economic ends rather than ways of living, the belief in the universal exchangeability of all things, in the possibility of rational control of all things, seen as mere means to a commercial end. The socialist's vision of society, as Rosa Luxemburg once said of Lenin, is the capitalist's vision of a factory, run by an overseer. The conception of economic planning, Schumpeter pointed out in his *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, is a capitalist conception: the capitalist manager is the prototype of the socialist administrator. Both depend in their ideology on the commercial morality of utilitarianism: on the conception that all things can be treated and assessed as means to ends, and that ends can be reduced to a common measure.

Marx had a strong desire to believe that the proletariat, in its misery, yearned for initiative, enterprise, and freedom, that it rejected servility, careerism, and the concern with security as Marx himself had rejected them. It would not be bought off with ameliorated conditions, prospects of better rewards, or of 'opportunities' for the individual to 'better' himself. But Marx was not prepared to make such a claim part of his theory, to see socialism as the extension and culmination of the freedom and enterprise already displayed by the worker. Essentially, he stuck to his negative view of the proletariat as the *most suffering class*[2]: a

[2] This was the accusation which Marx and Engels, in the *Communist Manifesto*, flung at the Utopian socialists; yet they themselves remained open to the same charge.

class whose future was determined not by its character, but by its condition. This prevented him from paying serious attention to freedom and enterprise as historic traditions, operating in any society, strengthened and not necessarily weakened in the struggle against adversity. It prevented him from seeing the importance of other forms of production and other manifestations of the productive spirit in social life: of artistic and scientific production as continuing traditions capable of supporting and strengthening the productive spirit in industry. Instead, Marx chose to rely on 'history', to hold out to the proletariat the vision of a classless society *made safe* for goods, where enterprise and freedom would be *guaranteed* by the economic foundations of society itself, where freedom would not lie in struggle, but follow from mere existence. It is a servile conception, appealing, however unwittingly on Marx's part, to the desire for security and sufficiency, to the longing for certain returns. Its servile character was even further strengthened by the fact that it was Engels, with his blindness to alienation, with his crude evolutionism and his utilitarian concern with economic satisfaction, who became the 'ideologue'—the propagandist and populariser—of Marxism.

There can be no question that the labour movement, and even the socialist movement, was at no stage wholly given over to enterprise. The search for security, for welfare and economic sufficiency, was always a powerful motive within it. But there can also be no question that propaganda of a Marxist colour, with its insistence on ends and aims, its elevation of economic rewards, did much to destroy what enterprise there was. In their controversies with anarchists and syndicalists, Marxists may have been able to expose much that was utopian in both movements. But against the anarcho-syndicalist elevation of the free and enterprising character of the existing working class, Marxists were upholding a servile and unfree morality.

Partly as a result of Marx's failure to deal positively with ethical questions, to highlight the ways of life and of organisation, ethical distinctions did not play a central part in the splits and controversies that racked Marxism. The revisionists in the 1890s, it is true, made much ado about their Kantian ethics, and Bernstein proclaimed his seemingly sound slogan: 'The movement is everything, the goal is nothing'. But Bernstein, for all this, preached security and sufficiency all his life. The real issue confronting Marxists was not ethics, but the consequences of their neglect of ethics. Marx had been wrong in forecasting the imminent collapse of capitalism and the growing pauperisation of the worker; no longer driven by needs, the workers were displaying their preference for rewards and security over freedom and struggle. If one wanted to follow the worker, the Marxist vision of a radically new society born of struggle had to be abandoned. Socialism became a matter of negotiation for improved conditions and greater security within the existing society. This was the path of reformism. Notably, the Marxist neglect of ethics prevented Marxists from attacking reformism for its elevation of rewards

and security; the orthodox Marxists had to argue instead, quite implausibly, that the reformists were bound to fail, that increased rewards and greater security could not last under capitalism.

Orthodox Marxists, clinging to the vision, had to find a substitute for the proletariat. Lenin, drawing on Russian populism, found it in the revolutionary intelligentsia and the centralised, hierarchical party of professional revolutionaries acting as the 'vanguard' of the working class, driving it beyond the bread-and-butter politics at which the working class by itself would always halt. Enterprise was not to be won by the worker, but for him.

The bringing of freedom and enterprise *to* somebody is not a free but a despotic conception. Yet Marx, too, had seen freedom as something that would be brought *to* the worker by 'history'. Marx's work laid no foundations for exposing the course the Communist Party under Lenin was soon to follow. Indeed, his failure to see freedom as a force within history, his treatment of it as merely a final end, made it possible to erect despotism in his name.

MARX'S economic reductionism closed off the positive study of ethics and the commitment to a morality of freedom just as Marx himself was beginning to lay the foundations from which these might be developed. To the revolutionary socialist this was not so obvious while his primary struggle was against social slavery in the form of political bondage or crass economic dependence. With all its incoherences, Marx's reductionism had enabled him to emphasise the disparity between 'formal' and actual justice in the societies of class domination, to show the emptiness of 'rights to do' that were not accompanied by the actual capacity to do. In some societies, such as Victorian England, which occupied a favourable position in the world economy of their day, in which the standard of living was rising rapidly and the pressure of competition was not particularly severe, the Marxist analysis made no great ethical or political impact. Once the trade union leaders had won their struggle for the popular franchise, their interest in Marxism ceased almost entirely. It was not unnatural for the leaders of all sections of the community to confuse the benefits of a period of increasing prosperity with the effects of espousing a liberal morality and employing 'reason' in social affairs.

In 19th-century Russia there was no such rapid rise in prosperity, and no corresponding faith in the efficacy of conventional moral principles, orderly political negotiation, and legal rights. 'Legal rights have no value for a man unless he possesses the material means to benefit by them', wrote the Russian revolutionary N. G. Chernyshevsky at the time that Marx was writing *Das Kapital*. 'Man is not an abstract legal person, but a living creature. . . . A man who is dependent for his material means of existence cannot in fact be an independent human being, though his independence be proclaimed by the letter of the law.'

Subsequent Marxists in Russia had little difficulty in taking up this thread —common to both Chernyshevsky and Marx—and making it, together with the materialist rejection of supra-empirical 'norms', their main criticism of the 'class moralities' of the past. The insistence that there is no common or social interest above other interests in the class society, the rejection of unhistorical 'norms' and of the abstract 'individual', and the exposure of contradictions between formal 'rights' and actual social situations and capacities is the one steady and reasonably respectable theme running through Marxist and Soviet ethical writing to the present day.

In the pre-revolutionary days and in the early days immediately following the October Revolution there was also considerable emphasis on communist morality as the morality of freedom—but it came more from intellectuals captivated by the vision of a new society than from the professional, disciplined revolutionaries whom Lenin saw as the true bearers of communism. Both P. B. Struve and N. A. Berdyaev, during their brief Marxian period in the last decade of the 19th century, emphasised the Kantian dictum that the individual person must always be treated as an end and never as a means, while rejecting Kant's ethical formalism and his concern with 'abstract obligation'. Communism, to Berdyaev and Struve, as to Marx, was the social realisation of Kant's Universal Kingdom of Ends, in which all men would be co-operating subjects, and no man would use another as an object. In 1903, when both Struve and Berdyaev had turned away from Marxism, four other young Russian Marxists were proclaiming communism as the true dawn of the individual. They were A. V. Lunacharsky (1875–1933), later to become People's Commissar for Education under Lenin, Stanislav Volsky (pseudonym of A. V. Sokolov, 1880–1936?), A. A. Bogdanov (pseudonym of A. A. Malinovsky, 1873–1928), and V. A. Bazarov (pseudonym of V. A. Rudnev, 1874–1936). Lunacharsky and Volsky, as G. L. Kline points out,[3] drew heavily on the work and ideals of Nietzsche, explicitly rejecting any conception of moral obligation and upholding the individual as a free creator of values and ideals. Moral indoctrination, Lunacharsky wrote,[4] can generate nothing but slaves. The new social order will emancipate man completely, establish the individual's right to be guided in his life solely by his own desires. Admittedly, social and individual interests may clash; but the species has no existence apart from its individual members. 'What is a living powerful species if not an aggregate of living, powerful individuals?' In 'the splendid future', under the new social order, the interests of the individuals and those of society will be in complete harmony. Volsky took the same line, hardly less passionately but somewhat more coherently. Obligatory norms will

[3] 'Changing Attitudes Toward the Individual', in C. E. Black (Ed.): *The Transformation of Russian Society*. I have relied on a number of Dr. Kline's interesting citations from works not easy to obtain in the West.

[4] *Osnovy Pozitivnoi Estetiki* (*Foundations of a Positive Aesthetic*), St. Petersburg, 1905, cited by Kline, loc. cit., p. 619.

disappear with the defeat of capitalism. The bourgeoisie had freed the individual in the hour of revolution only to enslave him in the hour of triumph; the proletariat will command the individual in the hour of revolution only to free him in the hour of triumph. 'The class sees in itself something to be eliminated, the individual something to be asserted.' [5]

Bogdanov and Bazarov were also concerned to free the individual from coercive norms, but they did not see the socialist collective as an aggregate of powerful, self-driven individuals. The individual, rather, will become fused into the collective—as 'in ecstatic moments . . . when it seems to us that our tiny being disappears, is fused with the infinite'.[6] Individualism, both Bogdanov and Bazarov insisted, was a liberating movement in its conflict with authoritarianism, but becomes reactionary in its struggle against the socialist future. In the new society, emphasis will fall upon *sobornost* (organic togetherness), upon 'objective, immediately social creativity, in which the very notion of "the individual" and his interests will be extinguished'.

The upholding of ethical individualism, I have suggested, cannot provide a coherent answer to Marxism: there is some truth in Bazarov's suggestion that a free society would not be 'walled off into the miserable little cells of self-sufficient individualities'. The intimacy of lovers, he writes, gives only 'a faint hint of that fusion of all human souls which will be the inevitable result of the communist order'.[7] Similarly, when Bogdanov insisted that Goethe did not produce *Faust* or Darwin the theory of evolution, but that both men put the finishing touches to a collective effort, this is not quite as ridiculous as Kline suggests. Bogdanov had perceived, as had Bazarov, something of the mutually supporting character of artistic creation, scientific production and enquiry, the way in which these can 'transcend' individuals and become immersed in a tradition, appropriating materials furnished by others and carrying on where these left off. Recognising this, however, does not require us to minimise the role that any particular person—Goethe or Darwin—might play in shaping the finished product, whereas Bogdanov and Bazarov did patently wish to minimise this role. The new society, Bazarov wrote, will favour not 'artists of disorderly individual searching, but artists in schools which move by plan to their goal'. Here we have more than the correct recognition of the co-operative character of goods; here we have the reimposition of servility, the elevation of goals and ends over the spontaneous workings of the free and creative activity.

THE struggle between individualists and collectivists noted by Kline was resolved emphatically in favour of the collectivists by the regime that followed the October Revolution. Lunacharsky's period of grace

[5] *Filosofiya borby: opyt postroeniya etiki marksizma* (*The Philosophy of Struggle: An Attempt at Building a Marxist Ethic*), Moscow, 1909; Kline, p. 620.
[6] *Tseli i normy zhizni* (*The Goals and Norms of Life*), 1905, republished in *Novymir* (1920), p. 64; Kline, p. 261.
[7] *Na dva fronta* (*On Two Fronts*), St. Petersburg, 1910, p. 140; Kline, p. 623.

was short-lived ; the poet Blok died and the poet Esenin committed suicide ; the primacy of the proletarian revolution, of the party, of collective discipline and individual subordination and obedience were established with increasing firmness. By 1920, as Kline points out, Trotsky in his *Terrorizm i kommunizm* is denouncing the doctrine that individuals are ends in themselves as a metaphysical bourgeois doctrine : the proletarian and the revolutionary know that where necessary (for the revolution) the individual is and should be treated only as a means. The prominent party theorist A. B. Zalkind put the position bluntly five years later : ' For the proletariat, human life does not have metaphysical, self-sufficient value. The proletariat recognises only the interests of the . . . revolution '.[8] By and large, however, ethical speculation was increasingly discouraged ; intellectuals were treated with suspicion as ' individualists ' and possible dissenters ; a mounting campaign against ' free love '—though able to argue correctly enough that love does not become ' free ' through the variety of its objects—seemed far more concerned with the dangerous tensions between sexual protest and political obedience. The principle of collective criminal responsibility was revived to crush the peasantry; the principle of guilt by class-origin or kinship was used to crush the intelligentsia. Everything, it is true, was done in the name of freedom, seen as a goal soon to be achieved; but the immediate content of Soviet moral conceptions was the primacy of the victory of communism and of the rules and norms laid down by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The identification of ethics with obedience to the will of the Communist Party as the supreme authority of the Soviet Union was made possible through that very economic reductionism whose effects we have already noted. Communist morality was taken to represent the common social interest that emerges with the abolition of classes, and that common social interest was taken to be an economic interest, to be established by rational calculation and planning. The famous article 1 of the 1922 Civil Code, formulated as a basis for the compromise legal system during the semi-capitalist New Economic Policy, makes this clear : ' Civil rights shall be protected by law except in instances where they are exercised in contradiction with their social-economic purpose '. The independence of any field of human activity or theory—whether law or morality—was denied completely : to establish the common interest was the work of the social planner, not of the moral philosopher. This became absolutely clear in 1928, when the NEP compromise was abandoned and replaced by the five-year plans, designed to turn Soviet Russia, independently of world revolution, into a socialist society as quickly as possible. As Harold J. Berman puts it in his *Justice in Russia* (pp. 30–31) : ' Now for the first time positive content was given to the Marxist idea of the disappearance of State and Law under socialism. It was thought that Law, an instrument of the class-dominated State, would be replaced by

[8] Kline, p. 623.

Plan, the manifestation of the will of a classless society. Through the Plan all the characteristics of the original Marxist dream would be realised. Planning would eliminate exploitation ; money would be transformed into a mere unit of account ; private property and private right generally would be swallowed up in collectivism ; the family would disappear as a legal entity, with husbands and wives bound only by ties of affection and children owing their allegiance and their upbringing to the whole society ; crime would be exceptional and would be treated as mental illness ; the coercive machinery of the State would become superfluous. The Plan itself would differ from Law, since it would be an instrument neither of compulsion nor of formality but simply an expression of rational foresight on the part of the planners, with the whole people participating and assenting spontaneously. Society would be regulated, administered—much as traffic at an intersection is regulated by traffic lights and by rules of the road ; but in a society without class conflict there would be few collisions and to deal with them it would be unnecessary to have a system of " justice ". Social-economic expediency would be the ultimate criterion ; disputes would be resolved on the spot '. Socialist law, such leading Marxist theoreticians as Pashukanis and Stuchka argued, was a contradiction in terms ; absolute moral norms and ' principles ' were dismissed, following Engels' *Anti-Dühring*, as illusory reflections of socio-economic aims. If this was not sufficient to discourage ethical theorists to venture on the dangerous grounds of systematising communist ethics, the growing police terror and purges of Old Bolsheviks and party theoreticians that accompanied Stalin's increasingly centralised rule were sufficient.

THEN, in 1936, a major theoretical upheaval began. Socialist society, it was formally announced, had finally been achieved. Yet the conclusions that would have followed from this announcement were categorically denied. The State was not to wither away ; law was not to begin disappearing. On the contrary, Pashukanis and Stuchka were denounced as traitors, and Vyshinsky, in his *Law of the Soviet State* (1938), set out to show that a new period of vital, creative socialist law and socialist legislation was about to commence. The reasons were practical. A major crisis in Soviet social relations had been becoming increasingly evident. Soviet leaders were coming to recognise that radical Marxist theory had failed to gain the support of the masses or to cope with such widespread problems as juvenile delinquency and the instability of Soviet family life. The new concern was with social stability, with reinforcing the family, the love of country, and the security of ' ordinary life '. ' Free love ' was denounced, abortion controlled patriotism verging on Russian chauvinism strongly encouraged. There were major concessions to religion. ' Soviet legality ' was suddenly proclaimed a fundamental basis of Soviet social life. The exigencies of war produced heavy emphasis on conventional moral slogans and normative

exhortation ; they also led to increased stress on ' socialist humanism ', the respect for man which ' progressives ' had displayed in all ages and shared in all countries, even today in their struggle against the ' fascist beasts '. Forthright attacks on the importance of the individual suddenly disappeared from Soviet writing. Communism, theoreticians began to stress, means ' the true flowering of the individual '. Such flowering, however, ' is only possible on the basis of the leading role of social interest '.[9]

The vital and creative role of Soviet law had been stressed by Vyshinsky—for patently political reasons—in 1938. To ascribe a vital and creative role to Soviet morality would have been to depart even more dangerously from Marx's slogan that ' social being determines social consciousness ' and that morality only reflects the material life of man. Then, with Stalin's *Marxism and Questions of Linguistics* (1950), the supreme authority himself opened the way for treating the superstructure, including morality, as a vital and active force on the path to communism. ' The superstructure ', Stalin wrote, ' is born of the base, but this does not mean at all that it only reflects the base, that it is passive, neutral, that it is indifferent to the fate of its base, to the future of classes, to the character of the [social] structure. On the contrary, having come into the world, it becomes a mighty active force, actively helping its base to develop and grow stronger, taking all measures to help the new order to ruin and liquidate the old economic base and the old classes.' Thereafter, official encouragement was given to the creation and propagation of the theory and norms of communist morality. In 1951, a conference of Soviet and Czech philosophers expressed concern over the poor state of ethical teaching in communist countries. In the same year, Sharia published his *O nekotorykh voprosakh kommunisticheskoi morali*, stressing even more strongly than Stalin the active, creative role of consciousness : ' Marxism-Leninism teaches that not only the building of the new communist economy, but also the formation of the new communist consciousness of man is not self-propelled, is not a process dictated by fate, but follows from the many-sided and completely devoted educational work of the Bolshevik Party and of the Soviet administration ' (Introduction, p. 3).

Sharia, in his emphasis on conscious decision and limited free will, had perhaps gone somewhat further than Soviet authorities were willing to countenance ; he has written nothing on ethics since. But the emphasis on moral theory and propaganda continued, reinforced and not weakened after Stalin's death. Shishkin published his *Osnovy kommunisticheskoi morali* in 1955, and the first reasonably serious work on the history of ethical theory for many years, *Iz istorii eticheskikh uchenii* (*From the*

[9] A. I. Zis, *O kommunisticheskoi morali*, Moscow, 1948, p. 30. Cf. A. Shishkin, *Osnovy kommunisticheskoi morali*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 144f. and 247f., where he stresses the priority of the social interest and collectivism over individual interests, but balances this by devoting an entire section (p. 230 f.) to socialist ' respect and care for man '.

History of Ethical Doctrines), in 1959. In the same year, a conference of moral philosophers and party, industrial, educational, and Komsomol leaders met in Leningrad under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and of the Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education, to discuss the role of ethics in Soviet life. The conference ended by formulating a draft syllabus for ethical teaching in higher educational institutions and by publishing the papers presented before it.[10] All of the papers stressed the profoundly ethical nature of communism and the need for the most intensive moral education to overcome the vestiges of capitalism and of the anti-moral and amoral conceptions in human consciousness. Khrushchev, in his report to the XXI Congress of the CPSU, had underlined the importance of moral education : ' We must develop among Soviet people communist morality, at the foundation of which lie loyalty to communism and uncompromising enmity to its foes, the consciousness of social duty, active participation in labour, the voluntary observance of the fundamental rules of human communal life, comradely mutual help, honesty and truthfulness, and intolerance of those who disturb the social order '.

To these excellent sentiments Soviet philosophers and educational leaders found little to add.

SOVIET moral philosophers, then, have come down heavily on the conception we saw Marx and Engels develop in the *German Ideology* : the conception that morality is concerned with the *social interest*.[11] The morality of the new world is thus full of the abstract moral concepts of the old : duty to society, care for fellow-men, upholding of the social order, etc. To establish a difference, Soviet philosophers rely on the economic interpretation of history. The abolition of private property means that the social interest has truly been established, while in the capitalist society of private property and class distinctions it remains an illusion or a hypocritical cloak for the interests of the ruling class. Even in the period of the proletarian dictatorship, when morality still represents a class interest, it completely loses its hypocritical character : the proletariat, the overwhelming majority of mankind, needs no hypocrisy to cloak its interests, which are the interests of the vast majority of mankind. But its morality, before the revolution and after, is a mighty force, organising and fusing the masses, helping to destroy the old order and lay the foundations of the new. More and more, Soviet leaders emphasised the power of ideology, of moral exhortation and moral education.

The abandonment of ethical radicalism, of contempt for conventional moral slogans, has led Soviet philosophers not only to insist—following Engels in chapter IX of *Anti-Dühring*—that there has been continuous

[10] *Voprosy marksistko-leninskoi etiki* (*Questions of Marxist-Leninist Ethics*), Moscow, 1960.

[11] ' The relationship of individual and society, the relationship between personal and social interests—this is the *chief* content of morality ' (Sharia, op. cit., p. 23).

progress in morality, but to emphasise both that there are certain basic moral conceptions applicable in all ages, and that the 'progressive' thinkers of all times have gone beyond the conditions of their time to the morality of the future.

All this, in Soviet Russia at least, has so far produced no genuine ethical theory. Like the legal writers, moral philosophers have faced the basic difficulty that the need for moral or legal obligation can only be explained if individual and social interest do not truly coincide, while the difference between communist morality and other moralities can only be explained by saying that under communism individual and social interest do coincide. Sharia, indeed, tries to argue that individual and social interest in communist society harmonise without being identical: if they were identical, he concedes, there would be no moral 'alternatives' and no field for morality (p. 70). Morality, therefore, has to be based on the combination of two criteria: 'True moral evaluation cannot take place on the basis of the purely objective criterion of the usefulness of an action for the development of society, neither can it take place on the basis of the purely subjective criterion of personal pleasure—only the bringing together of both criteria gives us the underlying morality of action. Priority always belongs to the objective content of behaviour. This Marxist thesis refutes both the a-priorism of moral norms and creeping empiricism, i.e. the actual denial of moral principles altogether. *In this Marxist thesis the dialectical-materialist principle of the unity of the subject and object finds its concrete expression in the field of morality*' (p. 62, Sharia's italics). The reference to dialectical materialism, of course, is sheer mystification. Sharia's promulgation of two criteria does nothing to solve the problem—if this is a genuine problem—of harmonising individual and social interest: it merely restates that problem. Neither does any other Soviet ethical writer solve or seriously tackle this problem; the others gloss it over more skilfully—and more dishonestly.

The pedestrian character of Soviet ethics, its tedious preaching of ends and duties, emerges even more clearly in Shishkin's *Osnovy*, where he sets out the 'principles and norms [*sic*!] of communist morality'. His section heads give an adequate idea of the contents:

1. The victory of socialism in the USSR and the new conditions under which communist morality is formed.
2. Collectivism as a principle of communist morality:
   (a) The superiority of collectivism over bourgeois individualism
   (b) The social interest—the main interest of Soviet man
   (c) The concept of duty, honour, and conscience in communist ethics
   (d) Labour—a duty and matter of honour.
3. Patriotism and internationalism:
   (a) Attitude to the homeland as a moral problem
   (b) Devotion to the homeland and to the international brotherhood of the toilers—the main demand of communist morality.

4. Socialist humanism
   (a) Socialist humanism—the highest type of humanism
   (b) Respect for the worth of man and care of man
   (c) Hatred for enemies and vigilance—an inescapable feature of socialist humanism.
5. The moral foundations of friendship, marriage, and family :
   (a) Society and personal life
   (b) Friendship
   (c) Marriage and the family.
6. The moral qualities and character traits of the fighter for communism.

In all this, of course, there is not even a hint of the fundamental problem and difficulties of normative morality : no discussion of the logical and empirical basis of obligation, no consideration of the problems of moral ' justification ', no hint of the necessary vagueness of normative principles. The true basis of moral ' obligation ' in communist society emerges clearly enough when Shishkin heads the next and final section of his book : ' The Communist Party—the Mind, Honour, and Conscience of Our Time '.

(The third part of this essay, ' Personality under Communism ', will appear in a future issue.)

SOVIET MUSICAL LIFE

David Brown

CRITICISM is half blind which does not consider an artist's creative principles. This does not mean complete capitulation to the principles, but to assert that they can produce nothing good is arrogant and foolhardy. Soviet and Western music stem from the same recent tradition, but their courses during the past few decades have diverged so much that their current positions are widely separated and in many respects antagonistic. Today the Western listener finds it difficult to assess contemporary Soviet music justly, not because good and bad are not universal constants, but rather because the Western musical situation which conditions his critical attitudes may inhibit his recognition of the positive qualities of works produced by a radically different aesthetic. The temper of Western musical circles has become so avant-garde that anything traditional instinctively arouses suspicion. We have so lost faith in tradition that now it is impossible for all but the truly original artist to extend an old convention. Soviet musical aesthetics have no place for avant-gardism ; instead they direct composition along severely traditional lines. Our distrust is accordingly aroused, but before we dare to pronounce final judgment we must be sure that we have understood certain of the fundamentals of Soviet musical aesthetics.

The most critical cultural problem today is the relationship of the artist to society. The West is allowing the problem to resolve itself by the natural process of experiment and experience. Although there are periods in music history when this problem seems hardly to have existed, it is in fact as old and constant as art itself, being simply one manifestation of the eternal tension between the individual and society. Today the problem is with us in a most exacerbated form. As most people in the West see it, the artist alone can offer the solution. The presence of society will be the major formative influence upon that solution and may even determine whether it is successful or not. Society will ignore an art which has no relevance to it, and this neglect, reinforced by the intellectual evolutions which spring from vigorous debate, will no doubt enable the Western artist and society to discover finally a new level of communication.

If this relationship is in a state of flux here, the Soviet authorities have no two minds about it. The artist is a worker who must play his part in contemporary society. His works are to be written for his fellow workers ; they must reflect the life and spirit of society, acting both as glorious monuments to actual achievement and as inspirations to further and greater effort. Therefore they must be of their own time, be accessible to the workers, and be positive and optimistic in spirit. This is the

essence of ' socialist realism '. Nationalism is highly valued and emphasised. Anything which savours of individualism or pessimism has no part in such a concept and is unreservedly condemned.

Soviet musical composition is accordingly organised on a basis calculated to promote the realisation of these principles. The promising composer is provided with a thorough musical education based upon traditional lines. Any ' reactionary ' (i.e. avant-garde) tendencies encounter outright disapproval, but since in the Soviet Union there is an almost complete absence of scores of Western music (either approved or disapproved) of the last thirty or forty years, there is little chance of a composer becoming attracted by such ideas ; in any case he knows there will be no chance of success if he allows these influences to affect his work. Before a composition can be performed, it must be submitted to the Union of Composers for ' creative criticism ', and thus it is easy to thwart the performance of any work judged to be unclean. Since, in practice, convention and conformity mean success, there is little to tempt the composer to experiment technically or to expand his expressive range. In addition, since he is supported by the state, failure to produce works which are socially satisfactory will obviously cause enquiries and perhaps unfortunate personal consequences.

This is a mechanism of strict control. At the same time, since the idea of ' socialist realism ' may be clear in theory but is quite indefinable in artistic terms, it is possible to find (or not find) socialistically realistic features in almost any kind of music. In practice the criteria are suitability of ideological sentiment in the text (or susceptibility to conventional ideological interpretation in the musical form) and immediacy of appeal.

LET it be said here that there is no reason why music should not be both of good quality and consonant with these requirements—provided, of course, that they are not imposed too dogmatically. Unfortunately this has not happened in practice. The Western musician, asked what he knows of post-war Soviet musical life, will almost surely mention first (and probably last, too) the Zhdanov decree of 1948. Perhaps this is the most significant single event in Soviet musical history of the past fifteen years. What Zhdanov did was to interpret the principles of socialist realism in art in their crudest form. The creative leaders of Soviet music, Prokofiev, Myaskovsky, Shostakovich, and Khachaturyan were publicly discredited and musical expression was forcibly debased to a level which permitted no originality of thought. The post-Zhdanov compositions were, we may gather, compounded of bombast, triteness, and cliché ; their most memorable feature is that they are forgotten.

No subsequent event in Soviet musical history has been quite so spectacular, yet a cursory glance at the April 1961 number of *Sovetskaya Muzyka* is sufficient to show that things have changed. This issue is largely devoted to singing the posthumous praises of Prokofiev and

Myaskovsky, pride of place being given to articles on these former heretics by Shostakovich and Khachaturyan respectively. Not that this is symptomatic of an all-round volte-face in the official attitude to musical composition. Prokofiev and Myaskovsky, being both dead and therefore beyond the possibility of further errors, may be safely praised. In addition, Shostakovich and Khachaturyan write in that fulsome and anonymous style of so much Soviet writing on music which says all the expected things but nothing significant—except that Shostakovich would like to see Prokofiev's non-Soviet-period operas, 'The Fiery Angel', 'The Gambler', and 'Love of Three Oranges' in the current Soviet repertoire. Quite inevitably Zhdanovism is dead, since such debased ideals could not long survive; their own fruits must become their own condemnation. The events of 1948 can be understood more clearly against the background of the early years of the cold war as a symptom of insecurity and the need to ensure a complete discipline at home. The increased confidence of the Soviet authorities shows itself not only in Mr Khrushchev's boisterous personal diplomacy but in a greater relaxation towards musicians; the basic principles of Soviet music aesthetics remain, however, unaltered.

Before approaching recent Soviet music itself, we must distinguish between the continuation of the Russian musical traditions of the old centres of European Russia, and the newly developed musical centres of the Asiatic republics. These latter have no long tradition of a developed Western-style musical culture and the attempts to evolve a more complex art by the grafting of Western musical techniques upon the native stock have not yet had time to mature; if the products from these centres do seem conventional and unremarkable, we should suspend our censure. But positive results should be forthcoming from composers in Western Russia who have been brought up and work in the tradition inherited from Glinka, Balakirev, and Tchaikovsky. A traditional, fundamentally nineteenth-century idiom is to be expected, but this is not necessarily to be condemned.

Nevertheless, to judge from the relevant scores which I have been able to examine, the picture is miserably depressing. Perhaps it is fairest to base any assessment upon works which have been performed in circumstances which suggest that they are considered by Soviet musical circles to be the cream of contemporary composition. A symphony by Andrei Eshpai (born 1925) was included in a concert given by the USSR symphony orchestra at this year's Prague Spring Festival and was given world-wide radio coverage. This work showed a complete lack of invention, was utterly commonplace in intention and almost incredibly short-winded. The same impressions are afforded by the score of his piano concerto—yet Eshpai seems to enjoy considerable respect and official success in the Soviet Union. Mercifully this is not the best. Andrei Volkonsky is a composer who has been mentioned favourably in the English press and his piano quintet (not by any means his best work, I am assured by a quite impartial English critic) was performed recently at the Wigmore

Hall in London. While leaning heavily on Brahms, it did at least show intermittent efforts at real composition as opposed to fabrication and conventional gesture. Its tone was genuinely serious but, to my hearing, its most remarkable feature was an absence of any noticeably Russian character. This is perhaps an encouraging sign, for the contemporary Soviet composer will benefit much if he is allowed to draw his creative nourishment from a wider tradition than that of his own country. Self-consciousness nationalism can only lead to parochialism. There is no point in dilating here on such mediocrity; suffice it to say that, of the relevant scores I have examined, most come closer to Eshpai's symphony than to Volkonsky's quintet in attainment.

FROM the pages of the Soviet musical press it is possible to pinpoint some of the causes of the poverty of contemporary Soviet composition. The March 1961 issue of *Sovetskaya Muzyka* devotes its first pages to the forthcoming congress in October of the Soviet Communist Party. It starts with all the usual familiar communist attitudes and platitudes. Soviet music must establish closer contact with the hearts of the people. It has, of course, already achieved much ; Soviet song and the major works of Soviet composers are world-famous and Soviet musical culture has spread from the European centres of western Russia to the farthest republics of the Soviet Union. But after this inevitable and uninformative preamble, there comes a change :

> But as the level of Soviet musical culture rises and its horizons widen, so the ' blind spots ' become clearer. There are still very few titles of operas by Soviet composers to be seen on theatre posters ; successful productions on themes from contemporary life are isolated events. In ballet the search for a contemporary theme is carried on half-heartedly and is almost imperceptible. Composers, ballet-masters, and theatres obstinately seek for ' inspiration ' in ancient tales, legends, classical literature. . . . The lack of suitable libretti is the usual explanation for this retreat from actual, present-day problems. But why is it, then, that not one of the scenarios on a contemporary theme which received prizes in the all-Union competition organised in 1959 by the Ministry of Culture of the USSR has yet aroused the serious interest of either composers or theatres ?
>
> Occasionally in some new pieces of programme music there is an absence of the true inspiration of our time, of concrete imagery of the living pulse of our restless and joyful life. The voice of Soviet song has become more silent and monotonous. . . . Criticism has often expressed alarm at the condition of this important genre, but there is still no noticeable improvement. . . .
>
> Unfortunately in recent years creative discussions in composers' organisations have rarely been successful. . . . The primary auditions of works by composers of the Russian Federation which have taken place in Moscow provide much material for heated creative discussions. However, at the judging sessions there were in fact no such arguments. Is this not a consequence of a lowering of standards, of lack of adventure in criticism ? Works of varying artistic standards

were heard at the auditions, but almost all of them, with few exceptions, received a favourable verdict. These instances again confirm that creative discussion must be carefully prepared. . . . Such preparation will help revive the interest of composers, especially the young ones, in candid and sincere debate and an impartial exchange of views. . . .

It must be frankly stated that much of what has been done by Soviet composers has not yet become the property of a wide public, basically because of the feeble and sometimes extremely inattentive work of concert organisations, radio, television, and many performers. If one considers the scale of concert and theatre activity, it is not difficult to see that propaganda for Soviet music, both at home and abroad, is intolerably poor. Many performers . . . assign a very small place in their programmes to the contemporary, indigenous repertoire. . . . But how much magnificent music—symphonic, vocal, chamber—written at various times by Soviet composers, remains safely forgotten only because of the inertia of philharmonic societies and their performers? How slowly, for example, do the remarkable vocal-symphonic productions of Soviet music enter the repertoire of our choirs and orchestras! But the majority of these embody images of contemporary reality. . . . For example, whose responsibility is it that the 'Pathetic Oratorio' of Sviridov, which won a Lenin prize, was only twice in as many years exported from Moscow; to Leningrad and recently to Gorky? . . . Why is the work of our best collectives planned with so little thrift?

There is no need to read between the lines to realise that the authorities know all is not well. We might add Mr Khrushchev's words: 'The art and literature of our country can and must become the greatest in the world, not only in richness of content [i.e. ideology] but in artistic skill and craftsmanship [i.e. technique and expressive quality]'. The sterility of the mass song, employed as an instrument for the propagation of political attitudes in conditions of mass emotion aroused by a musical setting of uncomplicated character, is easily understood and even inevitable. This genre received great encouragement under Zhdanov aesthetics but the fruits, despite gratifying quantity, were of low quality. Early in 1954, *Pravda* published a lengthy piece clearly exposing the decline of this genre and damning recent examples as banal in words and music and out of touch with the reality they purported to describe. A quotation from one lyric is enough to show what the authorities were up against:

'We built palaces for cows and calves. And we only lack showers, parquet floors, and radiograms. Wait, wait—it will all come'.[1]

The mass song's stereotyped and basic emotional level offers no creative stimulus to the good composer and can only elicit an artificial response. A glance at any anthology of Soviet song or at the recent examples in issues of *Sovetskaya Muzyka* tells its own story. The situation in 1961 is no better than in 1954—nor, in the very nature of things, is there much hope of improvement.

[1] *Pravda*, 8 February 1954: 'O pesne', by G. Khubov.

As for the rest of the above-quoted article, it is the despair which gives cause for hope. So long as the authorities realise (albeit for the wrong reasons) that all is not well with Soviet music, and organisations and performers decline (perhaps for very right reasons) to perform this music, a condition exists under which change becomes both possible and inevitable. What is desperately needed, perhaps even more than the writer of the article realises, is a real, free music criticism which can both influence the attitude of the political authorities to composers, reveal to the composers the impoverished quality of their work, and at the same time aid them in their search for a technique appropriate for their expressive needs. In practice Soviet musical criticism always assumes the same form of ideological interpretation and justification, as the following typical specimen from the same issue of *Sovetskaya Muzyka* demonstrates. The author, Kiril Kondrashin, is known in the West as one of the most respected of Russian conductors ; the work under discussion is a symphony by A. Nikolaev :

> While I was preparing to conduct one of the concerts of the session of the Union of Composers of the RSFSR, I made acquaintance for the first time with the symphony by the young Muscovite, A. Nikolaev. I immediately found it both likeable and memorable. The most winning quality of the music was its optimism. . . . As I got to know the music better, I felt that both its optimism and its unity were conditioned above all by the clarity of its ideological conception. It seems to me that the symphony embodies one image of many facets—the image of a young Soviet man—and expresses his healthy outlook. Neither dramatic nor tragic events can crush the will of the hero who is confident in his faith, who keenly apprehends the life around him, and takes an equal share in its evolution.

Then follows a detailed ideological interpretation of each part of the symphony. Of part of the first movement, he writes :

> The second theme—the main part of the exposition—is given forth quietly like the lyrical meditation of a bright contemplative intellect. But in the development its character changes sharply. . . . The stormy tempo and the emotional pressure give the impression that a whirlwind has suddenly blown up. The recapitulation, however . . . introduces peace. The coda of the first movement brings the listener back to the peaceful image of the introduction. Light shines through the transparent tones of two flutes to which are added the clear notes of the celeste and the piccolo. Thus open the first pages of the life of a young man. . . . Suddenly [after the scherzo] a slow (lento) calm melody emerges on the flute and introduces the third movement. I interpret this as the universal image of fresh love, helping the hero to surmount everything strange and alien which he meets on life's way. . . . In turn a new image arises—the picture of a triumphant procession.

> With quiet assured tread our hero strides through life, confident in his strength. Against the muffled background of the procession, the lyrical first theme is again heard, thus, as it were, uniting the feelings of love and citizenship.[2]

And so on. Adverse criticism is confined to two small points.

These extracts from a typical piece of 1961 Soviet music criticism clearly expose the dead end into which this criticism has been driven. Such interpretation is nothing but imagination, for music is simply music and can never contain concrete imagery ; if it did, there would be no need to describe it verbally. The Soviet delusion that music can and must have extra-musical content drives the Soviet critic into devoting the greater part of his time and space to reading into the music those ideological phenomena which it must ' express ' before it becomes legitimate. A critic who has been conditioned by years of ' socialist realism ' indoctrination must inevitably find his critical faculty inhibited if the work manifests technical and expressive attitudes adjudged to be politically correct. But musical sensitivity has only been repressed. Both authority and the composers say that there should be heated and vigorous discussion of Soviet music, the composers adding that there should be a broader interpretation of what is good in contemporary music.

HERE is the central dilemma of Soviet music. There can be no discussion unless it is admitted that there is the possibility not only of an opposite viewpoint but that this other viewpoint may be correct. Discussion is impossible unless controversial features are freely allowed in Soviet music. In practice this would mean the opening of musical doors to admit many forbidden Western currents. Some Soviet composers, notably Shostakovich and Khachaturyan, have requested this, sometimes very openly.

Whether the authorities like it or not, the Soviet composer is faced with the same crisis of technique and expression which confronts his Western colleague. This does not mean that the composer must throw in his lot with the avant-garde in order to survive creatively ; it is not necessary for a twentieth-century composer to abandon tonality in order to write good music. Therefore the outlawing of serialist and non-tonal methods does not create an impossible situation for the Soviet composer. To take a historical precedent—three and a half centuries ago the great Italian composer Monteverdi, who embraced wholeheartedly the ' new music ' of the early seventeenth century, could still write with full conviction in the old style of the previous century. But Monteverdi's ' old-fashioned ' works, far from being sterile pastiches, were animated by the dramatic spirit and expression of the new style. For all its technical traditionalism, the music was therefore contemporary and must

[2] *Sovetskaya Muzyka*, March 1961, pp. 34-36. A further specimen of Soviet music criticism is afforded by the *Musical Times* of April 1961, pp. 226–28, in which is printed in full Yuri Keldysh's critical article from *Sovetskaya Muzyka* on Shostakovich's recent 8th string quartet.

undoubtably have sounded new and not as immediately acceptable to the conservative listener as the music of the end of the previous century. The basic mistake of the Soviet authorities has not been to insist upon a traditional technique, but to have imposed a circumscribed, ideologically-perverted emotional range, and to have demanded a music readily accessible to the masses and therefore, perforce, compounded of familiar, pre-digested emotional elements. Repelled by serial and non-tonal methods, they have failed to see these simply as one solution of a particularly urgent present need to reach a new stage in the evolution of the whole tradition of Western music, of which Soviet music is still a part. By stifling its expressive evolution, the political-ideological authorities have made Soviet music sterile. New cultural movements (including those of the past most valued in the Soviet Union today) have the habit of starting in minority groups. Such groups are not allowed to exist in the Soviet Union, nor are 'individualist' composers. Unfortunately, however, the converse of individuality is not universality but anonymity.

So far no account has been taken of the most important figure and factor in Soviet music today. Dmitri Shostakovich is the one composer of definite genius and positive achievement working in the Soviet Union. Being a genius, he is an individual, and as such has lived a somewhat stormy but dogged life amid the varying changes of temper in Soviet cultural attitudes. His most notable collisions with authority were in 1936 and 1948 ; now, however, his position at the head of Soviet music seems assured. Five years after his last fall from grace, Shostakovich brought out his tenth symphony, a severe and serious work which, while flying in the face of Zhdanovism, compelled acceptance by its sheer strength and musical quality. This challenge to current official attitudes weathered the storm, and when the equally serious violin concerto appeared two years later (1955 ; it had been in an advanced state of composition before the Zhdanov affair, but was withheld for reasons which must now seem rather obvious) it received a more unanimous press. Since then he seems to have followed his own creative impulses freely without direct political interference. There is no reason to doubt that Shostakovich is a sincere communist, but his character accords uneasily with that demanded of the Soviet composer. Perhaps, paradoxically, this is the greatest single service he can render Soviet music. A genius, if sufficiently persistent (Shostakovich obviously is), will finally compel acceptance by the sheer quality of his works. When the cry of Soviet musical policy is for the expression of 'optimism'—which in musical terms so often means synthetic jollity and bombastic codas—Shostakovich has actively demonstrated that music of a more sombre cast can appeal to a Soviet audience and is relevant to their own experience. Perhaps this is the most hopeful current sign in Soviet music.

CHERNIKOV AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

Arthur R. Sprague

IN 1933, during a period crucial to the development of Soviet art, an architect and professor of geometry, Iakov Chernikov, published a book entitled *Architectural Fantasies* [1] which included one-hundred and one exquisitely drawn colour plates of imaginary building complexes. The volume has great value as an artistic document, not only for a study of the constructivist style but as a work of art in its own right. It has been referred to by writers in both the Soviet Union and the United States as a brilliant production worthy of examination in all respects, and as a work of the highest aesthetic order. When the book was published, however, it was denounced by the official organ of Soviet architectural circles of the day, *Arkhitektura SSSR*, as 'luxurious trivia' and 'absurdity'.

Architectural Fantasies was both the high point of the constructivist movement in Russia and its swan song. In earlier works, Chernikov had presented his theories of constructivist architecture and he brought them to fruition with the fantasy series. Constructivism took its origins from an amalgam of Italian Futurist influence, profoundly and extensively affecting the Petrograd-Leningrad avant-garde during the years 1914 to 1930, with various manifestations of post-cubist (De Stijl, Bauhaus) thought as set forth in Russia by such figures as Malevich, Lissitsky, and Tatlin. Although Chernikov does not acknowledge any specific source for his theories, certain influences are evident, such as the work of the Italian Futurist architect Sant'Elia, the German Gropius, and the Dutch van Doesberg. It is more likely that much of this came to him by way of Malevich and Lissitsky, since both these men were very active in Leningrad during the period of Chernikov's education there. This period (ca. 1920–1930) was one of extreme theorising in all directions in the arts. The more advanced artists and architects had identified the cause of liberal thought and experimentation in the arts with the spirit, if not the tenets, of the October Revolution, and, during the early years, the most fantastic and bizarre projects were planned. However, because of the exigencies of the civil war of 1918–20 and the resulting lack of funds and material, little of this ever got beyond the planning stage. Tatlin's howitzer-inspired *Monument to the Third International* is the classic case in point. Other factors contributing to the turmoil of early Soviet art were the conflict among the various schools of thought within the avant-garde itself, and what appears to have been a fairly general confusion

[1] Iakov Chernikov, *Arkhitekturnye Fantazii* (Leningrad, 1933).

within the artist himself in the face of well-nigh overwhelming possibilities. This was combined with an almost childish idealism and an ignorance of hard political realities.

Artistic theorising of this period in Russia is of great interest; it consisted primarily of a reduction of the elements of cubism to complete non-objectivism, intermingled with an almost religious veneration of pure geometric form. The following passages from writings of the nineteen-twenties are indicative of this:

> The capitalist individualist, when trying to express his personality, prefers the horizontal line. . . . The socialist, on the other hand, prefers the climbing horizontal line (spiral) which embraces his fellow men in its course and soars upwards to embrace the heavens. The spiral is a line of liberation for humanity . . . a symbol of disinterestedness and of the converse of earthly prettiness.[2]

This type of thinking can be found in Chernikov as well:

> In every constructive unification is manifest the idea of the collectivism of mankind. In the close cohesion of the elements among themselves is reflected the concord of all the finer aspirations of man.[3]

It would not be accurate to include Chernikov with the mystical theorists of the previous decade. His more mature attitudes seem to have been arrived at after much hard and thoughtful analysis of form and function, based on the actual experience of creative work and on a knowledge of design principles. His attitude towards geometric-symbolic design is summed up in the preface to *Architectural Fantasies*, wherein he takes strong exception to notions that suprematist design and constructivist form should be applied to all the artifacts of daily life. Apparently annoyed at the critical predicament the movement had got itself into in earlier years by having dealt in trivia,[4] he tried to convey his conviction that the validity of constructivism lay in its applicability to the process of architectural composition.

The impact of the machine on Russian artistic thought was powerful and was in keeping with a revolution which had glutted the press and daily conversation with machine ideology and whose fundamental object was to take over the productive *machinery* of the country and through industrialisation make it into a major world power.

> We saw projects elaborated for theatres in the form of electric dynamos, clubs in the shape of water turbines, and Palaces of the People serrated with toothed cogwheels; to say nothing of public libraries modelled on oil-fired boilers.[5]

[2] Cited by Bertholde Lubetkin in 'The Russian Scene', *The Architectural Review* (London), May 1932.

[3] Chernikov, *Konstruktsiya Arkhitekturnykh i Mashinnykh Form* (2nd ed., Leningrad, 1931), p. 81.

[4] Cf. K. A. Jelenski, 'Avant-Garde and Revolution', *Arts* (New York), October 1960, p. 37.

[5] Lubetkin, loc. cit.

The idea of a machine-building metamorphosis was short-lived, however, along with howitzer-like monuments. Chernikov wrote a treatise on machine form,[6] but this reveals more a fascination with discoveries of novel and powerful forms with which to work than any notion of transformation of the object itself.

Another instance of the popularity of machine thought in Russia at that time is to be found in the fascination exercised by the American boom of the twenties. Visits by prominent Soviet personalities to the USA (viz. Gorkii and Mayakovskii, both of whom wrote on the subject) were frequent, and Chernikov's interest is indicated by a swirling, futuristic *Monument to Columbus*[7] in purple and orange, reminiscent of Boccioni's *Development of a Bottle in Space* in conception, but on a heroic scale. It is more likely that it was immediately derived from Iakulov's design for a *Monument to the Twenty-Six Commissars of Baku*[8] (ca. 1924), but with the amusement-park frivolity and incongruous Palladian references distilled out.

ACCORDING to a recent chronology of Chernikov's career,[9] unfortunately my only source for biographical material, he came from humble origins. Born in Pavlograd in 1887, he was in Odessa in 1904 and, while working for a trucker, took up the study of photography. He attended the Odessa art school from 1907 to 1914, where he was evidently an outstanding student since he received a (paid ?) recommendation to the academy in Petrograd. There he managed simultaneously to achieve the equivalent of a college education at the Pedagogical Institute and to attend classes in the Faculty of Architecture of the Academy of Art. He served in the Imperial Army during the first world war and returned to the Institute in 1917, where he ended his general education while still assigned to an army position. In 1918 he left the (now Red) army and continued at the Academy, receiving his architect's degree in 1925. He began his teaching career in 1923 with courses in rendering, in which he himself had excelled. In 1926 he was teaching at the Leningrad Institute of Railway Transportation. It was in this year that he became a member of the Leningrad Society of Architects which published his early theoretical works.

As far as I know, no work which Chernikov personally designed was ever built. In 1930, he submitted a design in competition for the cable department of the Leningrad factory, *Krasny Gvozdilshchik* (Red Nailer)[10] which is quite similar in outward appearance to Gropius' Model Factory at the 1914 Werkbund Exhibition at Cologne.

In 1933, *Architectural Fantasies* was published and in that year he began teaching descriptive geometry. 1933 was also the decisive year for

[6] Chernikov, *Konstruktsiya. . . .*
[7] Chernikov, *Osnovy Sovremennoi Arkhitektury* (2nd ed., Leningrad, 1931), Plate 2.
[8] Jean Badovici, ' Le Mouvement Constructif Russe ', *Architecture Vivante* (Paris), IV, 1926.
[9] Preface to Chernikov, *Postroenie Shriftov* (Moscow, 1956). Published posthumously.
[10] *Ezhegodnik Obshchestva Arkhitektov i Khudozhnikov* (Leningrad, 1930), p. 134.

the determination of the direction Russian art was to follow in the future. It was the climax of a storm of controversy which had been brewing since the revolution and which was heightened in the field of architecture by the dispute arising from the international competition for the Palace of the Soviets in Moscow of 1931. Two years later, in 1933, the forces which supported the conservative, practical (' proletarian ') approach to architecture (whether dedicated or opportunist remains to be seen), and which were to lead to the later hodge-podge of pseudo-functionalist and corny neo-classic design in Soviet architecture, won out over more liberal factions ; the denunciation of the latter, now dubbed formalists, began with a vengeance.

In fact, 1933 was a bleak year all round, since it also saw the closing of the Bauhaus in Germany with the advent of the Nazis, and stricter control of the arts in Italy. The third issue of *Iskusstvo* in 1933 contains a bitter denunciation of the joining of forces by the Fascists and Futurists, as well as a leading article attacking formalism in Russian painting.[11] It is ironical that hostility to fascist ideology was combined in Russia with opposition to liberal movements in art, which began to be associated indiscriminately with fascism by their critics, while the avant-garde in Germany and Italy was being accused of Bolshevism.

In Leningrad, it was in an atmosphere of rapidly deepening shadow that Chernikov took up his position under the critical spotlight.

CHERNIKOV'S use of constructivist ideas is highly sophisticated. He reduces the proposed architectual complex to a total design devoid of any applied decor and develops the entire composition with colour as an integral factor to create a rendering that is a work of art in itself. The absence of minor detail is a logical consequence of thinking in terms of the wholeness of the work. (It is interesting to note that the first French publication to deal extensively with the constructivist movement in Russia contains in the same issue Adolphe Loos' essay ' Crime et l'ornament '.[12]) It is difficult to determine precisely what Chernikov has in mind in his drawing, since his approach seems to involve this concept of total architecture expressed as a work of art within the realm of fantasy. Unhampered by consideration of actual building problems or technical matters, these drawings may be, in reality, a species of precisionist painting which has an accidental origin in architectural thought. They seem to be aiming to create an entirely new work of art rather than offering solutions to any specific architectural problem. Granted that these are often equipped with titles such as ' project for a theatre ', ' chemical plant ', and so on, their effect is that of extremely exotic, somewhat sculptural, futuro-constructivist paintings. The actual craft of drawing is used with such complete command that Chernikov can be thought of as a

[11] B. Nikolaev, ' Italianskii Fashizm i Iskusstvo '; Osip Beskin, ' Formalizm v Khudozhestve ', *Iskusstvo* (Leningrad), No. 3, 1933.

[12] *Architecture Vivante* (Paris), IV, 1926.

master artist and his works stand on their aesthetic value alone without depending on architectural origin for whatever merit they may possess. In the *Fantasies* Chernikov was, in brief, a good deal more interested in pursuing an artistic search than in planning actual buildings. His design for the ' Red Nailer ' cable plant, since it was dealing with the possibility of an actual building, relies on the ideas of a successful industrial architect, Gropius, and offers practical solutions to its problem. There is little here of the soaring play of line and magical integration seen in the ' fantastic ' compositions.

As a whole, Chernikov's theoretical writing deals with problems that are a good deal more germane to the artist than the builder. He writes in a very strong Russian style that has the powerful ring of conviction. His language is authentic ' slavic ' Russian. He is given to rather extravagant flights of fancy but these do not mar the poetic effect of his exposition and, in view of the extremes of his visual imagination, were certainly excusable. At a time when a great many Russians were given to incorporating entire phrases from European languages into their speech and writing, Chernikov's vocabulary is surprisingly strong in pure slavic roots. He compounds these into neologisms to make his point even where a long accepted (and, by comparison, much flatter) expression would suffice, or where a term deriving from Latin or from one of the European languages would have been more fashionable. Indeed, his development of a theory of constructivist composition might apply to his syntax as well as to his visual design.

> The fundamental idea of constructivism consists in uniting objects or bodies in known principles of combination with themselves so that they present a completely harmonic form which gives a perfectly defined impression to our brain.

This statement is elaborated by a series of eleven laws of constructivist design :

1. All that can be united in principles of constructivism, whether material or immaterial, is always subject to the fixing of our brain with the aid of vision, sound, and association.
2. Every construction will present itself as a construction only when it possesses rational justification of the unification of its elements.
3. When the elements group themselves on the basis of harmonious interrelation with one another, then full constructive union is attained.
4. The elements, uniting into a new whole, form a construction when they take root in one another, clasp one another, grapple together, jam against one another ; that is, when they manifest active participation in the motion of unification.
5. Each constructive unification is a totality * of percussive moments (of force) in distinct stages of a developing entirety of impression.

   * (*sovokupnost*; an alternative, less abstract noun from the same root, *sovokuplenie*, means copulation.)

6. Every new construction is a result of man's searching, of his inventively creative needs.

7. All that is actually constructive is beautiful. That which is beautiful is perfect. All that is perfect is a contribution to the culture of the future.
8. In every constructive unification is manifest the idea of the collectivism of mankind. In close cohesion of elements is reflected the concord of all the finer aspirations of man.
9. Every constructive decision must have a reason, the basis of which is to build.
10. In order to create a constructive image, it is absolutely necessary to have knowledge, not only of the foundations of constructivism, but of the elements of reproduction.
11. Before acceptance of the final image, constructive reflection must pass through all unnecessary and possible steps of development and building.[13]

This is not the place for anything approaching a considered evaluation of this mass of theory. It must suffice to recognise certain basic motives for these laws, motives which reveal an extremely interesting mind trying to verbalise a hardly attainable set of quasi-Pythagorean formulas in order to account for real discoveries in the realm of abstract art. It hardly need be pointed out that this has little bearing on the uses of poured concrete, glass, and steel ; but it does say much for the quality and depth of Chernikov's imagination. The basic humanity of his theory goes far beyond the empty prating of better living conditions for the proletariat, which the ' formalists ' were being accused of maliciously ignoring for purposes of self-aggrandisement. The language of laws 5 and 10 is somewhat puzzling. While students of Freud who know Russian may find the fifth clear enough in intent and certainly poetic, the apparent reference to the facts of life in the tenth is, to say the least, enigmatic.

Chernikov's continued emphasis on ' unification ', ' wholeness ', and ' totality ' is evident in his designs, which are masterpieces of compositional integration. In his discussion of the uses of colour, he repeatedly mentions its use as an element of design unification.

In addition to colour, Chernikov occasionally incorporates lettering into his ' fantastic ' complexes. While this is often intended as a sign-like notification of the building's function, meaningless combinations of letters are sometimes integrated into the design. This may have roots in the cubist use of letters on the picture surface, but it seems rather to involve integration of the letter as a design element than as an associative, decorative, or functional element. That Chernikov was interested in letters-as-design is borne out by the fact that he did later become *the* Russian authority on letter design, and that his treatise on this subject, published posthumously, contained a glowing introduction, as well as a tribute to the man himself as a master designer. This is characteristic of the convenient, if weird, phenomenon of a work's containing its own reviews which is the accepted practice with publications of this sort in the Soviet Union.

[13] Chernikov, *Konstruktsiya*, pp. 81–84.

THERE is a possibility that the constructivism of Chernikov represented a working union of the illusion of movement with what may perhaps be termed the Futurists' liberation of light: Jean Badovici, writing in *Architecture Vivante*, commented on this: 'C'est cette systematisation des vibrations de la lumière et des mouvements des plans, présentie par les futuristes, que les Russes réalisent aujourd'hui'. The fantasies would then appear as a recapitulation of those two factors, the illusion of motion and the release of light from the object, which were major innovations of the first third of the century in the realm of the visual arts. Chernikov's concern with volume, plane, and line (i.e. the 'elements' of Law 4), manifesting an '*active* participation in the *motion* of unification', and his use elsewhere of such terms as '*advancing* and *receding* masses', '*protruding* disturbances', '*participating* forms', consort fully with the shifting, spiralling, always moving aspect of the fantasy compositions. Indeed, plates 17 and 18 of the *Architectural Fantasies* might be stylised analytical drawings of tornadoes running full blast.

Many of the designs are prophetic. Plate 68 could be a contemporary radar installation, and the drawings teem with radio and TV antennae, gigantic cranes, gantries, cantilevers, glass towers, and sweeping elevated transportation systems. Many have the quality of pure painting. Plates 56 and 95 are very similar to actual works by Kandinsky, and others remind one of works by Stella or even Riopelle (Pl. 58), the Canadian 'abstract-impressionist'. Chernikov's work clearly forecasts much of modern construction, from Texas towers to views from the top of an Empire State Building which could only have existed in his imagination.

One motif that occurs in plates 16, 19, and 21 is worthy of mention. It consists of a rising, spiral, open-work square tube which has the appearance of a transportation construction. In mid-flight, as it were, it comes to a rather disturbing dead end, much as the chicken-wire barrier does near the top of Wright's otherwise breathtaking spiral in the Guggenheim Museum, which prohibits further advance. If an artistic motif can symbolise a state of mind or anxiety, it is perhaps possible to hazard the notion that for Chernikov this dead end represented the year 1933.

Chernikov had attempted to reconcile his constructivist convictions with the needs of the new state:

> We are convinced that the correct solution of problems of constructivist form are of importance to all areas of human endeavour. . . . Constructivism must meet all demands of contemporary life and fulfil the needs of the 'collective client'—the people.[14]

Architectural Fantasies, however, professed to be, quite frankly, an exposition of the possibilities of constructivist design and a series of the *kind* of preliminary theoretical drawing which could profitably be used by other architects. At no point did he pretend to be presenting actual architectural possibilities; he was exercising his responsibility as a major artist and master draftsman to publish what he rightly considered to be

[14] Chernikov, *Konstruktsiya*, p. 221.

valuable discoveries in the realm of architectural *fantasy*. The prime purpose of the work is then to encourage architects to exploit their imaginations, their drawing ability and sense of design, by presenting masterful examples of his own which were, for his part (and only incidental to the purpose for which the book was published) highly satisfying works of art and exercises in form.

The following review appeared in the August 1933 issue of *Arkhitektura SSSR* (Leningrad) :

> The book, from beginning to end, is filled with a tasteless rehash of the long well known suprematist and expressionist seeking for new ways. These luxurious trivialities of Chernikov's are set off by abundant and especially bungling ' captions ' :
> ' Musical-rhythmatics, complecto-interassembled structure in spatial solutions '
> ' Architecturally composed whim of variegated assemblings ' . . .
> What means this morose dreaming? And how, in 1933, could Soviet publishers waste expensive polygraphic resources on these weighty absurdities with such exclusive splendour?

The review is written in scathingly sarcastic criticese and in a vulgarly condescending tone. It is pure denunciation in the classic Soviet tradition that ranges from lack of concern for accuracy (' suprematist and expressionist ') to the manipulation of the quotations. The review omits part of the ' caption ' for two of the examples cited. In context, the first continues with

> Constructivist (!) *game of volumes* and rods in agreeable harmony with chromatic illumination.

The second

> Complex *combination of varied volumes* with explicit chromatic illumination.

In both these captions the key phrase is deliberately avoided in order to give a misleading impression of the work while capitalising as much as possible on Chernikov's poetic titles, which, in these cases, sound quite nonsensical out of context. From the review, one could get the notion that Chernikov dealt with actual buildings but was irresponsible enough to treat them as ' musical-rhythmatics ' and ' whims '.

The Soviets have had chronic difficulty with their attempts to account for the ' Formalist ' movement in architecture. The *History of Russian Art*, which pretends to be the definitive work to date on the subject, sums up the formalist influence on Russian industrial architecture as follows :

> Many talented and gifted architects worked in these years (1925–30) in the field of industrial architecture. They created many interesting complexes. However, certain architects attempted to exercise principles of extreme formalism in their works. In a number of projects, despite climatic conditions, walls were practically entirely glassed in, which had a detrimental influence on the labour conditions of the

> workers. But in spite of isolated examples of this sort, Soviet industrial architecture of this period can be justly proud of the successes it attained with new energetic complexes, new giant institutions, new combines. . . . .[15]

Needless to say, Chernikov's theories are not mentioned in conjunction with a presentation of this kind, but then, Soviet art history is full of incongruous surprises.

IN 1933, Chernikov began teaching descriptive geometry. This, together with other academic duties in the field of drafting, was to take up the rest of his life. It appears that in spite of his ' Formalist ' leanings in the realm of architecture, he was able to make a distinguished career out of his outstanding drafting ability. He received a professorship and doctoral degree in 1934 and 1935 respectively, and taught at the Institute of Engineering and Economics. He was the head of the drafting department of the All-Union Correspondence Institute of the Construction Materials Institute up to the time of his death in 1951. During the latter part of his career he continued to produce books on drafting and design, and some fifty titles, all told, constitute his opus. Among these are a very interesting course in decorative design called *Ornament*, many titles concerning the basic craft of geometric drawing, sketching, and rendering, and the aforementioned work on the construction of alphabetical letters. These are in addition to his two early works on constructivist theory and *Architectural Fantasies*.

The work on letters, published in 1956 as a posthumous tribute to Chernikov, contains in the Preface the following information concerning his life :

> Chernikov's creative development was not free from formalism. In the late twenties and early thirties he was strongly fascinated by constructivist architecture. This direction in the creative work of Chernikov was subjected to criticism on the part of expert architects and draftsmen, but Chernikov did have his supporters as well. All of this, through what was actually quite a brief period of time, disoriented him. (!) However, by properly perceiving his errors through this criticism, to which his own statements bear witness, Chernikov succeeded in overcoming his mistakes.

The author of the Preface concludes on a characteristically Soviet, if schizophrenic note by recommending the reader, supposedly a tried and true party-line student of Soviet drafting, to pursue Professor Chernikov's other ' valuable and interesting ' texts, including *Architectural Fantasies*! To this he adds :

> Chernikov had prepared a cycle of works for publication which connected problems of aesthetics in architecture with the search for new methods of expression but the outbreak of war interrupted the production of this interesting work.

Just what has prevented its publication since 1945 is not explained.

[15] I. E. Grabar (ed.), *Istoriya Russkovo Iskusstva*, Vol. XI (Moscow, 1957), p. 548.

BULGARIA

Introduction

IT is generally agreed that of all the East European countries, Bulgaria has modelled itself most closely on the Soviet pattern. The almost complete collectivisation of agriculture, the amalgamation of the collectives, the virtual elimination of the private sector in industry and trade, the rigid regimentation of intellectual life and, above all, the dogmatic conformity of the Bulgarian communist party leaders to the policy laid down in Moscow, tend to create in the Western mind an image of a provincial Soviet backwater, its dreariness unrelieved even by the dubious glitter of the Imperial metropolis.

Considerations of the ethnic, historical, religious, and cultural links between Russia and Bulgaria only strengthen the inclination to write off Bulgaria as falling naturally within the Soviet sphere of power. While it is frequently pointed out that, long before the advent of Stalin, Bulgaria looked upon Russia as her Big Brother, it is often forgotten that as early as 1886, barely eight years after Bulgaria's liberation from Ottoman rule by the Russian armies, the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Sofia and Moscow reflected the determination of the Bulgarians to defend their liberty even against their liberators.

Whatever role other factors may have played, the key to Bulgaria's fate after the second world war lies in geography. In the long run it mattered little what particular policies the Eastern European countries pursued before the war and how they tried to play their cards in the conflict between the Great Powers. In the last resort their destinies were determined not by economic and social conditions or political alignments, which varied greatly from one East European country to another, but by the direction of the Red Army's advance, an aspect of Allied strategy which in turn was conditioned by geography.

In the case of Bulgaria, the communist seizure of power was made possible by the sudden Soviet declaration of war in 1944, which effectively thwarted the attempt of the anti-German Bulgarian government of Muraviev to negotiate an armistice with the Western Allies. The subsequent wholesale purges, which cleared the decks for the rapid *Gleichschaltung* of Bulgaria, were typical of the traditional fanaticism of the Bulgarian communist leaders whose prominence in the Comintern—as opposed to their scant political success at home—was due to their obedience to Moscow.

Khrushchev's new policy of allowing certain concessions to national peculiarities has had few repercussions in Bulgaria, where Soviet practice has been followed as sedulously after the Twentieth Congress as before it. A striking example is the recent drastic reorganisation of the educational system on the Soviet pattern, which A. Mandikoff discusses in this issue.

If Bulgaria has lately stolen some of the limelight from her sister

satellites, this has not been for the reasons for which Poland and Hungary claimed the interest of the West, their reluctance to advance on the ' road to Socialism '. With the spectacular ' leap forward ' begun in January 1959, the Bulgarian regime attempted to create at one stroke the technical-industrial base considered necessary for the establishment of communism. Bulgaria's role as a strategic and ideological outpost of communism in the Balkans, determined by her proximity to the NATO partners Greece and Turkey on one hand, and to revisionist Yugoslavia on the other, made the success of the experiment a question of crucial importance for the Bulgarian communist regime and its Soviet backers. The results of the ' leap ' are analysed by John Kalo, who points out that the failure to reach the targets set by Zhivkov should not blind one to the great changes that have taken place in Bulgaria's economy during the last decade-and-a-half.

Has the material revolution been accompanied by the creation of a new communist mentality in the people? The authors of the articles dealing with the state of the economy, literature, historiography, and the social sciences, seem to agree that it is in this sphere that the communists are encountering the greatest obstacles.

THE POLITICAL SCENE

J. F. Brown

THE year 1961 in Bulgaria has been mainly a year of aftermath, the year that followed the great 'leap forward'. Most of the important events have been the result of the spectacular years of 1959 and 1960. It has been essentially a backward rather than a forward looking year; a year when Bulgarians were given some respite; when the economic planners looked back in awe at their temerity and had recourse to prudence; and when some bold spirits looked back in anger at the follies committed. If one can accept the regime's 'tumultuous development' as a description of the years 1959 and 1960, then 1961 has been the year after the tumult, when stock was taken and the pieces picked up.

The economic 'leap forward' was basically an attempt by the Bulgarian regime to exploit its reserves of material and manpower to propel the economy and the nation at a much faster rate towards the construction of socialism. It borrowed a good deal of its inspiration, as well as its name, from the example of China. Yet the idea behind it was not new in Bulgaria. As early as 1948 Georgi Dimitrov had urged that the new republic must accomplish in 10 to 20 years what other nations had taken a century to accomplish. Such an outlook was not only typical for a revolutionary party which had come to power in an agrarian country, it was thoroughly consistent with the 'heroic' streak which runs through the history of Bulgaria's Communist Party.

At the end of 1960 and the beginning of 1961 the balance sheet of the 'leap forward' was drawn up. The regime claimed that the programme had been a success, that the third five-year plan, originally due to end in 1962, had been fulfilled 'by and large' by the end of 1960. Except in agriculture, where even the regime did not claim complete success, it was easy at first glance to be deceived by the figures. But closer analysis showed that the Planning Commission was deliberately confusing the actual volume of production with the growth rate of production, something which, at the beginning of the 'leap forward' in 1959, the Bulgarian leaders had specifically warned should not be done. Comparing the achievement figures with the plans which had originally been laid down, it became clear that the whole 'leap forward' had failed by colossal margins.

But more important to Bulgaria in 1961, and in future years, was not the statistical balance sheet but the impact of the 'leap forward' on the nation as a whole. In the economy, it could be argued that much more had been achieved than would have been the case had there been no 'leap forward'. There were considerable reserves of men and resources and possibly the whole economy was still young or backward enough to stand the tremendous jolt it was given. But even allowing this, and granting that great strides forward were made, it would seem

that even in the economy serious damage was inflicted. Quality suffered severely in the scramble for quantity. The initial plenitude of manpower caused productivity to be neglected. Economic organisation and co-ordination were gravely undermined by the tendency of individual factories to look to their own rather than the general interest, a tendency aggravated by a territorial reorganisation in early 1959 which gave districts and localities, and the factories within them, much more autonomy than before.

Of more long-term significance were the psychological effects of the 'leap forward' on the population, both governors and governed. It has left a trail of frustration, resentment, and recrimination lasting throughout 1961. Had the *Sturm und Drang* ended triumphantly, had the people and even the Party believed the leaders' claims, things might have been different. But a peasant nation is not an easy one to fool. Disillusion was the result.

Evidently sensing the damage which had been done, the regime adopted a new approach for 1961. The tone was set immediately by the announcement of the new annual economic plan. (This is to be the first year of a new five-year plan to be announced at the next Party Congress.) The targets were startling in their modesty—modesty, that is, by Bulgarian standards. The value of agricultural production was to go up by 10·9 per cent, of industrial production by 7·8 per cent. The emphasis was not to be so much on volume as on quality of production, higher productivity, lower costs and so on. Regime spokesmen openly admitted that these factors had been previously neglected. Retrenchment and efficiency are now the watchwords; quantity alone is not enough. In agriculture, where the fantasy of the targets had been matched only by the margin by which they were missed, the early part of the year saw a variety of much needed measures to encourage the farmers and to boost production. Here again, it seemed that the lesson was being learnt. But it was too little and too late.

THE return to reason did not have the desired effect on the population or on the Party. As has so often happened after a period of tremendous tension—especially when crowned with unsuccess—the new policy could not efface the bitterness and the frustration which the old one had left. It merely added an impetus to the discontent. Peasants dragooned into winter work, workers badgered into extra shifts, managers harassed by the bureaucracy—all emerged from the storm angered by the men who had caused it. Their dissatisfaction was not abated by the unfortunate series of food shortages which have plagued the country for most of this year. Here it has been the industrial workers who have suffered most. In 1960 they received higher pay; in 1961 food was scarce and dearer. In July came news of a currency reform scheduled for the beginning of next year. Ten old leva must be handed in for one new 'heavy' lev, the example coming from Moscow. It seems that no one will suffer, but tampering with money brings out the peasant in most

Bulgarians and the currency reforms of 1947 and 1952 have left bitter memories. Suspicions have fostered a hoarding complex; so has the recent war scare. There has been something of a rush on the foodshops, which were not well stocked enough to stand the strain. Now the harvest threatens to be below average.

But public dissatisfaction has not been expressed in dangerous forms; the mood is sullen but not seething. Within the Party and the state apparatus, however, dissatisfaction has been serious and articulate enough for the regime to take stern repressive action. The real failure of the 'leap forward' obviously led to a good deal of recrimination. The 'doubters', who had been effectively silenced at the beginning, emerged vindicated and emboldened at the end, having no doubt picked up quite a few converts on the way. Their manoeuvrings were exposed in the spring and early summer by the two most important journals of the Bulgarian Communist Party. These 'fractionalists', as they were admitted to be, were headed by Nikola Kufardzhiev, a trade union leader. Kufardzhiev is by no means a prominent figure. But the men behind the 'fraction' were identified as the once famous Dobri Terpeshev and Yonko Panov, who had been purged from their Central Committee positions in 1957 along with Georgi Chankov. Though this group was derided as being 'pitifully small', it seemed evident that it was numerous enough to cause concern. Their 'unmasking' was accompanied by a purge of several district Party secretaries and People's Councils Chairmen, and culminated in top-level changes in the trade unions, where the Chairman of the Central Council, Todor Prahov, and three secretaries were dismissed. (Prahov, however, retained his candidate membership of the Politburo.) Whether these dismissals were for conspiracy, inefficiency, or some other reason has not been made clear. Dissatisfaction among the local Party and government officials, and in the trade unions, was probably very acute. Throughout the two years of the 'leap forward' the leaders in Sofia had made it clear that success for the Party's policy would depend on the local officials, and its failure would be attributed to the same people. One can, therefore, assume that some had been considered to have failed in their tasks. Others may have allowed their resentment to border on insubordination or even worse.

THROUGHOUT this trying period, the leadership has remained surprisingly firm. The cracks have been small, but they seem to have been symptoms of a general uneasiness in the Bulgarian state and society. In the spring and summer rumours were rife in Sofia about dissension in the army, the militia, the Party, and the trade unions. There was talk of arrests and deportations. It is impossible to assess the truth of these rumours. The Bulgarian regime of course denied them. Apart from the factors already mentioned, a commonly ascribed cause of dissension was impatience with the regime's utter dependence on the USSR and a desire for some kind of 'national communist' solution on the Tito

model. Such sentiments, if articulated, would have considerable popular support. Titoism might seem at least an alleviation of the country's present situation. But any dissension which did exist was put down by a wary leadership.

So much for any flirtation with Titoism. Was there a flirtation with Maoism? The possibility of a group within the Bulgarian Communist Party more favourable to Peking than to Moscow has been canvassed, and there is little doubt that in 1958 Chinese economic policies held a good deal of fascination for a strong section of the Bulgarian Party, reflected in Bulgaria's own 'leap forward'. But this did not mean in any sense a transfer of allegiance, and the Bulgarian leaders were quick to protest their unswerving loyalty to Moscow. In 1960, when the Sino-Soviet dispute on foreign policy emerged, the subject came up once again. A good deal of unofficial information, as well as circumstantial evidence, did point to the existence of pro-Chinese sentiments, deeply distrustful of Khrushchev's co-existence policy and of Khrushchev personally. The leader was said to be Valko Chervenkov, Bulgaria's 'little Stalin' of the early fifties, the leading theoretician of the Party and its acknowledged elder statesman. There was no direct evidence of this but it was noticeable that, amid a plethora of official speeches strongly supporting the Moscow line, Chervenkov was silent. In the late summer of 1960 two Soviet leaders, Kozlov and Ignatov, visited Bulgaria, had talks with the Politburo and made several speeches explaining Soviet foreign policy. To the Moscow conference in November Bulgaria sent the strongest delegation ever to leave its borders, including Chervenkov. On his return he broke his long 'ideological' silence, expressing full support for the Moscow Declaration.

Since then, throughout 1961, there has been no indication that the whole Bulgarian leadership was not supporting the Moscow line. The attractions of China's policy must have been seriously diminished by the failure of Bulgaria's own 'leap forward'. And yet it is perhaps not by accident that elements in the Bulgarian Party were fascinated first by the internal and then by the external policy of Peking. In tradition the Party has something in common with the 'heroic' Party of China and its leader. Some of its older leaders, schooled in the 'unrevised' interpretations of Marxism-Leninism, must have distrusted the glosses placed on it by the ideological freebooter Khrushchev. It may have been a question not so much of articulate expression or even of clear thought, but of instinctive reaction and sympathy. True, the type of Bulgarian communist who may have felt this is steadily becoming an anachronism. But until he dies out completely there is always the possibility of future question marks about the international sympathy of at least a section of the Party.

Between the (possible) 'right' of the Party, drawn towards Tito, and the (possible) 'left', drawn towards Mao, there is the large gray body in the middle, bound to Moscow by hoops of steel and all-powerful largely because of this. This is the section led by Todor Zhivkov,

Party First Secretary since 1954 but the real master only since 1957 or 1958. By making subservience to Moscow the cornerstone of his policy, Zhivkov has assured his survival and his continuity. With powerful support both in his own Party and from the Soviet Union, he has not only been able to quell any disorder from the wings, he has also strengthened his own position. In fact a cynic might be tempted to say that the worse things get for Bulgaria, the better they get for Zhivkov. This year he has been in Moscow and Sochi with Khrushchev and has entertained Kosygin and Pospelov on Bulgaria's own Golden Sands. Recently his fiftieth birthday was celebrated as a gala event. His own serious difficulties have made him lean more and more on the Moscow crutch. Had he been more successful he might have been more independent.

THESE, then, are the more salient political facts and developments in 1961. Even such a brief survey as this, however, would not be complete without some reference to political currents and attitudes which have already emerged or appear to be emerging.

There is no genuine political life in Bulgaria because of the omnipotence of the Party. But the Party itself is not a static body; there are taking place within it certain changes which reflect in part the changing character of Bulgarian society. If Dimitar Blagoev could see his Party in 1961 he might well fail to recognise it. He would see a new type of man forcing his way to prominence—the apparatchik, the product of a communist state rather than a communist underground. In Zhivkov the Bulgarian Communist Party has now a leader who is perhaps the classic example of such a type. This is a type without the mental calibre of the old Bulgarian Comintern-type revolutionary or the colour of the homespun fighter on the barricades. But it is now in a big majority and Zhivkov has built up a powerful following within the Party among men of his own kind. It is these apparatchiks who have gradually ousted the older 'revolutionaries', some of whom in any case found the transition from barricades to executive desk an impossible one. It is true that the 'revolutionaries' are still well entrenched in the Bulgarian Politburo and the Council of Ministers. But in the provinces and in the Central Committee Secretariat it is the apparatchiks who dominate. The elections at the next Party Congress, due to be held soon, may well see further increases in their power.

Such a development was, of course, inevitable. It has taken place in every Communist Party. In the case of the Bulgarian Party many will have cause to regret it. For here was a Party which had produced a whole galaxy of talent. The names of Blagoev, Dimitrov, and Kolarov spring most readily to mind, but there was a host of lesser men who held important places in the international movement. Today only Valko Chervenkov remains, and it is no accident that he is easily the most popular figure among the rank and file; they may long for the heroic

days of the past, but today the Party is a comfortable career and not a crusade.

If in 1961 Blagoev could see what communism had wrought he would have some cause for satisfaction. He would see an overwhelmingly agrarian country transformed into an industrial-agrarian society; the old 'bourgeois' patterns of relationships broken down, the patchwork quilt of the countryside transformed into about a thousand huge collective or state farms, a heavy industry built or being built.

Most of this has been made possible through agricultural collectivisation. Though, from the point of view of food production, collectivisation has been noteworthy only for its inefficiency, it has achieved several communist aims. It has, along with mechanisation, uprooted the peasant population and provided the manpower for industry. It has destroyed a whole complex of economic and social relationships which communists considered retrograde. It may fail to feed Bulgaria properly but it has been a main factor in producing her industrial revolution.

But Blagoev's satisfaction would not survive a closer examination of the present situation. He would see a people not converted to communism but alienated from it. Old 'bourgeois' patterns of relationships and group loyalties may have been destroyed but they have not been replaced by a 'socialist' mentality or by loyalty to the Party. Especially among the youth they seem to have been replaced by a vacuum which must cause all friends of Bulgaria great concern. A new technical intelligentsia has replaced the old intellectual class. But this new intelligentsia, though educated by the regime, is largely non-political. Finally, though practically everything is nationalised and collectivised, the tradition of private ownership is dying very hard. It survives tenaciously in just about the only property which is still privately owned in Bulgaria, the household plots of the collective farm members. The outstanding economic success of these holdings symbolises more than the success of private over collective ownership.

These are some of the basic problems and developments in Bulgaria at present. They are the result not so much of any particular period in Bulgarian communist history, as of the imposition of communist rule on Bulgarian society. In 1961 the problems are serious; in future years they will become even more so.

THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY

John Kalo

THE Bulgarian economy has just passed through one of its most extraordinary experiences. It has been strained to the breaking point by a policy inspired by the theory that the will can overcome objective circumstances. It has been urged on to targets which made the ambitious planning of its associates in the Soviet bloc seem realistic by comparison. Only the economic planning of China offers a parallel, and it is no coincidence that these planning phases in both countries were called 'the great leap forward'. The policy has, of course, produced results. Considerable strides in volume of production have been made. But the 'leap forward' must be judged in terms of what the regime expected of it.

The Bulgarian regime claims that the policy was a success. It has announced that the third five-year plan (1958–62), originally due to end in 1962, was completed two years ahead of schedule, in 1960.[1] The examination of this claim gives a good general picture of the whole of this spectacular phase of Bulgarian communist history.

Genesis of an adventure

In June 1958 the seventh congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party approved the directives for the third five-year plan. The targets to be reached in 1962 were ambitious: the national income was to be 50 per cent higher than in 1957; industrial and rural output 60 per cent and 35 per cent higher respectively. But, ambitious though they were, these targets were soon to be drastically revised upwards.

In October 1958, only four months after the approval of the directives, the Party daily *Rabotnichesko Delo* signalled the beginning of a drive to fulfil the third five-year plan in three to four years. The drive, presented as a 'nation-wide movement', marked the birth of the 'great leap forward'. It found its final expression in the Zhivkov theses 'on the Accelerated Development of the National Economy', approved by the Party central committee in January 1959. To meet the new completion date, annual targets had to be boosted to dizzy heights.[2] In March 1959 the National Assembly endorsed the theses and they became law.

1 Cf. Speech of Stanko Todorov, Chairman of the Bulgarian State Planning Commission, in the National Assembly on 12 December 1960.

2 The leap forward, announced in the Bulgarian press on 14 November 1958, was described as the 'Bulgarian Leap in the Dark' by *The Economist* (London), 3 January 1959. At the January 1959 Plenum Todor Zhivkov commented that the 'bourgeois magazine' (i.e. *The Economist*) reflected the desire that the Bulgarian Leap Forward should be a leap into uncertainty, and that it should fail. He added that the wish of this influential British bourgeois periodical did not coincide with the objective laws of contemporary development in operation during the transition period from capitalism to socialism.

At a Party central committee meeting in November 1958 the first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov, defined what was meant by the fulfilment of the five-year plan ahead of schedule:

> Some comrades think that we have the necessary conditions and ought therefore to struggle for a shortening of the time-limits of the five-year plan only or chiefly as far as the growth of production is concerned. This kind of belief is incorrect; it hampers and cripples the movement. It is necessary to accept and affirm as correct the premise of struggling for the fulfilment of the five-year plan in terms of the planned volume of production and national income. We are interested not only in the individual percentages of growth, but primarily in what quantities of industrial and rural production we will obtain, and how we shall in a short period bring about a real increase in the national income (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, 14 November 1958).

A later appeal by the Fatherland Front was perhaps even more specific. It posed the fateful question and answered it:

> What is the meaning of the slogan 'The Five-Year Plan in Three to Four Years'? It means a struggle for the fulfilment of the five-year plan, in terms of volume of production and national income, not in five years, but in three to four years. In other words in industry, transport, building and trade to produce the stipulated national income of the five-year plan in four years; the rural economy in 1959 to produce about twice as much as in this year [1958], and in 1960 three times as much (*Otechestven Front*, 26 December 1958).

At the January 1959 Plenum which unanimously approved the theses, Valko Chervenkov said that the Party was committing itself to their realisation. The Party, he said, had always carried out its decisions and had never made idle promises. He added that the targets, though 'stupefying', were 'realistic'. Premier Anton Yugov stressed that the years 1959 and 1960 would be decisive for the future development of the country. Zhivkov labelled as 'Enemy No. 1 in the battle for the fulfilment of the third five-year plan in a shorter period' anyone who cast doubt on the practicability of the targets.

An Enemy No. 1 was soon found in the person of Boris Taskov. He questioned the feasibility of the new policy and doubted whether targets could be met. He paid for his forthrightness by losing both his position in the Party's Politburo and his post of Minister for Trade. His fate was intended as a warning to 'waverers'.

This, briefly, is the background against which we must examine what was planned, what was genuinely achieved, and what the Party claims to have achieved.

First a word of caution. The figures used here are almost all taken from Bulgarian sources. They are not wholly reliable, as has been acknowledged several times even by the Bulgarian authorities.[3] But, regrettably, they are all we have to work on.

[3] Cf. *Statistika*, organ of the Central Statistical Department, November–December 1958.

National income: planned and achieved

In January 1959, when introducing his theses for nation-wide discussion, Zhivkov stressed that the volume of national income would determine whether or not the third five-year plan would be fulfilled ahead of time. Again, when addressing the National Assembly in December 1959, he once more emphasised that the national income was one of the main indices of the state of a country's economy.[4]

The directives of the third five-year plan stated that 'as a result of the further increase in production and labour productivity', the national income should by the end of 1962 be about 50 per cent higher than in 1957.[5] This would give a figure of 80 to 85 milliard leva (at 1952 prices), which is 30 to 35 milliard more than envisaged in the original targets of the plan.

In the three years 1958–60 during which, it is claimed, the third five-year plan was fulfilled, national income did not in fact rise above 51 milliard.[5] The difference (roughly 100 milliard leva taking the period as a whole) is a measure of the gap between actual achievement and what would have been achieved had the third five-year plan really been fulfilled in three years. The Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Stanko Todorov, admitted in the National Assembly on 16 December 1960 that the national income for 1960 would be about 37·2 per cent higher than in 1957, while the directives envisaged that it should increase in 1962 by 50 per cent (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, 17 December 1960).

Industrial output

According to the directives of the third five-year plan, industrial production during the 1958–62 period was scheduled to increase by about 60 per cent compared with 1957. Assuming the increase to be spread equally over the five years, this would give an annual increase of about 3,608 million leva (at 1956 prices). For the year 1962 the value of industrial production would therefore be some 49,312 million leva, compared with 30,820 million leva at the end of 1957. On this basis the figures for 1958–62 would be as follows:

Year	In million leva at 1956 prices	
1958	34,518	
1959	38,217	
1960	41,915	total 209,576
1961	45,614	
1962	49,312	

What was actually produced in the years 1958–60, according to official Bulgarian statistical data,[6] was

[4] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 20 January 1959, 26 December 1959.
[5] The national income (in million leva at 1952 prices) was 40,874 in 1958, 47,822 in 1959, and 51,169 in 1960.
[6] *Bulgarian Statistical Yearbook*, 1959, p. 73; *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 26 January 1960 and 28 January 1961.

Year	In million leva at 1956 prices	
1958	34,952	
1959	42,752	total 125,680
1960	47,976	

Thus production in 1960 was not unreasonably distant from the earlier target for 1962, but the total shortfall amounted to about 84,000 million leva.

By themselves, the figures can be misleading. Despite the failure to meet targets, there has been considerable progress, and this is what Bulgarian statisticians and propagandists emphasise. But quantity is not everything; quality and production costs are of equal importance, and in this lies the great weakness of Bulgarian industrial production; quality is poor and costs are high.

Todor Zhivkov himself, in an important speech on 12 January 1960, raised the problem of quality. 'Big efforts', he said, 'must be made during the year for substantial improvement in the quality of production. The quality of our goods, in spite of the marked successes achieved by our industry, is unsatisfactory. . . .'[7] The criticism was taken up more thoroughly at the enlarged central committee meeting on industry which took place at the end of January 1960, and at a subsequent one on internal trade held at the end of July 1960.

The Minister of Foreign Trade, Georgi Kumbiliev, complained that the production costs of most Bulgarian export goods were considerably higher than the costs for the same goods in other countries.[8] Exports are considered profitable if 35 per cent of their value is recouped on the foreign market.[9]

There are probably three main reasons for high production costs: (i) administrative and managerial expenditures due to swollen non-productive apparatus; (ii) the use in many cases of obsolete machinery and plant; (iii) waste and lack of financial discipline. Waste, despite the constant war against it, can be seen in many enterprises, especially in the metallurgical industry. Financial discipline is poor and wage increases have grown faster than labour productivity.[10]

The industrial provisions of the 1961 State Plan are relatively modest. A mere 7·8 per cent increase over 1960 is planned. This is lower than the planned increase of 8·8 per cent for the Soviet Union, and considerably lower than the 13·5 per cent increase for neighbouring Rumania. It is the lowest planned increase in Bulgarian industrial production since 1948.[11] Apparently the intention is to slow down the drive for quantity and concentrate attention primarily on improving quality, increasing labour productivity, and decreasing production costs.

7 *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 19 January 1960.
8 *Otechestven Front*, 1 March 1961.
9 Russi Delchev, *Valutni Vaprossi v Ikonomikata na Balgaria* (Sofia, 1960), pp. 58–60.
10 Radio Sofia, 18 June 1960. Excerpts from a speech by Rayko Damyanov.
11 The average annual increase in industrial production during 1948–58 was about 16 per cent. *Novo Vreme*, March 1959, p. 23.

Agriculture

The utopian nature of the 'leap forward' is best exemplified in agriculture. The Zhivkov theses provided that the 1958 production should be doubled in 1959 and trebled in 1960. Later, in the State Plan for 1959 published in March 1959, the target of a 100 per cent increase was lowered to 74 per cent—still an extraordinary target. The target for 1960 was for a 32 per cent increase over 1959 production—much lower than the rate of increase of 1959 over 1958 but still too high to be realistic.

Neither Zhivkov, nor any other Bulgarian communist leader, has claimed that the agricultural targets of the third five-year plan were successfully fulfilled by 1960. But although the Party has confessed to failure regarding some products it has never admitted failure in agriculture as a whole.

The measure of the failure can be assessed as follows:

The directives for the third five-year plan stipulated that agricultural production by the end of 1962 should be 35 per cent greater than at the end of 1957.[12] This meant an average annual straight line increase of seven per cent, equivalent to 1,042 million leva, since total agricultural output in 1957 was 14,888 million leva (at 1955 prices).[13]

Thus in terms of the directives the value of rural production in 1962 was to be 20,098 million leva, and the total for the five years 1958–62 would be 90,070 million leva.

The figures of actual production claimed for 1958–60 are given as 15·1 milliard leva (valued at 1955 prices), 17·8 milliard, and 18·4 milliard, making a total of 51·3 milliard.[14]

In agriculture, at any rate, it cannot be claimed that what should have been produced in 1962 had in fact been produced by 1960.

The 1961 target for rural production is in keeping with the modesty of the economic plan for the year in general. The draft of the State Plan did not, as in previous years, give a forecast for percentage increase, but simply stated that agricultural production was 'to reach 26,861 million leva at 1960 prices'. The 1960 prices were introduced for the first time in the 1961 Plan, but there is so far no official indication of how much higher these prices are than 1955 prices.

Radio Sofia on 30 December 1960 announced that rural production in 1961 was planned to be 10·9 per cent higher than in 1960. When compared with the utopian doubling and trebling of rural targets in 1959 and 1960, the figure for 1961 does not appear unreasonable.

12 *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 12 June 1958.

13 *Bulgarian Statistical Yearbook* for 1959, p. 73. Todor Zhivkov in his report to the CC gave the figure of 15,133 million leva.

14 *Statistical Yearbook*, 1959, p. 112; UN *Economic Survey of Europe*, 1960, p. 30; *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 14 April 1961.

The Collectives

The most striking feature of Bulgarian agriculture is its complete collectivisation. 'In the Bulgarian village the cooperative and the state sectors reign supreme', proudly announced Todor Zhivkov in his report to the Central Committee on 12 April 1961.

In September 1960 there were 932 collective farms averaging some 4,200 hectares each. These are the largest collective farms in Eastern Europe, and are of the 'advanced kolkhoz type'. The number of state farms was 67, with an average size of 3,376 hectares each.[15]

Up till now the main responsibility for the mechanisation of rural production rested with the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS). The Zhivkov theses stated that the existing 209 MTS would be purchased gradually by the merged collective farms, following the Soviet example. This, however, did not begin till the end of 1960; recently a number of collectives have begun buying the local MTS machinery, and the process will probably continue, though not as fast as in the Soviet Union.

Private plots are the last bastion of private ownership in the Bulgarian countryside. Their productive performance, especially in animal husbandry, which is the weakest sector of Bulgarian rural production, has been of such importance that the Bulgarian Communist Party has been forced not only to protect but to encourage them. According to Todor Zhivkov, on 1 January 1961, 34·6 per cent of all cows, 27·8 per cent of all sheep, 33·1 per cent of all pigs, and 49·6 per cent of all poultry were on private plots (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, 14 April 1961).

In his report the First Party Secretary demanded that no private plot be left without a pig, sheep, or poultry, or, in the near future, without a cow. His concern was inspired not by love for the private plots, but by the hope of improving the catastrophic state of affairs in livestock breeding. At the same time it was an impressive tribute to private ownership and a reflection on collectivisation.

The collective farms are still not in a position to meet the growing needs of the Bulgarian population or the needs of raw materials for Bulgarian light industry. This applies especially to livestock breeding, as Zhivkov admitted.

Data available on plan fulfilment, reports in the Bulgarian press and periodicals, the recent decrees aiming at improving rural production, and Zhivkov's speech at the recent CC meeting on agriculture, present the following picture of shortcomings and proposed remedies.

The leitmotiv of Zhivkov's report was the imperative need to increase rural output and decrease production costs.

Poor organisation, inefficient and untrained management, superficial experimentation (often without any basic studies), and above all the apathy of the farmer who still does not regard the collective farm as his own, are the reasons for high production costs and poor labour

[15] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 9 September 1960; *Economic Survey of Europe*, 1960, p. 6; *Yearbook* for 1960, p. 80.

productivity. In the state farms the situation is worse. In 1960, instead of the planned profit of 61 million leva, the state farms through poor management and bad organisation lost 20 million leva.

The high percentage of persons not directly engaged in production reduces the remuneration of the collective farmer. Up to 10 and 12 per cent of the collective farm's income available for distribution goes on salaries to unproductive persons, most of whom are relatives of the chairman or vice-chairman of the farm and often quite unqualified for the job.[16]

Between 1957 and 1959 payments for the *trudoden* (i.e. remuneration for the ' labour day ') instead of increasing went down from 17·5 to 16·1 leva, while remuneration in cash and kind fell from 25·8 to 24·7 leva per calendar day (the figure for 1959 is not available).[17]

Because of the low income in the collective farms, the young people are leaving the villages en masse for jobs in industry or on building sites. At the April meeting on agriculture Zhivkov said that ' we must not close our eyes to this alarming fact ', which he explained was due mainly to ' economic reasons '.

Livestock breeding is probably the weakest single sector of the whole Bulgarian economy. In the past two years there has been some improvement over the disastrous year of 1959, but it was not sufficient to raise the number of cattle and sheep above the 1939 level.

Livestock (in thousands) [18]

	1939	Jan. 1959	Jan. 1960	Jan. 1961 (estimate)	1961 (plan)
Cattle	1,861	1,356	1,284	1,536	1,670
Sheep	10,262	8,619	8,769	8,901	9,200
Pigs	807	2,052	2,265	2,448	2,400
Poultry	12,233	15,236	21,669	21,500	20,000

Judging from the recurring complaints last year about the shortage of meat in the shops, the improvements seem to have been made at the cost of the home market supply. The breeding of pigs has for several years shown a steady upward trend and the increase compared with 1939 is striking (although it must be mentioned that in pre-war Bulgaria pork was eaten only in winter).

The main reasons for the present difficulties are the low state purchase prices for meat. At the beginning of 1961 purchase prices were substantially raised. There is also a shortage of fodder. The Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Todorov, stated in December 1960

[16] Zhivkov's report on agriculture is given in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 14 April 1961.

[17] *Economic Survey of Europe*, 1960, p. 34. The figures exclude income from private plots.

[18] *Statistical Yearbook* for 1956 p. 49; *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 26 January 1960, 17 December 1960.

in the National Assembly that the expected amount of fodder available at the beginning of 1961 would cover only 91·7 per cent of requirements. Recent warnings in the press against the slaughtering of cattle (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, 25 and 28 September 1961), suggest that the fodder shortage is already making itself felt.

Thirdly, there were many encroachments on the private plots in 1958–59. Despite recent Party encouragement, collective farmers are reluctant to keep cattle on their private plots, because they fear administrative measures for compulsory selling or even confiscation for the needs of collective and state farms. They prefer to breed poultry, sheep, and pigs, which can be more discreetly slaughtered.

Because of the frequency of droughts in Bulgaria, the Party issued in 1959 a decree providing for the irrigation of two million hectares (more than 40 per cent of the country's arable land) by the end of 1965. More than half of this programme was to have been completed by the end of 1961, but the plan for 1961 provides for the irrigation of only 0·75 million hectares by the end of the year. This is another example of the poor planning during the heady days of the 'big leap forward'. Zhivkov admitted in his report that for efficient irrigation big capital investments were needed (which obviously were not available), adding that the project would not be abandoned but its deadline—1965—would be extended.

The present trouble, however, is due less to the delay in the fulfilment of the plans for irrigation, than to the fact that the existing irrigation systems are not functioning well. They are poorly utilised, and in part incomplete. Last year (1960) only 60 per cent of the areas scheduled for irrigation were watered at all.

But the trouble does not end there: Zhivkov complained that where water was available it was not used at the proper time and caused damage instead of increasing production. To these shortcomings must be added the poor technique in irrigation and the lack of qualified personnel.

Despite increased use of fertilisers, and the expansion of the plants producing them, the quantity of fertiliser now used in Bulgaria is not sufficient to meet the needs of her intensified rural production. Because of the lack of foreign currency there was a decrease in the application of fertilisers in 1960 compared with 1959.

At the CC session on agriculture, Zhivkov urged a wider use of manure, admitting that the possibilities of importing fertilisers were limited. The plan for 1961 provides for the supply of 635,000 tons of fertilisers or an average of 131 kilograms per hectare of cultivated land.[19]

The use of selected seeds has been encouraged, and despite some shortcomings, are being steadily introduced in Bulgaria; the results can

[19] Todorov, Chairman of the State Planning Commission: *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 17 December 1960. In 1957 the same Todorov as Minister of Agriculture stated that Bulgarian agriculture needed 1,300,000 tons of fertilisers annually. According to the *Economic Survey of Europe* (1960, p. 42), Bulgaria had the second lowest consumption of fertilisers per hectare in the Balkans (Turkey was lowest).

be seen in increased yields per hectare for wheat, maize, and sunflower. Agricultural machines, too, have been supplied on a large scale. By the end of 1960 tractors numbered about 40,000 (15 h.p.), harvesting combines about 8,000, and trucks over 10,000. By the end of 1965 Bulgaria is expected to have an additional 57,060 tractors, 14,312 harvesting combines, and 6,730 trucks. It is true that a considerable part of the present agricultural machinery is out of date, and since their foundation the MTS have been under constant fire for inefficient utilisation and poor maintenance. Bulgarian industry has shared the blame for not supplying enough spares.

The most practical remedial measures of all came early in 1961 with two decrees substantially increasing the official purchase prices of several agricultural products, most of which had been bought by the state at prices under production costs. Increases were granted for tobacco, meat, milk, eggs, rice, and early tomatoes. Not since the abolition of compulsory deliveries in May 1959 had such an incentive been introduced in Bulgarian agriculture. For tobacco alone, the price increases, if correctly applied, should amount to about 310 million leva, and all the increases combined should boost village income by nearly one milliard leva.

Whether such welcome incentives as these can counteract the overall disincentive inherent in collectivisation remains to be seen. They will certainly help, but in some cases it would seem that the cost price of certain agricultural items is actually greater than the higher price now being offered.[20]

The near future will also show whether the new purchase prices are not aimed rather at providing the necessary means for the take-over of the MTS by the collective farms (by allocating a greater share to the "indivisible" and other funds of the farms), than at increasing the personal income of the farmers. This has been the case in the Soviet Union. The 1958 decision to abolish the MTS in the USSR was followed by a reform of the price and procurement system, aimed at providing the kolkhozes with the necessary means to take over the MTS.[21]

Conclusion

The Bulgarian Communist Party claims that the third five-year plan was fulfilled in 1960—two years ahead of time. This is manifestly not the case.

To strengthen their case, the Bulgarian leaders are shifting the emphasis from total volume of production to rate of growth. But even on this basis the showing for national income and agriculture is unsatisfactory. Only for industry and gross national product are the results for 1960 about the same as the targets for 1962. But to reach the rate of growth of production one or two years ahead of time does not mean that the planned output for those years has been produced. The former

[20] See *Izvestia na Vishia Finansov*, No. 4, p. 114, and Zhivkov's report on agriculture.
[21] *Economic Survey of Europe*, 1960, p. 3.

is no mean achievement, but it represents a fraction of the latter. Nevertheless, despite the failures, shortcomings, and a situation often approaching chaos, tremendous changes have taken place in Bulgaria's economy in the past 10–15 years. From a nation of rural small-holders, it has become a country where the population is about evenly divided between town and country. Bulgaria has been transformed from an overwhelmingly agrarian into an agrarian-industrial country. The countryside has been changed by the collective and state farms; heavy industry has been built up and is growing. The price paid was heavy both in terms of human sacrifice and in money. It was done too quickly, and very inefficiently. But there is no putting the clock back. The great need now is to humanise the new economic structure, to re-create a sense of belonging and participation in the people.

These, however, are considerations for the future. At present the ruling Party faces a series of crucial problems on the economic front: how to cut production costs, how to increase labour productivity, how to improve livestock breeding and the quality of industrial production. That Party has at last realised the importance of the human factor. This is perhaps more true for agriculture than for any other branch of the economy. The beginning of 1961 was marked by measures designed to raise incentives for the farmers. These were soon followed by a decree raising old age pensions for the peasant-farmers. In industry similarly wages and salaries were adjusted as a means to stimulate production, and some of them (mostly in the lower brackets) were increased.

It seems that the regime has abandoned its unrealistic targets and is now concentrating on making the economy more efficient. But the year 1961 may be only a period of respite. When the new fourth five-year plan is published, it will be seen whether the 1961 targets represent a genuine change to realism in economic planning.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE PARTY

Irwin T. Sanders

THE social sciences in any country take on the cultural and political colouration of that country. Since the economic and political differences between Bulgaria and Western countries are so marked, it is not surprising to find distinct differences in the social sciences as well. In Bulgaria, for example, the primary purpose of the social sciences is to serve the cause of socialism as interpreted by the Bulgarian Communist Party. This in itself makes it difficult for the Western-trained observer to give an accurate appraisal of Bulgarian social science and, by the same token, for the Bulgarian to appreciate readily the Western approach to the study of society. It is important, first of all, to face frankly some of these difficulties in semantics and assumptions; then we can better understand how social science is organised in Bulgaria and some of the more recent developments in this field of learning.

The first difficulty lies in the listing of the social sciences. In the West it is customary to consider as humanities and not social sciences such subjects as literature, drama, art, and philosophy, and to reserve the term ' social sciences ' for some of the more newly developed disciplines which deal with social institutions (economics, political science) or which try to make generalisations about society (sociology), culture (anthropology), or the relationship between the individual and society (social psychology). History is at times considered a humanity, at times a social science, depending upon the approach of the historian. Human geography is also a social science, while some of the fields already listed turn their spotlight upon law, religion, family life, leisure, or education. There is, of course, no unanimity of opinion in the West about the definition of social science, but there is a tendency to distinguish between those areas of study which are humanistic and those in which an effort is made to apply scientific methods to the study of man and his social and cultural worlds.

To the Bulgarian social scientist, the fields of knowledge have different boundaries. He usually thinks in terms of what he calls social (obshtestveni) and natural (prirodni) sciences. ' Social ' here means anything having to do with ' social reality ', with man. Thus, literature—which is supposed to reflect social reality if it is literature according to his standards—belongs with the social sciences. The official Communist Party newspaper, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, on 11 November 1959 published the resolution of the Central Committee of the party and of the Council of Ministers ' On the Further Development of Bulgarian Science and Enhancing its Role in Socialist Construction '. The sciences covered included the physical-mathematical, the chemical, the technical, the

geological, the agricultural, the biological and medical, and the social sciences. Under the social sciences mention was made of philosophy, political economy, pedagogy, history, law, literature, philology, art, economics, and ethnography.

When the Bulgarian social scientist is asked specifically about philosophy, he is apt to reply that neither philosophy nor mathematics really belongs in the social or natural category, but that for practical convenience philosophy is customarily assigned to the social and mathematics to the natural sciences.

A second difficulty in communication occurs when the Westerner tries to explain what is meant by social science in the West. On the surface, this should present no problem, since Marxist thought is committed to the scientific approach. It is the sweeping application of the term science (nauka) that is the heart of the problem. In Bulgaria any field of systematic inquiry is called a science, whether it deals with an examination of the themes in Beowulf or gives an intuitive impression of the work of a great novelist. The effort, often made in the West, to distinguish between an intuitive and a scientific approach to truth, has no parallel in Bulgaria, where all approach to truth is considered scientific. This makes it impossible for the Bulgarian social scientist to understand the distinction between the humanities and the social sciences, and for the Westerner to understand how the scientific method as he conceives it (dealing with objective, empirical data; straining towards prediction; emphasising repeated testing; accepting no hypothesis as a law until it is found to have no inexplicable exceptions) can be applied to the broad range of subjects which the Bulgarian terms social sciences.

A third difficulty lies in basic assumptions. For the Bulgarian Marxist, the laws governing society have already been discovered. This is what dialectical materialism is all about. By turning to it, and particularly to historical materialism, the Bulgarian social scientist claims to find there a ready explanation for any and every social phenomenon. It provides him with neat categories for classifying all historical data, it gives him a working theory for describing without much detailed study what is happening in the capitalist world and in the developing countries. He claims that it also helps him to anticipate and direct social change. Much of his research may therefore be concerned with finding examples which support the theory, while dismissing as irrelevant to the topic under investigation those instances which do not fit it. To many Westerners, on the other hand, social science exists primarily to test whatever hypotheses may be advanced about society. They, too, carry into their work certain assumptions about science and the nature of society, but by training and tradition they try to keep these from distorting their investigations.

When the Westerner chides the Bulgarian for not being objective in the strictly scientific sense and for setting out to prove what he has already accepted *a priori*, the Bulgarian will reply: 'But you are not scientific yourself. You have no grand comprehensive theory that helps

you fit all social phenomena into place. We have.' And communication inevitably breaks down when the Westerner suggests that the two team up in an empirical investigation to test the universality of any one of Marx's basic tenets through time and in a representative group of countries. In this case the Westerner is accused of being a 'positivist', which is as uncomplimentary a word for the Bulgarian to use as 'subjectivity' is when applied by the Westerner to someone he considers to be misusing the scientific approach.

A fourth difficulty lies in the picture that the Bulgarian and Westerner each has of what society is and should be. To the former the state is the central force, at least during this period of maximum exertion as embodied in various five-year plans. In Bulgaria, as elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, the withering away of the state has been indefinitely postponed. The Bulgarian Marxist finds it difficult to understand a pluralist society where there are checks and balances between the institutional complexes. To him, this seems chaotic and undisciplined. This is because he takes as one of his basic tenets, not to be questioned in any scientific study, the primary role of the Communist Party in every sphere. Policies may change as 'objective conditions' change, but the leadership of the Party continues. To many Westerners this gives the impression of a garrison state in which scholars are treated as soldiers and assigned to posts where needed; where the luxury of free, independent, individual scholarly enquiry (in which Karl Marx himself was able to indulge) is subordinated to the fulfilment of the five-year plan. To some of the more dogmatic Marxists in Bulgaria the pursuit by the scholar of his own enquiry without reference to the practical applicability of his findings is tantamount to disloyalty to the state. At the same time, there are social scientists in Bulgaria who, while insisting on their loyalty both to the Party and to Marxist doctrine, sense an inherent contradiction, as do scientists everywhere, between science—whose goals are universal—and politics—whose goals are particularist.

Any insight, therefore, into Bulgarian social science must take into account the dialogue that is apt to characterise its comparison with that of the West. It is defined differently, its assumptions vary in important respects, and its social functions are related to the accomplishment of regime objectives. This attitude of mind is the result of the character of the postwar government and its determined purpose to divert Bulgarian intellectual life away from the Western direction in which it was moving before World War II and into the Soviet path. Any redirection such as this invariably results in loss of momentum. Intellectuals who survived the postwar transition had to refashion their views to conform to the new ideology; the new intellectuals who came to positions of power, whether aware of it or not, give the impression of being almost completely isolated from the Western world from which Marxism itself sprang.

THE organisation of Bulgarian social science follows the Soviet pattern. Research activity is institute-based rather than university-based. Yet the educational institutions do serve as important training centres for young people in all branches of activity; Bulgarians claim that they have a larger proportion of their young people attending higher educational institutions (twenty in number), than do England and some other Western countries. The University of Sofia has several faculties that deal with the Bulgarian version of the social sciences: the Faculty of Law, the Faculty of Pedagogy and Philosophy (including psychology), the Faculty of Literature and Philology, the Faculty of History. Geography is attached to the natural sciences, although some of its subject-matter is social in scope. The Karl Marx Higher Economic Institute concentrates on political economy and business administration; the Higher Party School also stresses political economy, history, and economics. The graduates of these two schools may be found throughout the whole political and economic machine. In Sofia, Svishtov, and Varna are other institutes which teach economics, accounting, statistics, and business administration. Also to be included under social sciences are the Conservatory of Music, the School of the Theatre, and an Academy of Painting. But this does not complete the story. Each of the faculties of natural science has its own chair for dialectical materialism and political economy, compulsory for all students. Recently there has been much discussion in Bulgaria as to whether the students in these scientific faculties should be taught dialectical materialism as it relates specifically to their scientific speciality (e.g. medicine) or as it relates more broadly to social reality. Apparently the decision has been taken to tie dialectical materialism directly in with the specific field. Thus the doctor will not be grounded in all of the broad aspects of the topic, but will be shown how his work as a doctor and his speciality of medicine are connected with dialectical materialism. The chief Bulgarian textbook on the topic, which bears the title *Dialectical Materialism*, is a translation from the basic Russian textbook, but in the sections devoted to historical materialism a number of examples are taken from Bulgarian history.

The Bulgarian social scientist, however, does not work only as a teacher in the university or in other institutions of higher education; he becomes a member of one of the thirty-five institutes attached to the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. If at all prominent in his field, and if considered politically reliable, he may be elected a member of the Academy of Sciences. Those institutes in the Academy related to the social sciences include the Institute of Philosophy, the Economic Institute, and the Institute of Law. By a decree of November 1959, these three were combined into one department of the Academy. The Historical Institute, the Institute of Pedagogy, and the Ethnographic Institute are combined into a second department. A third department includes the Institutes concerned with Philology, Literature, and Art. Social scientists may also be used in the administrative scientific institutes

which are attached to various ministries. For example, according to the reorganisation plan for the social sciences, the Institute for Physical Education and School Hygiene is combined with the Pedagogical Institute of the Academy, whereas there is a new institute, attached to the Ministry of Education and Culture, which combines the former Higher Institute for Physical Culture and the Scientific Research Institute for Physical Culture. This kind of regrouping takes place periodically as authorities seek a better administrative apparatus to tackle problems in need of immediate solution.

A further feature of the organised life of the social scientist is the Union of Scientific Workers. There are more than 5,000 scientific workers in Bulgaria engaged in teaching and research work and distributed as members throughout the fifteen sections of the Union of Scientific Workers. These groups tend to follow the divisions already listed for the University of Sofia faculties and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences. The sections correspond roughly to the professional associations to which social scientists of a Western country may belong: they hold conferences, sponsor publications, and receive foreign specialists.

The official document of 1959, to which reference has already been made, views developments in the social sciences as follows:

> Significant progress has also been made by the social sciences. They can be credited with the struggle to eradicate bourgeois ideology and to consolidate Marxism-Leninism as the dominant ideology in our society. They have successfully undertaken the scientific analysis of the history of the Bulgarian people. Through their labour, workers in the field of the juridical sciences have made a valuable contribution to our comprehensive judicial system.

Looking a little more closely at what some of the social sciences have actually done to achieve the results here recorded, we find that since the coming to power of the Fatherland Front in September 1944, the Bulgarian historians have been busy setting the historical record 'straight'. This meant rewriting the prewar history books and interpreting the events since 1944 in a manner favourable to the regime. Evidence of the new approach in history is provided by the two-volume *Istoriya na Bulgariya* (History of Bulgaria) and the one-volume *Kratka Istoriya na Bulgariya* (Short History of Bulgaria), published in 1958 by the Institute of Bulgarian History of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Of particular interest are the last three parts of the short history, which deal with 'The free development of capitalism in Bulgaria' (1877–1917), 'Bulgaria during the period of the general crisis of capitalism' (1917–44), and 'Bulgaria on the road to socialism'. A special feature of Bulgarian historical writing in recent years has been the study of past insurrections and peasant uprisings, with the object of identifying them both in spirit and in fact with the socialist cause. The periodical *Istoricheski Pregled* (Historical Review) published by the Historical Institute is viewed in official circles as a strong fortress on the 'Marxist historical front'.

Economists are highly regarded among social scientists not only because economic analysis is so much a part of Marxist thought, but because economists play a key part in a planned economy. The compilation of a five-year plan, and Bulgaria is now in its third one, calls for detailed information about every sector of Bulgarian life. But if economists have prestige, they are also frequently censured. When Bulgaria experiences its recurrent economic difficulties, those doing the planning in this planned society are blamed, if the weather cannot be held responsible. The planners, in turn, blame those furnishing poor statistics or economic analysis. The state must remain infallible, while its fallible servants are replaced or are urged to more careful efforts.

This means that economists in Bulgaria, as elsewhere, spend a great deal of time on current economic problems. Some of them do have time to make excursions into economic theory, but most do not. An analysis of articles written for *Ikonomicheska Misul* (Economic Thought), published by the Economic Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, shows a wide range of interests, most of which relate to immediate problems. Themes receiving heavy stress are various aspects of industrial development, the collective farm, the payment of labour, the five-year plan, the national budget, automation, with occasional articles on the merchant fleet, and on the economic situation in places as widely separated as North Korea, Czechoslovakia, South-East Asia, and Greece. A major theme, also, is Western capitalism. Although it is supposedly the enemy of the very thing that socialism in Bulgaria stands for, it has a fascination for the economists. They try to outdo each other in setting forth its weaknesses and in tracing what they consider to be its decline. But this is no parlour game for the economists, since both theoretically and practically they have an interest in the demise of capitalism. One gains the impression from conversation with them that, like heirs to an aged relative, they start each morning by asking how the patient is doing, since their hopes are pinned on an unfavourable medical report.

IN September 1959 the newly-formed Bulgarian Sociological Association was admitted to the International Sociological Association at its Stresa Congress. A few days after the Congress, I had a meeting in Sofia with fifteen members of the new Bulgarian society. During a two-hour discussion (punctuated by many acts of traditional Bulgarian hospitality), I reminded the group that they had recently been accepted for membership in this international sociological body and asked just what their definition of sociology really was. Apparently I had unintentionally touched upon a sensitive point, because a deep silence fell over the group until the chairman, Sava Ganovski, experienced in diplomatic and political life, made the official reply. 'We are still discussing this matter. Some of us feel that there is no need for a sociology distinct from historical materialism, while others think that they can develop a Marxist sociology apart from historical materialism.' Within the past few months the matter has been up for discussion again, with the decision seeming

to favour those who oppose any development of sociology apart from historical materialism. Officially, then, historical materialism is the application of dialectical materialism to the study of social reality.

The leading proponent for setting up a Marxist sociology is Zhivko Oshavkov. His book, *Istoricheskiyat Materializum i Sotsiologiyata*, published in 1958 by the Institute of Philosophy of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, distinguishes between the philosophical and non-philosophical sciences, including sociology under the latter. If what has happened in some of the other countries of the Soviet bloc is any indication, the Bulgarian social scientists will probably not make use of the 'bourgeois' discipline of sociology, even though it be rephrased in Marxist terms, until they feel compelled to deal more analytically with the kinds of problem which beset any regime involved in rapid social change: worker morale and productivity, changing status of women and effects on family life, community—including urban—development, juvenile delinquency, state of public opinion, education and a newly emerging class structure, to name but a few problem areas. Some of the younger social scientists realise that the methods developed for philosophical discourse are not suited to the kind of data-gathering and analysis necessary for an understanding of the social situation in specific communities or regions. They also seem to be learning that local problems are not solved by appeals to greater endeavour, that it is only when human behaviour is studied as a phenomenon in its own right that this behaviour can be explained and something done about it. It remains to be seen whether the Bulgarian social scientists will work out their own adaptation of Western sociological methodology to the Bulgarian situation or whether they will wait until this can be borrowed in more fully developed form from the Soviet Union. But there are a few straws in the wind. Within recent months a few articles have appeared in *Planovo Stopanstvo i Statistika* (Planned Economy and Statistics), where the argument seems to derive from the data empirically collected rather than being based merely on *a priori* assumptions with data thrown in as illustrations of social facts.

Of all the social sciences, sociology has been most drastically affected in that it has to all intents and purposes been proscribed. Exactly the reverse is true of ethnography which, more than any other social science, has pursued the even tenor of its way, with an occasional reference to the new ideology, but with its major concern still being the ethnographic description of traditional ways of life, customs as well as artifacts. Visitors to Sofia find the time spent at the Ethnographic Museum very rewarding, for it depicts in intimate detail what village life in many parts of Bulgaria once was like.

The most attractive social science periodical, from the standpoint of composition, paper, and illustrations, is the *Izvestiya na Ethnografskiya Institut s Muzei* (Bulletin of the Ethnographic Institute and Museum). It, too, is a publication of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and, through the use of extended passages in other languages, is designed to

appeal to an international audience. The scholarly ethnographic tradition which was well established before World War II is therefore being continued unabated by the Bulgarian government today.

For an insight into developments in social theory one turns to *Philosofska Misul* (Philosophical Thought), published by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, or to *Novo Vreme* (New Times), the official organ of the Communist Party. It is difficult to summarise in a few lines the scope of these two publications; they cover all the topics usually considered under political economy or the study of the state and social philosophy. Unfortunately, many of the more stirring intellectual debates on matters of social theory go on for months verbally before anyone ventures to set forth a new position in writing.

Of interest to the Westerner is the space devoted to the general problem of 'the elimination of the vestiges of capitalism' from the superstructure of Bulgarian society. The social scientists are urged to discover what these vestiges are and to find ways of rooting them out so that socialist progress can be made. A case in point is that of property ownership; people need to be re-educated to value collective rather than private ownership. Social scientists are also expected to discover through their research ways of inspiring people to participate in 'socialist competition' in order to fulfil the five-year plan ahead of schedule.

The social sciences in Bulgaria have been redirected in the past fifteen years to a rigorous Marxist approach and have been organised according to the pattern developed in the Soviet Union. There is thus little continuity between scholarship before World War II and the present, with the exception of ethnography. New names have appeared on the intellectual scene but they have not yet had time to establish scholarly traditions and international reputations. One cannot predict the trend of events, but a personal evaluation is in order. It is very likely that the more vigorously Bulgarian social scientists are pushed into the analysis and resolution of practical problems, and held responsible for the outcome of their recommendations, the more they will turn to the empirical approach developed in the West. In their study of social problems, their methodology, particularly that dealing with non-economic problems, is far behind that of the West. This time lag is due in part to the decision made a few years ago that statistics was to be considered a social science and therefore to be viewed in the light of historical materialism rather than by mathematical criteria; in part perhaps to the fear on the part of the regime that empirical studies might reveal the unsoundness of some parts of their doctrine, and to the reluctance of those who have achieved power at such cost to admit that their views of social reality need any kind of verification. Genuine science requires first of all genuine humility; any pretension of omniscience militates

against it. To use the words of the Marxists themselves, ' objective conditions ' in Bulgaria are apt to change (or at least the interpretation of them will change) to the point that much social science may have to move from the philosophical to the empirical emphasis, and a non-philosophical discipline might then be established.

Our Contributors

LILIANA BRISBY, journalist and broadcaster, is the author of *Les Relations Russo-Bulgares (1878–1886)*.

ADAM BROMKE, formerly at McGill University and University of Montreal, is now a Research Fellow at the Harvard Russian Research Center, engaged on a book on Poland under Gomulka.

DAVID BROWN, Music Librarian of London University, has written on English and Russian music, and is co-editor of the complete edition of Thomas Weelke's church music, to be published next year.

J. F. BROWN, formerly a Research Fellow at the University of Michigan, now lives in Europe and has written a number of studies of Balkan affairs.

BORIS CHRISTOFF is a student of Bulgarian affairs.

L. A. D. DELLIN, Associate Professor at the University of Vermont, is the editor of *Bulgaria* (Atlantic Books, 1957).

JOHN KALO is an economist specialising on Bulgaria.

EUGENE KAMENKA, author of several studies on Soviet philosophy, now teaches at Canberra University.

WILLIAM KOREY, graduate of Columbia University Russian Institute, who has taught Russian history at various American universities, is now Director of the New York Bureau of the B'nai B'rith International Council.

ASSEN MANDIKOFF is a journalist specialising in Bulgarian affairs.

BERNARD MORRIS is Assistant Professor in International Relations at the American University, Washington.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD, author of *The Communist Party of Bulgaria, 1883–1936*, and of a forthcoming study of Pilsudski's *coup d'état* in Poland, is Assistant Professor of Government at Columbia University.

IRWIN SANDERS, Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Boston University, formerly taught at the American College in Sofia.

ARTHUR SPRAGUE is a Research Fellow in Russian Art History at Columbia University.

Between Moscow and Sofia

BULGARIAN HISTORY REVISED

L. A. D. Dellin

THE study of history was the principal tool used by Marx in formulating his theories of social development, on which he based his prediction of the inevitable triumph of socialism. Marx was concerned primarily with the class struggle as it grew out of a given complex of production relations, and with the role of the proletarian masses; those who now claim to speak in his name, however, rely increasingly on un-Marxist categories such as nationality and nationalism, race and tradition, using them arbitrarily in an effort to refashion the tale for purposes which are anything but historical.

The rewriting of Bulgarian history is a particularly suitable case in point. It follows, of course, the familiar approach in terms of methodology and periodisation, but, as several stages of Bulgarian history escape this rationalising pattern, the communist historians fill in the gap with strange analogies. The new version displays the usual magnification of the role of the communist movement and of class antagonisms, but encounters unusual difficulties in squeezing Bulgarian peasant society into the ready-made mould. The rewriting of Bulgarian history offers a rare example of direct Soviet intervention in the recording and interpretation of Bulgaria's past, and of the connivance of Bulgarian communist or conformist authors in the treatment of Bulgaria's history as virtually a function of Russian history.

The major source for this essay is the two-volume *History of Bulgaria*,[1] the *magnum opus* of Bulgarian communist historiography, published by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 1954 and 1955. Many other sources, such as the *History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, history textbooks, and publications of the Academy's Institute for Bulgarian History, provide supplementary material. Comparison with the two-volume *History of Bulgaria*, published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in the same years, but earlier than their Bulgarian counterpart, is necessary, as well as an examination of the collaboration between Soviet and Bulgarian communist historians, to uncover the real purpose behind the work.

It should be made clear at the outset that the original work discernible in Bulgarian historical publications between the communist seizure of power in September 1944 and the reorganisation of the Institute for Bulgarian History in 1950, gave way to a rapid and comprehensive

1 All quotations, unless otherwise identified, are taken from this source: *Istoriya na Bulgariya.*

sovietisation of Bulgarian historiography. The immediate reason was the Party assignment to the Bulgarian Academy to write a 'Marxist history' of Bulgaria, and the ensuing necessity to find an 'authors collective', willing and able to carry out the assignment. This took some doing, because the non-Marxist historians neither saw the need for a new history (Bulgaria's past had been studied in definitive works by Zlatarski, Nikov, Mutafchiev, and others), nor felt able to participate in the venture with a clear conscience. The history had to be written, to quote from the directive of the communist President of the Academy, 'with a political edge and purpose, in order to become a tool in the hands of and influence the people . . . so that communism might be victorious in our country, in the Balkans, and in the entire world'.[2] On the other hand, those who willingly put on the Marxist cloak, like Burmov, Angelov, Milchev, Gandev, or Kosev, were mediocrities, unable or unwilling to show any independence, while faithful Party members, who were promoted to the rank of 'Marxist historians', were described by the director of the Institute for Bulgarian History as 'lacking sufficient training'.[3]

The result was confusion and frustration until the Soviet historians of the Institute of Slavic Studies, led by Grekov, moved in; they transferred source materials, manuscripts, and even the Bulgarian 'authors collective' from Sofia to Moscow,[4] and finally the Bulgarian edition was ready to appear, shortly after the Soviet *History of Bulgaria.* Even a cursory review of the two works confirms the suspicion that the Bulgarian product was an unhappy version of the Soviet original, and in some instances even more Soviet and more russophile.

COMMUNIST historiography is by its own confession deeply partisan, that is, serving the political aims of the Communist Party; the use of this approach to the history of Bulgaria led the authors into a dead-end which, however, had to be presented as an open avenue even at the cost of ridicule. Thus, the standard periodisation into the five stages of social development, based on characteristic 'production relations' and 'class struggle', does not fit Bulgaria's past, as the second, slave-holding, stage is totally absent, while the third, feudal stage, and that part of the fourth called 'imperialist capitalism' are, to say the least, dubious in the Bulgarian context. Nevertheless, the authors deal at length with a 'slave-holding structure' in Bulgaria, although at one point they mention almost casually that the Bulgarian people 'skipped the slave-owning phase', as if this did not invalidate their entire case. Similar treatment is accorded the stage of Bulgarian 'imperialism'. Here again the lengthy build-up is practically annihilated by the cursory admission that Bulgarian capitalism 'did not enter the phase of imperialism'. The thesis of a

[2] Todor Pavlov. 'Za Marksicheska Istoriya na Bulgaria' (Towards a Marxist History of Bulgaria), *Selected Speeches,* Sofia, 1954, p. 316.
[3] *Istoricheski Pregled* (Historical Review), Sofia, 1953, No. 6.
[4] See Kosev's report in *Istoricheski Pregled,* 1955, No. 3.

feudal Bulgaria is, however, defended to the bitter end, although the arguments against it marshalled by the late Professor Mutafchiev, to the effect that the Bulgarian landowners had no political rights over the peasantry, are not even indicated.

Similar results flow from the application of the standard analysis of class divisions and antagonisms, although in this case the political colour is added with clear premeditation. The well-known obstacle represented by the almost proverbial equalitarianism in Bulgaria's pre-communist peasant society, and the lack of a significant industrial labour force, not to speak of a ' revolutionary proletariat ', is removed by a kind of sleight of hand. First, the role of the Bulgarian Communist Party is exaggerated beyond recognition, as is the class stratification of Bulgarian society; the achievements of the Third Kingdom are denied, in an attempt to foment hatred of the most recent past of a society in which the communists were unable to assert themselves. Second, since the Bulgarian Communist Party has a short history, communist substitutes are invented by the coinage of such social categories as ' revolutionary democrats ' or ' peasant-plebeian revolutionaries and educators ', and national revolutionary movements, personalities, and writings are usurped outright and presented as communist precursors or sympathisers. The authors extend the communist paternity claims even to the medieval religious Bogomil heresy and the national uprising of the shepherd Ivailo, not to speak of the more recent *haiduk* (Robin Hood-like) raids or the popular April 1876 uprising against the Turks. They insist that the romantic *History of Bulgarian Kings and Saints*, written in the eighteenth century by the inspirer of the Bulgarian Renaissance, Father Paissy, is a ' Party history ', and that Paissy and other heroes of the pre-liberation period like Rakovski, Levski, and Botev, are ' ours and exclusively ours and not of the treacherous, reactionary, and fascist Bulgarian bourgeoisie ' (p. 337). These pathetic attempts to communise Bulgaria's past would not deserve mention except as an illustration of the character of communist historiography and an example of the barrage to which the rising Bulgarian generation is subjected.

The communist version of Bulgarian history reveals its most striking feature in the treatment of Russian-Bulgarian relations. That the Soviet state and Party are subjects of adoration comes as no great surprise; it was taken for granted that the Bulgarian communist historians would faithfully follow the Party line by presenting Soviet friendship as being ' as necessary to Bulgaria as the air and the sun is to every living creature ' (Dimitrov's well-known motto), by calling the entry of Soviet troops into Bulgaria in 1944 ' liberation ', or in general by presenting every event in Soviet-Bulgarian relations in a light favourable to the Soviets. What did come as a surprise, however, was the retroactive projection of the adulation of the Soviets into the past, the attempt to ' russify ' the entire thirteen-century-long history of the Bulgarian nation.

It is common knowledge that Bulgarians and Russians are ethnically and culturally akin, and that intercourse between the two nations began

in the earliest stages of their European history. But while in modern times Russia has been the greater giver, in the Middle Ages there was an almost continuous flow of Bulgarian contributions to the north. As a fountainhead of Slavic Orthodox Christianity and culture, Bulgaria exerted a marked influence upon Russian development, too well known to require elaboration here. But communist historiography does not want it that way. Obsessed by present-day power and ideological relationships which rule out any official doubts about Soviet supremacy, the Soviet historians, echoed and even outdone by their Bulgarian counterparts, simply transfer the present to the past and transpose well-established historical facts. Bulgarian history thus assumes the character of an appendage of Russian history, and Russia, as now the Soviet Union, appears as the inspirer, giver, leader, protector, and big brother from the emergence of Bulgaria and uninterruptedly to the present day. The only too obvious purpose is to obliterate from the minds of the rising generations the sense of a distinct and distinguished national history, to erase the memory and implications of crucial Bulgarian contributions to Russia, and of Russian aspirations vis-à-vis Bulgaria, as well as to engender feelings of subordination, gratitude, and adulation towards the successors of the Tsars. With the sense of national identity blurred and misdirected, the new generations will, it is hoped, be moulded into the ' new communist man '. Historiography will thus serve its purpose as a ' most powerful tool for the victory of communism '.

SPACE permits us to cite only a few of the most outspoken examples of this kind of re-writing, but they should be enough to substantiate the case. It is symptomatic that the russification starts with the dawn of Bulgarian European history, when Southern Slavic tribes dwelling on the fringes of the Byzantine Empire were conquered by the non-Slavic proto-Bulgarians, led by Asparukh, and incorporated into the first Bulgarian state in the Balkans (A.D. 679), a development resembling Rurik's victory over the Eastern Slavs in the north two centuries later. But, just as the Soviet historians rejected the Norman theory of the origin of the Russian state as ' politically harmful . . . since it denied the Slavic peoples any state-forming ability of their own, ascribing it to foreign more cultured European nations ' (*Bolshevik*, November 1947), and proclaimed the Eastern Slavs as the creators of the first Russian state, so the communist authors of the *History of Bulgaria* credit the Slavic tribes within Byzantium with the formation of their own state in the Balkans, before the arrival of the proto-Bulgarians. However, since they are aware of the gap of two centuries by which the alleged Slavic state organisation in Russia lagged behind that in Bulgaria, the communist historians simply back-date the formation of a Russian state by three centuries, and thus make it happen a hundred years earlier than the achievement in Bulgaria. Then comes the finishing stroke: the Bulgarian Slavs (' who have assimilated the proto-Bulgarians completely and without trace ') are presented as belonging not only to the Southern

(Sclavine) branch but also 'to a certain extent to the Eastern (Antes) group', i.e. to the Russian Slavs, thus turning the Bulgarians into an ethnic subdivision of the Russians and their state into an extension of the Russian state. Should it not follow from this that Bulgarian history is in fact part of Russian history, and that the Bulgarian people owe their origin, statehood, and all else to the Russians? The historical truth that the proto-Bulgarians formed and ruled over the first Bulgarian state in the Balkans two centuries before the establishment of Rurik's Kievan Russia, shaped Bulgaria's medieval glory, and left a lasting imprint upon Bulgarian ethnical character and society (as on other Southern but not Eastern Slavs) is not just ignored; it is turned into something else.

Another, even more absurd, falsification involves the cultural relationship between Bulgaria and Russia in the Middle Ages. It is common knowledge that Bulgaria, as a result of the acceptance of Christianity and the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet in the ninth century, developed a literature in the vernacular, centred in the famous Preslav School, which not only made it one of the most civilised countries of the Middle Ages but spread throughout the lands of the Southern and Eastern Slavs, and especially into Kievan Russia. More than any other country, Bulgaria was responsible for the civilisation of medieval Russia through the transmission of script, literature, and Christian faith. As the English historian of medieval Bulgaria, Steven Runciman, observes: 'The great gift of Bulgaria to Europe lay in her readiness to take over the legacy of Cyril and Methodius. . . . It was Boris of Bulgaria that brought it to completion, and thus put all the Balkan peninsula and all the Russias into his debt'.[5]

So the communist historians, anxious about the effect of this monumental Bulgarian contribution to Russia, now that the indebtedness must be the other way round, concentrate their efforts on turning history upside-down. Taking their cue from the President of the Academy, that 'we should not fall into an apology for the work of Cyril and Methodius which contemporary Soviet historiography will greet with an ironic smile' (p. 329), they discover the existence of a Slavic alphabet and even of books written in Russian before Cyril and Methodius, citing as evidence a tale in the *Pannonian Legends*, long known to historians. Yet, regardless of the reliability of this source, they must have known that the books which Cyril is alleged to have seen on his journey to Kherson, in the Crimea, could not have been written in 'Russian' for the simple reason that at that time (around 860) Kherson was inhabited by the non-Slavic Khazars, and that the Kievan Slavs were not yet known as 'Russians', a term coined by the Varangians (Normans) who invaded later-day Russia after Cyril's mission to the Khazars. The absurdity is so patent that even the Soviet authors state in conclusion that this was 'Slavic script in its primitive form' (writing 'books' in it must have been quite an achievement!), while their Bulgarian counterparts speak

[5] Steven Runciman, *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire* (London, 1930), p. 261.

of ' some sort of an alphabet . . . created by known and unknown [*sic*!] attempts '. One is almost tempted to sympathise with such labour pains.

The same theme of almost completely one-way Russian contributions to Bulgaria runs throughout the medieval sections of the history; this was in fact the golden age of Bulgaria's political and cultural power, while Russia was still in its early infancy. Even Chervenkov in 1945 proudly stated that ' it was in our country that the Slavic script developed first and was transmitted from us to Russia '. Now, this is reversed and Bulgarian historians today deny the achievement that their predecessors and historians everywhere have ascribed to their fatherland.

ONE of the more unfortunate attempts to project the ' eternal Russian-Bulgarian friendship ', and especially Russia's image as the ' liberator and protector of Bulgaria ' into the past is the treatment of the military expedition by Kiev's Prince Svyatoslav into Bulgaria, at the end of the tenth century. As is known, Svyatoslav, enticed by the Byzantines, moved against Bulgaria in 967, conquered the capital, imprisoned King Boris II, and rode roughshod over the Bulgarian population until the Byzantines, concerned by the growth of his power, managed to repel him, thus substituting their own domination over Bulgaria for Svyatoslav's. Runciman, dwelling upon these events which sealed the end of the First Bulgarian Empire, remarks: ' [The Bulgarians] had at last met the fate for which diplomats at Constantinople so long had plotted; they had succumbed to barbarians from the Steppes. And now they had to watch the barbarians and the Imperial armies fighting over their lands, knowing that, whichever might be victorious, neither would give them back their independence '.[6]

Instead of sliding over these events, so compromising to their thesis, the communist historians decided simply to rewrite the episode, and proclaim, of all men, Svyatoslav as the ' liberator ' of Bulgaria, suggesting also an analogy between his time and September 1944, when the Soviets moved into Bulgaria to ' liberate ' it.

The section devoted to the Second Bulgarian Empire is marred by similar concoctions. The king-liberators Peter and Asen, and the entire Asen dynasty, are said to be ' probably of Russian-Kumanian origin ' and Russian troops are said to have assisted Peter and Asen and brought Ivan Asen the Great to power, although at that time Kievan Russia was fighting for its life against the Tatars. Similarly, Russian cultural contributions to Bulgaria's Second Empire are stressed, whereas the facts again point the other way; Bulgaria was then independent and flourishing, while Russia was under Tatar domination. There are wholly inadequate references to the well-known contributions of the Turnovo School to Russian religious and cultural life, personified inter alia by the occupancy of the Kiev and Moscow metropolitan sees by the Bulgarian bishops Cyprian and Gregory Tsamblak.

[6] Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

Contemporary Bulgarian history, which lends itself much more easily to the glorification of Russia, as Bulgaria's liberation came as a direct result of Tsarist Russia's victory over Turkey, is presented outright as a function of Russia's benevolence and influence. Even some glaring instances of Bulgarian-Russian conflict are omitted, obscured, or turned upside down, such as the initial Russian support of the Greek Patriarchate as the exclusive representative of all Balkan Christians, the Tsars' attempts to turn the newly-liberated state into a dependency, the Russian-inspired suspension of the liberal Turnovo Constitution and the ensuing heavy-handed rule of Russian generals (1881–83), the Tsar's castigation of Prince Battenberg, resulting in his abdication from the Bulgarian throne, Russia's objection to the reunion between the Principality and Southern Bulgaria (then called Eastern Rumelia) in 1885, the ten-year (1886–96) break in diplomatic relations, or the encounter between Bulgarian and Russian troops on the Dobrudzha battlefield during the First World War. Russia, Tsarist or Communist, can do no wrong.

Bulgarian history after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 which, without any plausible justification, is used as a dividing line in the periodisation of Bulgarian history too, becomes a ' reflection of the Great October Socialist Revolution '. The sixty-five-odd years of the Third Kingdom are subdivided into sections with such headings as ' Surge of the Revolutionary Forces ', ' Reaction ', ' Militarism-Fascism ', ' Anti-Fascist People's Uprising ', ' Monarcho-Fascist Dictatorship ', and so on. It matters little that during that period membership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, according to its own data, never exceeded 30,000, that there was never a Fascist or Nazi party in power, and that the structure and composition of Bulgarian society made it a poor ground for communism.

This stereotyped communist vocabulary is applied with no more justification to the most recent phase of Bulgarian history with its ' armed popular partisan movement ', i.e. the minute Fatherland Front, its ' liberation ' by the Soviet Army, i.e. unprovoked Soviet aggression, or its ' Road to Socialism ', i.e. the present condition of the people. The villains, ' the most vicious enemies of the Bulgarian people ', remain the United States and Britain, followed by neighbouring or far-away countries which happen to be in Russia's black books.

In conclusion, it seems pertinent to comment briefly on the reception given to this work of learning by the professional historians in Bulgaria and elsewhere.

It should be known that the authors of the new *History of Bulgaria* were attacked and ridiculed by their Bulgarian colleagues in communist Bulgaria itself with a courage which, bearing in mind the risks involved, deserves the greatest admiration. At a memorable meeting, in November 1953, called to discuss the galley-proofs of the first volume, the non-communist and non-conformist Bulgarian historians of the calibre of the ancient historians Dechev and Miyatev and the medievalists Duichev

and Nikolaev, levelled devastating criticism at the authors' collective.[7] With an impressive mastery of their subject, they pointed to specific plagiarisms from Soviet authors and even to outright 'illiteracy' in translating from the Russian (by Milchev), to borrowings from non-communist Bulgarian historians without acknowledgement (by Danov), to servility towards the Soviets (by Burmov, Angelov, Kosev, and Christov), and to general incompetence. To quote Professor Nikolaev: 'What I am referring to is that harmful and unskilful plagiarism which consists in a mechanical and formalistic transplanting of the forms established for the USSR . . . their disregard for the concrete historical reality and their reliance on alien models for the solution of our history problems'. Even communist academicians, like Professor Kristanov, joined in the criticism.

Historians of the non-communist world who had their first post-war contact with their communist colleagues at the tenth International Congress of Historians in Rome, in 1955, were embarrassed by the performance of the communist historians. Visibly disturbed and humiliated, Kosev wrote on his return: 'The Bulgarian contribution must be evaluated as extremely unsatisfactory . . . as we have no experience and are not prepared for activities of this kind'.[8] The five years that have passed since then appear to have made no noticeable change in the quality of performance.

[7] See the summary of the discussion in *Izvestiya na Instituta za Bulgarska Istoriya* (News of the Institute for Bulgarian History), 1954, No. 5.

[8] See, *inter alia*, Gerhard Ritter, 'Der X. International Historikerkongress in Rom', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1955, No. 3; Kosev's Report in *Istoricheski Pregled*, 1955, No. 6.

REMODELLING EDUCATION

A. Mandikoff

THE educational tradition in Bulgaria dates back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the age of the Bulgarian National Revival. While the country was still under Turkish rule, a system of primary and secondary schools gradually developed and spread with the assistance of the Church. By 1878—the year of Bulgaria's liberation—30 per cent of the children were attending school.

The country's new constitution of 1879 made school attendance for children between seven and fourteen years of age compulsory. From that time and until 1944, when the communist regime was established, the educational system in Bulgaria corresponded roughly to the system prevailing in Europe: seven years in a primary school, compulsory and free of charge; five years in a secondary school (high school); there were a number of pedagogical institutes, and specialised advanced schools or colleges such as the Schools of Commerce, Finance, Economics, the College of Music, the Art School and the University.

After 1944, the outward structure of the educational system remained at first unchanged. But the new government wasted no time introducing radical changes in the spirit of the educational system. A decree of 13 October 1944 enforced the destruction—in the literal sense of the word—of all textbooks published before 9 September 1944. By a decree of 19 February 1945, publication of textbooks became a state monopoly. A decree of 3 November 1944, arranged for the dismissal of teachers out of sympathy with the regime. The University Education Act of 24 September 1948 empowered the authorities to refuse admittance of politically undesirable students to the University.

Meanwhile, the few existing private schools were turned into public schools; the religious minority communities and the Churches were prohibited from maintaining schools of any kind, with the exception of Theological Colleges for clergymen, and these could be established only by special ministerial ordinance.

On 24 August 1949 the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Council of Ministers published a joint resolution which stated that in future education was to be run ' in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism ' and based on ' indestructible friendship with the Soviet Union '. Bulgaria was to avail itself of Soviet experience in the field of education.

The years from 1949 to 1957 were marked by blind imitation of the Soviet educational system. Dialectical Materialism, History of the Soviet Communist Party, History of the Bulgarian Communist Party, were introduced as compulsory subjects, and the study of Russian was given priority over all other foreign languages.

The Universities were deprived of the autonomy they had enjoyed in the past; as a matter of fact, this had already been undermined by the decree of 3 November 1944, which hit mainly University professors. The Academy of Arts and Sciences was placed under the direct control of the Council of Ministers not only with respect to its administration, but also in its scientific research activities. Its tasks were defined by the Act of 11 October 1949: 'The Academy of Arts and Sciences will study and develop the achievements of world and above all Soviet science, in accordance with the plan for the construction of socialism'. The period of basic schooling—completion of which is a condition of University entry—was cut down from twelve to eleven years (seven years in primary school and four in secondary, instead of five).

The main trend in the policy followed by the communist authorities in the field of education, was outlined in the National Education Edict (Ukase) of 6 November 1954. Article 1 reads as follows: 'Instruction in schools and all other educational institutions must be conducted in a communist spirit'. The extent of indoctrination is particularly apparent from Article 4: 'For children aged three to seven nursery schools are to be opened, their purpose being to ensure the children's correct physical and spiritual upbringing, to lay the foundations of their communist education, and prepare them for entrance into primary schools'.

The results of the new policy can be deduced from the preamble to the Decree of 5 July 1957 on the Further Development of Education: 'Serious mistakes were allowed, which impeded the development of the general education schools. Some educational problems were settled hastily; there was little serious consideration of the different school reforms; the experience of Soviet schools was transplanted mechanically and pedagogical science was hardly applied to education; school reforms were carried out without competent preliminary investigation; the positive legacy of our schools from the past was under-rated'.

This decree of July 1957 was designed to eliminate these defects. It emphasised that education was to be more closely linked with the requirements of the regime's economic policy; the number of vocational schools was to be increased; some secondary schools were transformed into agricultural technical schools, and provision was made for the vocational training of teachers. The period of basic schooling was once more extended from eleven to twelve years, as before September 1944. The practice of electing rectors at the Universities was re-established.[1]

The main purpose of the decree clearly was to adapt the educational system to the requirements of industry, the collective farms, trade, etc., and to amend the more glaring shortcomings of the period 1949–57.

[1] Candidates can be put forward for election only if they have been recommended by the Academical Council, the Party organisation, and the Trade Union organisation of the University.

NO more than a year later the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party announced that the 1957 decree had proved ineffective in solving the educational problems of Bulgaria. This declaration was made before the new system had actually been put into operation and tested, for it was not due to begin before 1960; in the school year 1957–58, only a limited number of schools were to have the so-called polytechnical training introduced, and that on an experimental basis.

The reason for rejecting the new system could not, therefore, lie in the system itself, as it had not yet actually started functioning. The explanation lay elsewhere. In November 1958, Khrushchev had published his 'Theses on the Relation Between Schools and Life', and the communist authorities in Bulgaria wasted no time in following suit. In December 1958 they declared their intention to introduce not amendments, but basic reforms in the educational system which they had outlined only a year before. This was done on 3 July 1959, in an 'Act for closer ties between schools and life and the further development of National Education'. It is on this that the present educational system in Bulgaria rests, and on the Act for University Education of 6 February 1958. On the basis of these two Acts, the following structure emerges:

The basic type of school is the so-called Medium Polytechnical School, a unified twelve-year school, in which general education is combined with technical training and practical work in production. The first eight years are compulsory, and the children are given both general and technical education. After completing the compulsory course, the student may continue either by taking the upper four-year course or by entering a vocational school or so-called Technicum. The syllabus of the four-year course includes about 1,600 hours' work in production. The student who completes this course can then continue his education in any faculty of the University or other institute for advanced studies.

The course at vocational schools is from four to five years for students who have finished only the compulsory eight years, and one to four years for students who have completed the upper course at the polytechnical school. These technicums give training in industry, agriculture, building, transport, public health, etc. There are also special professional schools, attached to technicums, plants, factories, and state farms, which have a course of one to three years for training skilled workers for production in various branches of the economy.

The University and the other institutes for advanced education are in theory open to all students who have finished their secondary education and have completed their military service. The University course covers four to six years, depending on the faculty. The student must devote half of this period to 'socially useful work'. Socially useful work in production by university and secondary school students is paid at rates determined by order of the Council of Ministers.

Evening classes and correspondence courses are also part of the educational system. Provision is made for their expansion and improvement, to bring them up to the standard of the regular secondary schools. Steps are also being taken to raise the qualifications of the teaching staff in all schools: teachers of the first to fourth forms are expected to take a three-year course, after having completed twelve years at a polytechnical school; teachers of the fifth form and above must be University graduates. Following the Russian pattern, some schools are to be turned into boarding-schools. To begin with, this will be done on an experimental basis.

The new system of primary, secondary and specialised technical education outlined in the Act of 3 July 1959 came into force at the beginning of the 1960–61 school year. The reorganisation of the educational system in Bulgaria is to be completed in the course of the next four to five years.

DURING the school year 1959–60 there were 1,176,491 children attending schools for general education, staffed by 49,454 teachers. During the same year technicums and vocational schools were attended by 77,272 students, and had a teaching staff of 4,286. The polytechnical schools turned out 14,000 students, who are treated as qualified specialists in the different branches of the economy. For the school year 1961–62 there will be 455 technicums and vocational schools in Bulgaria, attended by 63,000 new students; this will bring the total number of students attending this type of school to 160,000.

During the year 1959–60, twenty Universities and other institutes for advanced education, with a total of thirty faculties and 3,750 staff, gave instruction to 48,880 students (13,020 of whom took correspondence courses). During 1960–61 the number of University students increased to 55,700 (15,530 by correspondence courses).[2]

An examination of the laws, decrees, and enactments now in force reveals that in Bulgaria today University education is *not* open to all who qualify by their educational attainments. There are a number of strong discriminatory clauses. One of the conditions of entry to the University specified in the Decree of the Ministry of Education and Culture of 10 March 1961 is that 'persons known for anti-popular activities will not be admitted to the University'. The concept of 'anti-popular activities' is of a purely political nature and its interpretation is left to political bodies: a young person cannot become a candidate for the University unless he has secured the approval of a special committee, composed of representatives of the Communist Party, Young Communist League, the Fatherland Front, and the trade union organisation attached to his former school. About 20 per cent of the vacancies for new University students are reserved for young people who already belong to some specific political and social category: 'Active participants in

[2] Cf. *Narodna Mladezh*, 15 September 1960.

the anti-fascist campaign and their children, young persons engaged in production, and those who have been particularly active in the public and political sphere'. They are also in a privileged position with regard to the entry examination for the University or any other institute of higher education.

Opportunities for education in foreign countries are very limited. The number of scholarships within the existing international conventions for cultural exchanges with other countries is insignificant. Studying abroad on private means is possible only for certain categories of people such as students whose parents or relatives are resident or permanently employed in a foreign country. The candidates go through a strict bureaucratic procedure: they have to file a petition for studying abroad, enclosing a copy of the confirmation of employment in a foreign country issued to the member of their family who will be responsible for their support, by the competent Bulgarian Ministry or department. Obviously, only children of employees of the regime stand a chance of studying abroad.

Opportunities for contact with foreign countries are also restricted in every other way. Western influence on youth is considered undesirable. An article published recently in the newspaper *Narodna Mladezh* clearly reflects the regime's efforts to eliminate this influence and to create in the students a psychosis of mistrust towards the West. It deals with a single but typical case concerning the activities of Jean Michel Leclair, lecturer in French at the Sofia State University, who took up the post in 1957 under the terms of the cultural convention between France and Bulgaria.

The paper of the Youth League accused M. Leclair of espionage and subversive activities, because he had distributed questionnaires inside and out of the University (e.g., during the showing of the film *Moderato Cantabile*). Some of the questions were: 'Have you any preference for a particular part of the country?'; 'Would you like to live for a time in a foreign country?'; 'Is patriotism a component part of the Bulgarian mentality?'

The French lecturer contended that he was interested in questions of ethno-psychology, as he was preparing a dissertation on the subject. According to the newspaper, however, M. Leclair was trying to get 'a picture of the political physiognomy of the person questioned', to reveal or create 'political sentiments', and to obtain 'concrete data on the industrialisation of certain districts in Bulgaria'. It also accused him of giving 'advice' and 'instructions' about France to Bulgarian students and teachers going to that country, and, worse than all, 'addresses'! To find out who was going abroad, and when, M. Leclair had made repeated visits to Bulgarian cultural institutes and departments.

Narodna Mladezh, the official organ of the only youth organisation in Bulgaria, invited the lecturer to vacate his post at the Sofia State University immediately, ending the article with the words: 'A la porte, M. Leclair!' A month after this article was published, Bulgaria

concluded a new convention with France for wider cultural exchanges between the two countries. This, at first sight, might be taken as a symptom of political schizophrenia. But such an explanation is too simple. As a matter of fact, it is an example of how the idea of ' peaceful co-existence between different social systems ' works in practice. The apparent expansion of relations with the West creates illusions on both sides. These carefully fostered illusions exaggerate the actual extent of liberalisation after Stalin's death and the subsequent changes in the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Government. In reality the liberalisation touches only the surface. Wider study of foreign languages apart from Russian, exchanges of exhibitions, specialists, and artistic troupes are encouraged, but a true extension of cultural relations with foreign countries based on free exchange of information, ideas, and impressions is not tolerated.

The case of the lecturer in French at Sofia University lights up the real situation behind the facade; it could be summed up as cultural exchange with foreign countries adjusted for optical illusion.

ALL foreign schools in Bulgaria, some of which dated from before the Liberation in 1878 and were of high repute, were nationalised after the establishment of the communist regime; the only foreign schools allowed are the ones attached to the diplomatic missions for the children of their staff; and the Soviet Embassy is the only one that enjoys this privilege.

The last educational reform, though hastily introduced in zealous imitation of the Soviet example, meets a real need for skilled technical workers in industry, agriculture, transport, commerce, etc. The tendency to bring technical training into education is universal. The growing need for more and better trained specialists is felt in every part of the world. Are the new reforms going to be sufficient to meet Bulgarian requirements?

It is still too early for a considered assessment of the new system. At the moment the only certainty is that it still does not function satisfactorily. Soon after the reforms were introduced, it became apparent that technical specialisation would not be possible without the necessary workshops, tools, etc., nor without a body of trained staff, and these are not yet available.

According to the statement of the Deputy Minister of Education and Culture, students sent to factories and plants for their technical training in fact either do unskilled work which has no bearing on their speciality, or are treated by the factory managers and the workmen as mere visitors and observers; in other words, they do not work at all. On the other hand, many of the students themselves show no wish to specialise, particularly in the field of agriculture. An investigation among pupils in a secondary school in the mining centre of Dimitrovo showed that only 25 per cent were inclined to take up a profession involving physical

labour; only one pupil was prepared to work on a collective farm, and none wanted to be miners. Obviously, in order to achieve practical results, the authorities must from now on concentrate on providing two very essential prerequisites. The first is of a technical order—workshops and qualified teaching staff. This is a question of time and resources and the present deficiencies could be remedied. The second is of a spiritual nature—to arouse willingness, both in the parents and the young, to accept the new systems as something positive.

During the summer of 1960 the Minister of Education and Culture, listing a number of complaints, concluded that there was no complete programme for the communist upbringing of youth. He was mistaken. The programme is there, but its results do not satisfy the authorities. The Party needs a new intelligentsia, technically competent and politically stable, and this goal may in the long run be reached. But the first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party was right in declaring, at the seventh Party congress, that the creation of a socialist ideology and the communist education and re-education of the people is an arduous, complex, and lengthy process, which follows a much slower and more difficult course than changes in politics and economy. In the final analysis this is the most important problem facing the regime, on the solution of which its future depends.

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Conformity and Resistance

BULGARIAN WRITING TODAY

Liliana Brisby

THE prevailing system of material privileges and incentives for conforming writers gives a semblance of justice to the communist claim that conditions for creative work have never been better in Bulgaria. The rising graph of official statistics for the output of state publishing houses is fostering the same impression: the number of all books published in the country has increased fourfold under communist rule (*Literaturen Front*, No. 23, 1961). But the striking disproportion between quantity and quality which has dogged industrial and economic development in Bulgaria since the communists took over, has its depressing counterpart in literature. 'The publishing houses and editorial offices systematically receive as ready for publication manuscripts which do not even satisfy the requirements of elementary literacy and which, in many cases, are signed by professional writers, members of the Union' (*Literaturen Front*, No. 8, 1961).

In theory socialist-realist literature is supposed to be of a higher order than anything preceding it. Todor Pavlov, head of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the Party's leading exponent of Marxist aesthetics, has repeatedly theorised about the organic link between socialism and talent, in virtue of which what is supposed to be the highest form of social-political organisation produces qualitatively new and superior talents. But in reality there is no evidence of such advance. Nowadays even Party spokesmen are forced to admit that fifteen years of communism have failed to give birth to the expected masterpieces or even to produce works equalling the standard of Bulgarian literature before 1944.

'Today we may not have novelists and short story writers of the calibre of Vasov and Elin-Pelin for instance, or poets like Slaveykov and Yavorov, but our contemporary writers and poets see the immediate as well as the distant future of our people far more clearly than their illustrious forerunners'.[1] Whether or not he considers political clairvoyance an adequate substitute for the creative achievements of the Bulgarian classics, the puzzled reader may well ask: if the method of socialist-realism endows the writer who practises it with the ability 'infallibly to choose the side of progress against that of reaction',[2] why is it that the literary scene today is characterised by recurring clashes between the Party and the writers?

* * * * *

[1] Cf. 'Fifteen Years of Socialist Literature', in *Septemvri*, monthly organ of the Union of Bulgarian Writers, No. 9, 1959.
[2] *Ibid.*

IT is still official doctrine in Bulgaria that the directives of the April 1956 plenary session of the central committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (which echoed the call for de-Stalinisation of the twentieth Soviet Party congress) cleared the path of literature and the arts for unhampered creative development. The avowed debility of Bulgarian letters during the first decade of communist rule is ascribed to conditions obtaining under the ' cult of personality ', when dogmatism and sectarianism in the Party leadership are said to have been responsible for ' schematism ', ' varnishing ', ' vulgar sociologism ', ' lack of conflicts ', and other recognised flaws in literary works. However, the proliferation of ideologically suspect novels, poems, short stories, and plays throughout 1956–57,[3] and the bogy of Hungary, where literature allegedly became ' the Trojan horse of reaction ', very soon forced the Party to redefine its New Look. If the decisions of the April Plenum cannot be disavowed, they can be presented in a different light, by playing down their liberalising momentum, stressing their Leninist militancy, and above all by insisting on their continuity with past policies. Five years after the onset of the Bulgarian ' thaw ', a leader in the weekly organ of the Writers' Union (*Literaturen Front*, 6 April 1961) underlines that ' on the whole the April Plenum confirmed the correctness of the general Party line laid down at previous Party congresses by Georgi Dimitrov, effectively repulsed petty-bourgeois excesses and licence, and checked the manifestations of unscrupulous denigration, corrupt criticism, demagogy, distortion of reality, factionalism and anti-Party agitation.' Thus communist mythology has transformed the banner of the revisionist intellectuals of 1956 into the stick with which they were routed.

With the full-scale mobilisation of the intelligentsia for the Great Leap Forward towards the end of 1958, Bulgarian literature entered upon a new phase. The report on the possibilities of fulfilling the third five-year plan ahead of time was said to contain ' a complete militant programme for all artists and especially for the writers '. These were urged to exchange the quiet of their studies for ' creative assignments ' (*tvorcheska komandirovka*) in factories and collective farms, and to produce ' inspired annals of the grandiose epic of building, fixing forever the living image of the times which statisticians, economists, and sociologists cannot evoke '. The monthly magazine of the Writers' Union, *Plamuk*, which had been the spearhead of revisionist trends and had its editorial board purged at the end of 1957, now replaced the symbolic flame on its cover with socialist-realist etchings of Bulgarian workers and peasants, and introduced a new feature called ' Chronicle of the Five Year Plan '.

[3] Outstanding among them were Luben Stanev's novel *The Laskov Family*, Emil Manov's novella *An Unauthentic Case*, Todor Genov's play *Fear*, Slavcho Krassinski's verse drama *Chutna Yana*, Radoy Ralin's epigrams and St. Z. Daskalov's stories of peasant life.

The 'positive hero', derided with relish during the heady days of the thaw, was once again rehabilitated. But the central committee's call to the writers 'to create images of heroes, fighters, and builders, who shine with the most striking features of the Bulgarian nation, its revolutionary character, virility, diligence, sense of purpose, and loyalty to the communist party—images which can serve as an example to the workers', had some unexpected results. Discussing the 1959 National Drama Contest in which theatre companies from all over the country took part, one critic calculated that in the plays to reach the finals 'one could count some fifty characters of which thirty were either traitors or thieves, degenerate or rotten to the core, or otherwise steeped in all sorts of vices'—the rest did not shine with any communist virtues either.[4] The drive for the portrayal of the heroes of the Brave New World had produced a gallery of rogues.

Like the censured works of Manov, Stanev, and Genov, the new literary harvest challenged the myth of a superior socialist morality. Even a relatively orthodox novel like *The Golden Fleece*, by Andrey Gulyashki, obliquely pointed the contradiction between communist ideal and practice, and suggested that the new order does not automatically provide the answer to man's eternal quest for happiness. The novel aroused some criticism because its hero, a militant communist, shows too much concern for the plight of the peasants during the collectivisation drive and in the end, mysteriously, commits suicide. Nevertheless the author, editor of *Plamuk* and secretary of the Party bureau of the Writers' Union, escaped almost unscathed because he had taken good care to coat the novel's bitter core with socialist-realist sugar.[5] The Party dealt more severely with two other novels on contemporary themes: *The Twins*, by the experienced writer Boyan Bolgar, who examines the effects of the disintegration of family life under communism; and *The Roads Do Not Meet*, by the young author Dragomir Asenov, who was said by a sympathetic critic to be 'unable to shake off the impression of moral impurity which he encounters in our days'.[6] The greatest uproar was caused by a play based on the life of miners, *The Buried Sun*. Its author, the well-known dramatist Orlin Vasilev, who was removed from the Presidium of the Writers' Union in April 1958, was accused in the organ of the central committee of presenting 'a picture of the total paralysis of (our) society, oppressed by bureaucrats, careerists, fortune-chasers, and good-for-nothings' (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, 7 July 1959). Like the straying sheep of 1956–57, Vasilev, Asenov, and Bolgar might have replied in the famous words of Stendhal on the novel: 'The mirror reflects mud and you blame the mirror'. Instead, Vasilev thought it more prudent to comply and an amended version of his play was a great

[4] Cf. 'The Image of the Communist', by Lozan Strelkov, in *Septemvri*, No. 9, 1959.

[5] Recently Gulyashki essayed a new genre, a 'socialist thriller', in which the hero—unmistakably modelled on Sherlock Holmes—defeats the saboteurs of the communist state.

[6] A. Voynikova, *Plamuk*, May 1960.

success in Sofia this spring. Nevertheless, it remains that the new hero emerging from the most interesting novels, plays and short stories after the seventh Party congress in June 1958 was not the model communist defined in the Party directives. An idealist, frustrated and disillusioned by communist reality, he was the spiritual kin of Vladimir Dudintsev's Lopatin in *Not By Bread Alone.*

Even when he was irreproachable from an ideological point of view, he seemed strangely ineffectual. A conference called in the summer of 1960 to discuss 'The image of the communist in our literature' spotlit the fact that the 'positive' characters in works dealing with contemporary issues are pale and unconvincing in comparison with the living images of 'negative' characters motivated by discarded bourgeois values.[7] A case in point is Emilian Stanev's controversial novel *Ivan Kondarev.* (Part I appeared in 1958, Part II is still being serialised in the magazine *Septemvri.*) Stanev is an experienced writer whose vivid descriptions of small-town life and poetic hunting stories deservedly enjoyed a reputation long before the communists came to power. In *Ivan Kondarev* he tries to marry his established way of writing to the method of socialist-realism by interpreting a page of Bulgaria's recent pre-communist history from the Marxist standpoint. Behind the vast canvas of events and people in a provincial Bulgarian town on the eve of the coup d'etat of 1923, he seeks to uncover the determining mechanism of social and political forces. The outcome is a fascinating illustration of the artist's inability to accommodate his own intuitive reaction to the world within the framework of superimposed ideological ratiocination. Stanev is an acute observer whose strength as a writer lies in his immediate contact with the life around him, in his sensory and emotional perception of things and people, in his keen eye for individuality. The world which he evokes so realistically in *Ivan Kondarev* simply does not fit into the ideological mould of his novel. The result is a curious paradox as regards the main characters. The hero, Ivan Kondarev—a provincial teacher typical of the frustrated half-baked intellectuals whom the Party recruited in the immediate aftermath of Bulgaria's defeat in World War I—is endowed with all the qualities of a dedicated revolutionary. Yet, as the critics justly pointed out, he is wooden, cold, unsympathetic, and somewhat unreal, while his rival and class enemy, the landowner Kostadin Dzhupunov—a simple man dominated by the peasant's traditional love for his land—is a full-blooded, vital character who steals the sympathy of the reader, as well as the communist's bride. Since it is unlikely that this effect was intended, Stanev's novel goes to show that a real poet's talent is rooted in the subconscious part of his personality and cannot be compressed in a rigid pattern of ideological dogma. The higher the standing of the writer and the stronger his creative personality, the greater the strains and stresses that will arise to plague him and mar his work, even though he may be trying sincerely to work and live within the

[7] Cf. *Literaturen Front*, No. 24, 1960 and No. 81, 1961.

imposed system. It is a fact that so far not a single work of Bulgarian 'socialist' literature exhibits the total identity of the intellectual and the instinctive response to life that is to be found, for instance, in Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*.

The impression that the Bulgarian Communist Party, handicapped by concessions granted during its tactical retreat from untenable Zhdanovist positions, has been unable to restore perfect discipline on the literary front, was startlingly confirmed by an editorial in *Literaturen Front* on 8 June 1961. A group of writers who remained unnamed were charged with engaging in 'factional and dissentient activities', of spreading ideological and moral confusion, especially among the young, and in general of obstructing the Party line in literature. The earlier claim that unity and concord reigned on the literary scene since the seventh congress of the Bulgarian Party was thus exploded.[8] Some observers have linked the re-emergence of an opposition to the Party's literary tutelage with the serious difficulties into which the Government has run on the economic front and the resulting trouble with Party and trade union cadres. It seems more likely that the widespread discontent due to the unrealistic policies of the 'leap forward', which strained the country to breaking point, is forcing the party to tighten its control in all sectors of public life, and especially among the writers whose influence on public opinion it has never underestimated.

Some light on the nature of the 'factional and dissentient activities' was thrown earlier by Georgi Karaslavov, who in April 1958 took over the management of the Writers' Union from the compromised Stalinist Christo Radevski, but is reported to have alienated his confrères with his equally fanatical championship of the Party line. Attacking writers 'deficient in ideological training', Karaslavov said: 'Incapable of discovering the bright and the beautiful, which rise to the sky or are still at the embryonic stage of their future grandiose development, they dig in the garbage of the backyards of our new reality and deny with foam on their lips every justified, enthusiastic appraisal of our great, immortal communist deeds' (*Literaturen Front*, 9 March 1961). For this state of affairs he blamed survivals of outlived bourgeois mentality, which allegedly seeped like rust into people's hearts and blinded writers to the true value of socialist progress. So far the Party has not attempted to explain why those apparently most prone to 'backward ideological slag' and 'relics of private-ownership attitudes' are not the old guard of intellectuals who matured under the former bourgeois regime, but precisely the young generation of writers and poets, who progressed from the cradle to the writing desk under the vigilant eye of the Party.

Insidious Western bourgeois influences are held responsible for a multitude of sins. Consequently great efforts are made to counter the lure of the West, and literary works which paint a sombre picture of

[8] In *Septemvri* (February 1961) a leading critic had written: 'There was a period when some weak literary works appeared in which our reality was presented like a nightmare. . . . This period has already passed into literary history'.

life there meet with special favour. A shock worker of the anti-West demolition squad is Bogomil Raynov, writer, poet, and art critic of some talent, whose spell at the Bulgarian Embassy in Paris has supplied him with an abundant source of tainted material. In his highly commended collection of short stories, *The Man On The Street Corner*, French workers are portrayed as living in utmost penury, peaceful demonstrators are machine-gunned by Paris policemen, tramps are dying from starvation on the steps of the teeming food market and under the bridges of the Seine, while trips to model welfare states like Holland and Switzerland provide frightening glimpses of a dehumanised society in which all higher aspirations have been killed by the cult of material prosperity. Raynov's novella *As Only We Know How To Die*, which in May this year was awarded the second prize for the best prose writing of 1960, recounts the martyrdom of a French sympathiser of the Algerian rebels slowly tortured to death in an Algiers prison. It was praised both as a contribution to the internationalist traditions of Bulgarian revolutionary literature, and as an example for younger authors of a contemporary style ' worthy of a communist writer who cannot be a passportless seeker of novelties in the literary markets of the West ' (*Literaturen Front*, 25 May 1961). The systematic denigration of Britain in fictional form is the preserve of Brigitta Yosifova, wife of a British communist and London correspondent of the Bulgarian Party daily *Rabotnichesko Delo*; even communist critics, however, have admitted that her short stories, published last year under the title *Beer Glass With Coins*, are little more than rather crude political pamphlets.[9]

Freer travel to the West has resulted in a spate of tendentious poems, sketches, and travelogues: thus, for instance, Leda Mileva's poem ' Two Dogs on the Pavement ' (*Septemvri*, March 1960), contrasts the miserable lot of London's pavement artists with the care lavished on dogs by societies for animal protection run by wealthy ladies; in Alexander Gerov's cycle of poems ' Berlin—East and West ', capitalist corruption is symbolised by ' Coca-Cola with the smell of fresh blood ' (*Literaturen Front*, No. 21, 1961); and even an unblinkered young writer like Luben Stanev is ready to pay for the privilege of a visit abroad by presenting Sweden as a country of contradictions, inequalities, and moral decadence (*Plamuk*, March 1961). But for all that, these garbled reports let through enough to give the discerning reader a fair idea of true conditions and values in the West. A writer's aim may be to denigrate modern art—but in the process he will describe it and so, unwittingly, stimulate interest in it. He may want to stress the lack of purpose in Western youth, but in doing so, cannot help rousing envy of their freedom. At any rate, people can no longer be said to be isolated from the ideas of the West. Anyone familiar with C. Milosz's brilliant analysis of *The Captive Mind* will find it difficult to believe that this smuggling of information between the lines of literature is unintentional. Probably this is what Raynov

[9] Cf. *Plamuk*, March 1961.

had in mind when he alluded to 'the attempts at infiltration of bourgeois ideology, which in the domain of the creative arts are cleverly camouflaged'. Significantly, a book like Ivan Ruzh's *The Law of the Literary Jungle*—a dogmatic indictment of Western, and particularly American, literary practices—was hailed as a much needed antidote against 'the over-reverent and servile attitude to Western culture' (*Septemvri*, April 1961). Western influence must be strong indeed, if a critic who in 1957 inveighed against the ascendancy of Hemingway over young Bulgarian writers nowadays tries to coax them along the road of socialist-realism by buttressing his argument with quotations from that author and conceding that 'though Hemingway alone is not enough, he too is necessary' (E. Karanfilov in *Plamuk*, June 1961). Soviet authors, constantly held up as models, do not seem capable of providing the desired immunisation against Western ideas, especially since those who are admired most are the least orthodox: Evtushenko, Paustovsky, Dudintsev, Kazakov, Nagibin.

The Party bosses are blaming the literary critics for failing to give the necessary lead. 'If the Party sets us one task, and literary criticism another, is the result not going to be doubt and confusion in our ranks?' asked Ruzh (*Plamuk*, March 1960). In a long review of the results of the conference on artistic perfection, which took place in February this year, Z. Stoyanov spoke of the dangerous hidden tendencies predominating of late in Bulgarian literary criticism: it was insufficiently dialectical and militant, and seemed 'hypnotised by the immovable light of millennial aesthetic wisdom, by notions like "undying beauty", etc.' (*Septemvri*, May 1961). At the end of 1959, the reports and discussions on the state of literature after fifteen years of communist rule revealed the sharp division between two main schools of thought: on the one hand the diehards who believe that literature should centre on the problems of the building of socialism, as defined in the Party directives, on the other the younger and more liberal critics who hold that literature sets its own standards and stress the role of talent at the expense of *partiinost*. The most remarkable fact in the protracted slanging match between the two parties has been the staying power of the liberals and the cunning with which they have turned the tables on their accusers. Foremost among them is the young critic Pencho Dantchev, one of the rebels of 1956 who was pardoned in 1958 after some 'self-criticism', but was dropped again from the secretariat of the Writers' Union in July 1960. In counter-attacking the formidable Academician Todor Pavlov, Dantchev has shown that the best way to disagree with a powerful pundit is first to praise him to the skies, and then subtly to demolish his most cherished ideas.[10] Each side has accused the other of copying a Soviet model: Dantchev has been bracketed with the 'subjectivist'

[10] For T. Pavlov's views see *Literaturna Misl*, May 1959; *Septemvri*, March 1960, and his book *Fundamental questions of Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics* (1958), which is the Bible of orthodox thought. P. Dantchev's views are summarised in *Literaturna Misl*, April 1959, *Plamuk*, October 1959, and *Septemvri*, October 1960.

A. Burov, Pavlov with L. Stolovich. It is also customary to label the opponent with the heresy of which one is suspected: thus a Stalinist like Ruzh calls his adversaries 'dogmatists', while Dantchev accuses the dogmatic Pavlov of holding some views in common with the Hungarian arch-revisionist Georgy Lukacs. The main charge against the deviation of 'aestheticism', represented by critics like Pencho Dantchev and Stoyan Karolev, is that it encourages the spread of revisionist tendencies.

The existence of a profound cleavage of opinion on such fundamental questions as the object of art, the relationship between working method and outlook on life (*metod i mirogled*), realism and romanticism, is now accepted as a fact. At the February conference on the problems of literary skill all pretence of monolithic unity was dropped. The official thesis of the Party is that artistic merit cannot be decided by an analysis of the outward forms of literature alone; questions of style, composition, theme, language, etc., must be subordinated to the appraisal of the ideological position of the writer and the power of his work to educate in a communist spirit. This is not generally accepted. 'Some writers still cling to the erroneous conviction that the important thing is not what they write about, but *how* they write', complained G. Dimitrov-Goshkin, whose zeal in fighting revisionism earned him the first prize for literary criticism in 1960. He claimed that 'to place talent above all else is to betray indifference towards the social and ideological purpose of socialist-realism' (*Literaturen Front*, 2 March 1961). Dimitrov-Goshkin's ardent advocacy of firm directives was compared by one rebel to the behaviour of an architect who has been entrusted with the mission to build a big township in a desert, and who, before there are streets or even plans, demands that a militiaman should be appointed to regulate the traffic (*Literaturen Front*, 13 July 1961).

The Party's guiding hand has certainly weighed heavily on the writers in the last year. That they have little enthusiasm for the meetings, conferences, discussions, and lectures which have succeeded each other with increasing frequency, can be gleaned from official complaints about growing absenteeism, apathy, and passive resistance.[11] Apart from general exhortations, 'creative assignments', and literary competitions on contemporary themes, the Party offers also practical suggestions: on 13 July *Literaturen Front* triumphantly announced that it had found the ideal theme for all creative artists in Kremikovtsi, the new big metallurgical plant now being built near Sofia. 'It is unjustifiable that writers, painters, composers, critics, dramatists, and producers show little or no interest in the rich opportunities and fresh ideas offered them by Kremikovtsi'. The latest slogan is 'We build the plant and the plant builds us'. Its counterpart in literature is the insistence that socialist-realism is not merely a mirror for the positive hero but an active participant in his creation. The writer's task is not only to reflect life, but to help to *shape* it. In the last resort, writers are told, literature will

[11] Cf. *Literaturen Front*, 29 July 1961.

be judged by the measure in which it has contributed to moulding the new society. Since accuracy in depicting reality can defeat this purpose, it is no longer considered a virtue. 'Naturalism' has become a dirty word and recent additions to the catalogue of current failings are *factographstvo* and *samotselno opisatelstvo* (factual recording and description for its own sake). It is no accident that these sins are discovered particularly in stories and novels on peasant life—perceptive evocations of the mood of the countryside tend to contradict the official view of the joys of collectivisation. St. Z. Daskalov's last novel, *The Lime Trees of Stubel*, and his long story 'The Presidents of Sokolare' (*Septemvri*, December 1960), which depict with remarkable frankness different phases of the revolution in the Bulgarian village, have been criticised for containing 'outlived opinions about our life and the nature of socialist-realism'. The author was accused of recidivism and of treating his critics with the utmost contempt.[12] Though Daskalov's work is marred by many imperfections, his books are a mine of accurate sociological observation. In general, the Party's drive to make literature topical has yielded fascinating information to the outside observer.

The 'engineers of the human soul' must build in verse as well as in prose. The report on 'Poetry in 1960' which was presented in June this year showed that love poems devoid of militancy (as in Krum Penev's collection *Stars under the Clouds*), individualistic leanings (as in Konstantin Pavlov's *Satires*) and abstract philosophical ideas (as in Ivan Radoev's *Ballad*) are frowned upon. While poets were commended for responding swiftly to Gagarin's exploits and Cuba's ordeal, their readiness to follow modernistic trends and their weakness for blank verse was very much deplored.[13] 'There are some poets writing now who need to be told not to hurry, not to spur on their Pegasus so impetuously', wrote the experienced time-server Ludmil Stoyanov (*Plamuk*, June 1961). But the young innovators—foremost among them Vladimir Bashev and Lubomir Levchev—have received unexpected support from another veteran poet, Lamar: referring to Mayakovsky's futuristic verse, he argued that 'modernism should be yoked to socialist-realism' (*Plamuk*, May 1961). The Party is obliged to pay lip-service to the need for experiment in poetry (*novatorstvo*), but claims that 'to be an innovator today means to be a firm and consistent representative and propagator of the ideas of communism'.[14] The weakness of the official argument in favour of militancy, namely, that 'great poetry has always been revolutionary' is obvious: the present difficulties of Bulgarian poets stem precisely from the fact that they must be poets of the establishment.

* * *

For all that, a new wind is blowing on the Bulgarian literary scene. To take the measure of the country's intellectual life only from the

12 Cf. *Literaturen Front*, 11 May 1961.
13 *Literaturen Front*, No. 26, 1961.
14 Cf. Bozhidar Bozhilov in *Plamuk*, January 1961.

stereotyped official pronouncements would be a grave error. The most encouraging sign in Bulgarian literature today is not the birth of a ' new hero ', it is the rebirth of man and the recognition that conscience, love, friendship, beauty, good and evil are still the most topical problems. This restored ethical dimension is evident not only in the works which have excited controversy. It is present in a novel like Todor Manov's *There is No Death*, which earned praise, and even in a partisan poem like Valery Petrov's ' In the Mellow Autumn ', similar in inspiration to Tvardovsky's ' Beyond the Distant Reaches ', which received a prize this year. Recently Bogomil Nonev noted: ' Nowadays it has become the fashion for us to prefer authors who create heroes whose minds are affected by disquiet and doubts, whose hearts are troubled by complex feelings and an acute sensibility; we are even inclined to generalise that the tragic division of the personality, on the social as well as on the psychological plane, is perhaps the most convincing image, the most perfect reflection, of the soul of contemporary man ' (*Literaturen Front*, 27 July 1961). Though there is little evidence of a ' new *proletarian* humanism ', there can be no doubt about the humanisation of Bulgarian literature after a period of unprecedented barrenness.

' Fortunately today we have no longer open and consistent revisionists, but there have been and still are, statements, arguments, and formulations that can lead to revisionism ', wrote the watchdog of Marxist purity, Todor Pavlov (*Septemvri*, March 1960). In the light of the preceding review, this seems an understatement.

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CHURCH AND STATE

Boris Christoff

THROUGHOUT Bulgaria's chequered history the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has been a patriotic force providing a rallying point for national aspirations against foreign domination. King Boris I received baptism as early as 865 and under his successor, Tzar Simeon, Byzantium recognised the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as an autocephalous patriarchate, with its Holy See first in the ancient capital of Preslav, then in Ochrida in Macedonia. With the Byzantine conquest in 1018 the Church was reduced to an archbishopric, but after the overthrow of the Byzantine yoke, the Bulgarian Patriarchate was restored with its seat this time in Tirnovo, capital of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom. It was once again destroyed at the turn of the fourteenth century by the invading Turks who sent its head, the Patriarch Eftimi, into perpetual exile.

That the Bulgarians managed to preserve their faith and national spirit through nearly five centuries of Ottoman oppression, was due in great measure to the efforts of the priests and monks, to whom the people owed their survival as a nation. But by the eighteenth century the Bulgarian Church had gradually lost its independence to the Constantinople Patriarchate and was threatened with Hellenisation.

This attempt at subjugation led to an organised struggle started by a handful of deposed clergy and laymen in 1833, which developed into a powerful nation-wide movement. In 1870, perturbed by the movement of the Balkan peoples for political independence, the Turkish Government decided as an act of appeasement to grant autonomy to the Bulgarian Church, and a Bulgarian Exarch, Joseph I, was appointed with a seat in Constantinople. The insistence of the Bulgarian Church that its head should have jurisdiction over all Bulgarians wherever they might live, was one of the main reasons why the Constantinople Patriarchate refused to recognise the Exarchate, and in 1872 excommunicated the Bulgarians. The Schism was not healed until 1945, when the Bulgarian Exarchate was once again recognised and Stefan, Archbishop of Sofia, was appointed Primate.

Stefan was one of the most prominent figures in contemporary Bulgarian Church history. In fact the return of the Bulgarian Church to the fold of the Greek Orthodox Church was due largely to his personal efforts. He worked hard for Christian unity and in particular for communion with the Anglican Church, for which purpose he visited England several times between 1922 and 1936. Probably his most Christian and outstanding act, when Archbishop of Sofia, was his outspoken opposition to the Bulgarian Government's attempt, under Nazi pressure in 1942, to start a wholesale persecution and deportation of the Jewish minority. Despite his anti-Fascist record, Stefan was forced

to resign from office in 1948, dying eight years later in seclusion in the Bachkovsky monastery.

It is one of the paradoxes of history that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church regained the status it had not enjoyed since the Turkish conqueror destroyed the Tirnovo Patriarchate under a regime whose avowed aim it is to abolish religion. Complete independence from Constantinople was achieved in 1953 when the Patriarchate was restored and Kiril, Archbishop of Plovdiv, who at one time had been imprisoned by the communists, was chosen to fill the high office. His election was popular; at thanksgiving services held throughout the country people seized the opportunity to manifest their devotion to the Church which in days of political and spiritual oppression had saved the Bulgarians from national obliteration. Patriarch Kiril is known not only as an outstanding ecclesiastic, but also as a prominent writer and historian. Amongst his recent works which have gained international repute in historical and theological circles is *The Life and Work of Exarch Antim*, a study of Bulgaria's struggle for Church and national independence during the nineteenth century. As leader of the Church today he is in a peculiarly exposed position in the conflict which communism wages with all forms of religion. (This is true of course for all Orthodox peoples in Eastern Europe.)

Before examining the relations between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the communist state, it must be said that throughout the 67 years which followed Bulgaria's liberation from Turkish rule in 1877 the Church enjoyed complete freedom. Atheism was virtually unknown and there was no interference by the state in the affairs of the Church, although it was the established religion.

IN present-day Bulgaria, as in Soviet Russia, the Church is disestablished. This does not mean that the state refuses material help, although the final decision regarding the extent of the grant rests with the Government. Religious associations, however, receive no financial support from the state. They have to rely on voluntary offerings of believers, the sale of candles, crosses, and icons, and on fees for administering rites and performing ceremonies. It is illegal for the Church to allocate money to charitable works, nor can it build new churches without permission from the state, priority being given to housing, industrial, and other requirements. In spite of this new churches have been consecrated during recent years. As far as is known only one was closed by the authorities and later turned into a club! This happened in February 1961 [1] in the village of Dryankovetz, and the official explanation given by the local People's Council was that most of the villagers were atheists and only two or three old women went to this church. The ' people ' therefore decided that it would be far more useful to turn

[1] See the report in *Trud*, 25 February 1961.

it into a cultural club. The Council thereupon made a grant of 20,000 leva (£1,000) for reconstruction and decoration.

The amount of money that the Church can spend on printing is kept within narrow limits, which means few publications, other than prayer-books and church calendars. Apart from its purely informative purpose, the Bulgarian ecclesiastical press is the only medium outside the home for religious instruction, especially for the younger generation, reminding and teaching them about historic events of great spiritual and political significance. Contributors to this press are for the most part prominent members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and staff and students of the theological colleges still functioning in the country.

Of course, in Bulgaria, as in every other communist state, the Church is required through its press, as well as from the pulpit, to express support for major Government decisions on domestic and foreign policy, e.g., collectivisation of agriculture or the 'movement for the defence of world peace'. This support has not only been moral: clergy and laity have helped in construction work and in harvesting.

Under the Tirnovo Constitution of 1879, religious instruction of youth was integrated into the general educational system, the parish priest (and gradually laymen) teaching the scriptures in the local schools. Under the existing constitution (introduced in 1947) this is no longer possible: religious instruction was eliminated from school curricula and the Church is unable to organise day or Sunday schools or to give any kind of religious teaching to young people under the age of 18 in youth organisations or any other kind of group. So far this has not meant the complete isolation of children from the care of the Church, since they are able to attend services and be visited in their homes by the parish priest. But of course it makes instruction infinitely more difficult, more especially as attempts are made to prevent unaccompanied children from attending church services. 'This is not a place for you! Come, we will take you to see something you will really enjoy', they are told by special party officials stationed outside to induce the children to go to cinemas, circuses, or other entertainments arranged to coincide with church service hours. Now children are always accompanied by at least one parent!

Unlike the Soviet Union, Bulgaria does not require priests to hold a civil licence for the practice of their profession. Thus they are relieved of the anxiety of its being withdrawn or suspended for any offence against civil or ecclesiastical law or on any other pretext. A Bulgarian priest who sponsors a young man for the priesthood in a theological college is not liable to be accused of propaganda. From this it does not follow that good preachers, and especially those who have gained converts to the Church and openly attack anti-religious propaganda, are looked upon benevolently. At the same time, as far as is known, there have been no arrests or forced dismissals of priests in Bulgaria during recent years. Neither do priests now seem to be subject to direct pressure or to personal abuse other than in the form of caricatures.

In Bulgaria, as in all other communist-ruled countries, the anti-religious campaign is organised on a large scale and conducted in a variety of forms. It begins in the elementary schools where the place of prayers has been taken by the reading of a revolutionary poem, and in the higher schools by readings from Karl Marx, Lenin, or Khrushchev. Then there is the almost constant stream of atheistic articles in the daily and periodical press, together with mobile 'godless libraries', and lectures on the futility of religion as a regular feature in the educational programme. Believers and clergymen are often the subject of libellous and humiliating cartoons. At times this anti-religious campaign has also been marked by deliberate disturbances during services, and if it could be said that these were not sponsored by the state, they were certainly tolerated by it. When the campaign appears to be getting out of hand there are calls for 'more interesting and convincing methods of atheistic propaganda', followed by a period of relaxation.

ATHEISTIC propaganda, primarily directed at youth, had and still has yet another target—the ordinary clergymen, especially those whose parishes happen to be in country districts. Communist penetration of the Priests Union was the reason for its disbandment in July 1955, because it had worked against Church unity and had failed to make the changes in its statutes which the Holy Synod suggested in 1953. A leading article in *Tserkoven Vestnik*, organ of the Holy Synod, on the disbandment decree said that the Priests Union had split the Church and had disobeyed canonical orders; it had encouraged verbal and written attacks on bishops and had had a disrupting influence on priests. 'The priests themselves would welcome the disbandment of the Union.' Though the inspiration behind these disruptive activities can be easily surmised, the decree of the Holy Synod could not have been issued without the consent of the Government. In point of fact, Patriarch Kiril had a meeting with the Prime Minister on the day the Holy Synod decided to disband the Union. This decision was a victory for neither side—it represented a compromise between the Government's desire to be able to exercise control over the Church through direct contacts with the higher hierarchy, as is the case in Russia, and the natural desire of the Church to rid itself of a dangerous form of attack from within.

In the methods employed, and in the alternation between violence and sufferance, the anti-religious campaign in Bulgaria follows closely the pattern in Russia. Thus in 1957 the Bulgarian Communist Youth League launched a new campaign soon after the Soviet Komsomol had done so, designed to drive a wedge between the higher and lower clergy. Anonymous circular letters were received by many priests, the object of which was to provoke discontent among them and to stir up hatred and disrespect against Patriarch Kiril. For instance, the circulars contrasted the poverty of the parish priest with the alleged wealth of the bishops and especially the Patriarch. The Bulgarian Communist Youth League was also used to frustrate the attempts made both by clergy and laymen

to have religious instruction reinstated as part of elementary and secondary education.

Although it has been under attack now for almost fifteen years, the Christian religion in Bulgaria retains vitality. Possibly some kind of co-existence agreement with the atheistic state has been reached. The Government's economic programmes are sincerely supported by the clergy; they do not attempt to meddle in politics and still less do they criticise the Government. At the same time the Church, through its leaders, has worked with some success for the freedom of religion. It does not know of course what new sacrifices it may be called upon to make. But the Bulgarians are a religious and tenacious people; for centuries under Turkish rule they retained their faith intact. They have known how to bend before the storm and to bide their time.

The worshippers are there in full. In the words of one young Bulgarian: 'Few churches are now empty on Sundays but at Christmas and Easter the scene is indescribable. The congregation at my church, St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Sofia, overflows by thousands into the large square and the adjoining streets. It is the same at other churches and people tell me that this is happening all over Bulgaria and I believe it.'

The Alexander Nevsky Cathedral can hold about 8,000 people, and eye-witness accounts speak of congregations of at least 40,000 in and around the Cathedral on great festivals. 'People of all ages attend, especially at Easter, taking their lighted candles home.' In many churches throughout Bulgaria services continue to be held daily. The number of people attending each day is significant: for instance at St. Spas in Sofia it is said to be between 120 and 180.

Religious instruction is also given by the 'Bratstva'—brotherhoods consisting of men and women who are interested in the life of the Church and its teachings. Founded by Orthodox laymen some 35 years ago, these brotherhoods are still active in towns and villages. They organise regular lectures on various religious subjects. During March 1961 for instance, according to the report of the World Council of Churches, in one Sofia church alone three lectures were given, and it is interesting to record that notices of lectures are even today delivered to people in their homes. Even more significant is the large number of people drawn to these brotherhoods; the 1961 figure for one of the smaller churches in Sofia was 700 members and ordinary weekday attendances were about 200.

Few churches have been allowed to fall into disrepair through lack of funds or other obstacles. Even the domes of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Sofia have been regilded, a very costly operation considering their height and size. New churches both in villages and towns have been consecrated and others are under construction, although it must be added not as many as desired. This may be explained by difficulties in obtaining building licences which only the state can grant All monasteries and convents (there are 110 in the country) have been kept intact.

One of them, the Tcherepitch Monastery, founded in the sixteenth century, near Vratsa in north-west Bulgaria, is the seat of the two seminaries, which before 1950 were housed in Sofia and Plovdiv. It is interesting to note here that the faculty of theology at Sofia has been replaced by a Theological Academy. Life in the monasteries and particularly in the great national shrine Rila continues apparently uninterrupted, in spite of the profound changes that have occurred in the outer world. Many thousands of people go there, especially during the summer. Whilst the majority may be regarded as excursionists, it is known that a large number of pilgrims are amongst them. Bulgarian monasteries continue to support themselves out of their own resources, depending to a very large extent on their vineyards, orchards, and fields. They are allowed to sell the produce in the open market free of all taxes.

Noteworthy also is the restoration of ancient churches. This work is being carried out vigorously by the state at its own expense as part of an official programme for the preservation of national monuments of Bulgarian architecture. Work has been completed on the twelfth-century village church at Boyana, on the slopes of Mount Vitosha overlooking the Sofia plain. The frescoes are exceptionally fine and full of life, anticipating Giotto by a century. Boyana Church is now a state museum but the villagers have not been deprived of their place of worship, for a new church has been built. Although its officially proclaimed purpose is the preservation of historic relics, the restoration of ancient churches has an inherent spiritual value which makes this state care all the more welcome.

Of course, in any country where communism has secured political control, the existence of the Church depends in the first place on its relations with the state. It is an atheistic state which rejects not only the Christian creed but all forms of religion, and wages war against them. But in comparison with the early days of the regime the onslaught on the Church is by no means so savage. The mere fact that in its high-sounding appeal on behalf of the down-trodden and oppressed the state promised freedom of religion, together with all other freedoms, puts certain limits to the struggle it was to wage against the Church. The fathers of the Bulgarian communist state, Georgi Dimitrov and Vassil Kolarov, solemnly and repeatedly declared that all citizens of the new Bulgaria were to enjoy full religious freedom, guaranteed by the Constitution. Of course, communists give their own meaning to the word freedom, but in the case of religion the keeping of some solemn pledges and the disregard for others seem to have produced over the years an ambivalent situation. Because of these circumstances, the communist state has directed its atheistic propaganda primarily to young people, on the explicit assumption that religion is the result of defective education; to this it has added open and oblique attempts to undermine the position of religious leaders and discredit them in the eyes of the public. Thus the dangers to which the clergy are exposed are obvious and they must necessarily continue to tread warily.

WE AND ARCHIE: *A Story*

Tsvetan Stoyanov

(*This is a translation of parts of a story, unfortunately too long to be reproduced in full, which appeared in the July* 1961 *issue of the magazine* Septemvri, *journal of the Bulgarian Union of Writers.*)

One morning Adriana rang me up and asked me to come round. Adriana runs the department for cultural relations with foreign countries. I went and she told me:

Last night Archibald Turtle arrived in Sofia!

Is that so? I said. And who is Archibald Turtle?

You don't know who Archibald Turtle is?

No, I don't. Is he very well known?

Archibald Turtle, she said after looking at a piece of paper on her desk, is an English writer, publicist and journalist. Contributor to the conservative magazine *Ambassador*. He has published two novels, many short stories, four volumes of war reminiscences and nine travel books. He has come to Bulgaria to collect impressions of the country and to write travel notes. As you know, just now we are expanding our tourist trade, and it is important for us that these notes should be positive. We would like you to accompany him, while he is here.

But I have never done anything like that, I remarked.

No special experience is required, she assured me. You will simply explain to him whatever interests him, you will order his food in the restaurants, and the rest of the time you will just chat, so that he is not bored.

But my English is not all that good.

How's that? Aren't you a translator?

What if I am a translator? Do you think that a translator must necessarily know the language?

This Adriana is very naive. She thinks that translators are ordinary linguists. For instance, I have a friend who translated Goethe, although he knew no more than half-a-dozen German words. He told me how once he met a German poet and had to take him to the opera. While they were in the foyer the German started talking in German and gesticulating in such a way that my friend thought he wanted to go to a certain place. He took him, showed him the entrance, but the German shook his head and again started talking in German. Only later did it transpire that he was, on the contrary, thirsty and wanted some fruit juice. My friend began to feel embarrassed, but fortunately there was someone else in the box who spoke German. 'I see that you have already got to know our charming young translator,' said this person. 'Yes, yes,' said the German. 'Do you know that he is our most gifted translator of Goethe?' 'Oh!' said the German and looked closely at my friend. 'He is now preparing a special edition of Goethe's lyric poetry.' 'Oh!' said the German again and looked even more closely at my friend, who was feeling more and more embarrassed. And yet nobody can deny that he translated Goethe. You may not know the language well, and still have a knack for this kind of work.

I explained all this to Adriana. I added that in a written translation you are much freer, and if you come across an expression that is not clear, you can alter it, or as they say 'give a Bulgarian ring' to the text. But when you accompany a live foreigner, this is more difficult, because the live foreigner doesn't stay quiet. but talks all the time, asks questions, and so a misunderstanding can easily arise.

But I am sure that you will understand each other, objected Adriana. Anyway, stop arguing, because we have already selected you. We know that you are a bright boy and that you will cope with this assignment.

After these words I agreed with her. I have met people who play at being modest, who say they don't understand this or that, but I know no one who has objected when told that he was intelligent. Besides, if I did not accept the offer immediately, this was only from politeness. Who would be mad enough to refuse such a plum? While I listened to Adriana, I already savoured in advance the attractions of my new job. All at once I would establish contact with a great culture. Mr. Turtle would tell me about the latest trends in Western thought. In turn, I would tell him about my small but interesting country. What wealth of ideas could such an encounter of two psychologies yield! At the same time, it would be necessary to show the foreigner that whatever they may think of us in the West we are not all that backward! Such a mission would not only be pleasant but noble as well.

This is why I agreed to accompany Archibald Turtle. That same day Adriana took me to his hotel and introduced me to him and from then onwards we two formed a peculiar organism of two bodies and two souls, which react to the world simultaneously, albeit differently.

* * *

As they say in the novels, dusk was gathering and we sat on the verandah. Outwardly I was calm, but secretly I was in a state of nervous excitement, because my responsible task was beginning and, besides, I was about to make contact with a great culture. I wanted to talk at length with Mr. Turtle, to discuss literature, art, and many other interesting things. But I did not know how to begin, and the visitor did not help me the least little bit, so that all I could do was to observe him well. Mr. Turtle was obviously past fifty. His body was soft and rotund, his nose was crimson, and the lights playing in his watery blue eyes were friendly. His general appearance reminded one of those ideal avuncular personages whom everyone has loved as a child. They always joke, know tricks, pat you on the shoulder, and carry presents.

What will you drink before dinner? I asked.

Preferably something Bulgarian.

Perhaps mastika?

What is mastika?

I tried to explain: smell of aniseed, colourless, strong.

Could it be uzo?

What is uzo?

A drink similar to the one you describe. If you add water, it turns white like milk.

Same thing, I said. Is it called uzo in England?

No, not in England, said Mr. Turtle. I have drunk it in Greece. It really is something! Unfortunately, last time I tried it I exaggerated the dose and now I can't put a single drop of uzo into my mouth. The very smell makes me sick. Have you nothing else, equally oriental?

Our national drink is slivova, I said.

And what is that?

Spirit of plums.

Oh! of course, how silly of me! said Mr. Turtle. I have come across it in Germany. There they call it slivovitz. All right, go ahead, let's try it!

So I ordered two big ones, from the export brand. When the waiter placed the glasses before us, Mr. Turtle sipped and approved.

Not bad.

He had drunk over half when he improved the valuation.

Magnificent.

And after he had finished the glass, his nose got even redder and he could no longer contain his enthusiasm.

This is almost certainly the best drink I have swallowed in all my life. Except real Scotch whisky, of course.

Do you like whisky? I asked.

Mankind will never invent a more perfect beverage, he said.

After that we dined and talked about drinks. I was a little disappointed, because I had wanted to enquire about recent trends in Western thought, but we had a lot of time before us, and on the other hand, for us who just now are striving to develop our tourist trade, it was important that he had praised our slivova so highly.

The following day was a Sunday. From Monday onwards Adriana had promised to draw up a detailed programme for Mr. Turtle, but Sunday was a problem. How to fill a day? It is a principle of international tourism not to let the visitor get bored. Sometimes foreigners don't understand this and grumble, perhaps because they get too tired. But it is for their own good. They are the losers if they omit to see something which they will regret later. Once a friend of mine, a Pole, arrived in Bulgaria and apparently could not understand this. True, his programme was quite heavy, for during the ten days he spent here he could not even find ten seconds to meet me. I managed to see him only at the station as he was leaving. He looked pale, with dark shadows under his eyes, and when I asked him if he had liked Bulgaria, he said 'Very much,' but his guide complained to me that he had behaved in an undisciplined way. The previous day the Pole had simply rebelled. The programme scheduled visits to two or three places, but he refused. He declared that he was exhausted and poured out a flood of susurrating Polish complaints difficult to understand. The guide was very bitter and I agreed with him. Since he had come all the way to Bulgaria, the Pole should have made a little more effort to make his visit worthwhile.

So that the question now was how to fill in the Sunday. Adriana thought a little and quickly found a solution.

Take him to the Boyana Church, she said. After that go up to the Golden Bridges and have lunch there.

And how are we to travel? Today all public transport will be overcrowded.

Of course, you will take a taxi, said Adriana.

Very nice, I said. Only, who pays?

Hm! she said. It is true that Mr. Turtle has come here as a private tourist, but it would be inhospitable to make him pay his taxis as well. As a matter of fact, he is a member of the International Association of Authors of Travel Books, and the Bulgarian section of the association has a duty towards him. They have already rung me up. Monday night the section is giving a dinner in honour of Mr. Turtle. The dinner will be at the Russian Club. Since this is the situation, take a taxi on their account. You will drive to Boyana, then up to the Golden Bridges. The taxi will wait while you are having your lunch. Only don't forget to get a receipt.

And so on Sunday morning Mr. Turtle and I alighted at the garden in front of the Boyana Church. This church is really a blessing. We must be very grateful to Sebatokrator Kaloyan for having built it so near the capital. It offers great opportunities from the point of view of the international tourist trade. As a conscientious guide I had briefed myself beforehand and had read a whole monograph on the church. But to my unpleasant surprise we found the door locked. While I looked around a woman appeared.

Why is it shut? I asked.

There is no light.

What do you mean, there is no light?

At the moment we are changing the electrical installation. Visits have been discontinued.

And this on a Sunday at the height of the season! What on earth made you change the installation just now?

We have to undertake repairs, comrade, answered the woman. The repairs have been ordered from above. According to plan.

There is something fatal in these repairs. They spring up in our path just when we least expect them. But if, at other times, I have been ready to resign myself, now I was in no mood to give in. This time I had with me the English writer Archibald Turtle, and behind me stood our whole national policy aimed at the development of international tourism. I looked sternly at the woman and said in a cold voice:

Look here! This comrade is an English writer, a guest of the government. Will you please open the door!

What am I to do, comrade? whined the woman. All right, I'll open if you insist! But inside it is quite dark, you won't be able to see a thing.

She took out a huge key and the small wooden door swung open. We took a few hesitant steps and realised that the situation was hopeless.

My eyes are not very strong, said Mr. Turtle, and it seems to me that I can't see very well.

Obviously he was making fun of me. I was seized by rage. This is how my mission as a guide was starting! We came out and I said to the woman in an even icier voice:

Look here! Some light must be found immediately!

But wherever from, comrade? she cried. Didn't I tell you that the installation is being repaired?

You will find something, I said. That is why you have been put here, to find something! Think!

She did think and said:

There is a mobile lamp which the workmen use. But they take it away with them.

You will get it from them.

But today is Sunday and they are not at work!

You will look for them wherever they may be.

She thought a little harder and said:

Perhaps they are down in the café. But I am not at all sure to find them!

Well, try! I said.

She turned round and hurried down the alley. I looked after her. A middle-aged woman with shapeless shoes. There was something neo-realist in her figure. For a second I felt a twinge of pity, but I said to myself: We all make sacrifices for our fatherland! After all, it's her job! and I turned to Mr. Turtle.

Are we going away? he said.

On the contrary, I said. Everything has been fixed. Let's sit down on this bench and smoke a cigarette. It is lovely here, isn't it?

We sat down. I summoned all my lyrical inspiration and told him about the unknown master of the Boyana frescoes. About Desislava. About all this ancient epoch. About the eternally germinating genius of the people. About how little Bulgaria anticipated the Quattrocento by a whole century, and how, but for the Turkish invasion, the Renaissance would have started not in Italy but here. Towards the end of my peroration the woman appeared again. She was accompanied by two men, the one tall, the other short. I was just saying something about overcoming Byzantine flatness when Mr. Turtle bent his head towards me and whispered: 'Look at these two, aren't they like Laurel and Hardy?' I was vexed, but as the likeness was indeed striking I agreed with him.

I found them, said the woman. They were down there.

Comrades, I am sorry about all this, started Laurel.

We were just going to have a drink, said Hardy.

It's all right, I said. I regret having to spoil your break. But, you see, the case is rather special. I have brought a writer, a foreigner, guest of the government, and he must visit the church this morning.

Both examined Mr. Turtle with interest.

We get it, said Laurel. Kolyo, run and bring the lamp!

Then he took on a mysterious expression, discreetly bent down to my ear and whispered:

Where did you say the comrade was from?

From England.

Laurel again riveted his eyes on Mr. Turtle and smiled at him.

An Englishman! This is fine! he said slowly and ponderously as if making a deduction. Meanwhile Hardy brought the lamp, handed it to Laurel, and we went in.

This part of the church, I started explaining, was built in the eleventh century. But what is more interesting is the work of the unknown master of the thirteenth century who. . . .

I continued with many interesting details. I talked about traditions, aesthetics, saints, the peculiar sensibility of the time, about angles, originality, colour, plasticity and what not. I had the feeling, however, that Mr. Turtle was not carried away by my words. 'Very, very interesting,' he murmured, shifting his eyes mechanically from place to place.

And here is the Last Supper, I said. Note the moving naïveté with which the painter has put on the table purely Bulgarian national dishes: garlic, rye bread. . . .

Very interesting, said Mr. Turtle and moved on.

I was far from finished with this part of the church, but there was nothing I could do and so I followed him. Behind us walked Laurel with the lamp, Hardy, and the woman. I embarked on new explanations. I poured out my enthusiasm for the portrait of the sullen Ephraim, the gentle Damyan, the scene with the three fishermen, with Jesus and the scholars. And all the time I had a feeling that something was amiss with my commentary. Mr. Turtle remained calm and politely attentive. He looked at each fresco sufficiently long not to offend me and sufficiently briefly not to indulge in unnecessary contemplation. His dosage was perfect. Like a commander in the field who at the last moment throws the elite division into the battle, I approached the paintings of the two noble families and drew his attention to them. This here is the meek Constantine Asen. The proud Irina. The intelligent and humane Kaloyan. And for the grand finale—Desislava.

Here is the woman who, according to legend, was in love with the painter, I said. Look at this remarkable Slav face, this quiet assurance. . . .

At this moment I felt that the feet of Mr. Turtle denoted tension. Above he remained as calm and attentive as before. But his feet were ready to head for the exit. One could sense their impatience through the well polished shoes. My eloquence dried up. I stopped in the middle of a sentence. The others waited, but I had nothing more to say.

This is it, I ended. A remarkable monument to Bulgarian medieval art.

Most interesting, said Mr. Turtle again.

Suddenly he changed. The tension disappeared. He cast a last glance at the portraits and started to walk away slowly, reluctantly, as if he found it difficult to tear himself away from this place. The English have always had extraordinary breeding. We walked through the churchyard. The woman, Laurel and Hardy accompanied us.

A pleasant church, said Mr. Turtle. Those frescoes gave me great pleasure.

What does he say, did he like it? asked Laurel.

He did, he did, I replied sourly.

Many foreigners come here and they all like it, said Hardy.

We were nearly at the gate.

And forgive us for having made the guest wait, said Laurel.

Mr. Turtle looked round at them. He had his own interpretation for the fact that they had followed us all along the alley.

Nice people, he said. Should I give them something?

No, please, I replied. They came with us just out of politeness.

Very nice people, added Mr. Turtle. Do give them my thanks then.

I conveyed this. Mr. Turtle nodded and smiled. They too grinned.

Well, all the best! said the three of them together.

When we instal the new lighting, come again, said Laurel.

Perhaps, I said and we departed.

During all this time the chauffeur had waited outside, immobile like a Buddha, and the only thing that gave sign of life was his meter. In the car Mr. Turtle and I started a conversation which we continued at the Golden Bridges.

I have a feeling that the Boyana Church did not make a great impression on you, I began boldly.

He smiled.

Please forgive me, he said. The church is original, but the truth is that no church impresses me any longer.

Why is that?

You have no idea how many churches I have seen, he said. I have lived almost two years in Italy. I have spent quite a long time in Germany, France, Spain and Greece. As a young man I went to Egypt, Persia, India, and Burma. I have paid homage to Rah, Shiva, Ormuzd, Zeus, Allah, Jehovah, and Sabaoth! My eyes are tired. Nothing from the past can excite me any longer.

At first I envied you for all the countries you have visited, I said. But now I see that there is nothing to envy.

Believe me, I too would like to have your fresh enthusiasm, he said. But what can one do, we carry not only the age of our own life, but also the age of the civilisation to which we belong. Don't talk to me about museums. All England has become a museum.

We too have a millennial history, I said. I would even venture to suggest that it is slightly longer than England's. Homer talks of civilisation in this land!

Mr. Turtle smiled again and took a sip from the slivova.

Possibly, he said. In that case the difference is merely that you have started to admire your history later!

Perhaps this is not merely a question of time but of outlook, I said. Perhaps in order to love the past, one must love the present.

My words sounded pompous, but there it was. The ideological fencing had started.

I too like the present, said Mr. Turtle. This is precisely what interests me in Bulgaria. Of course, I am quite willing to see your antiques, but the main thing that draws me is your today. How do the people live? What do they think? What do they believe in? This excites my curiosity far more than any frescoes.

And indeed, this is the most interesting, I said. And you will have every opportunity to see it!

We were both smiling amiably. It was already time for lunch. The whole valley looked like a picture postcard. Around us Skoda and Moskvich cars were arriving. The women were spreading rugs on the grass. Young girls with tight blouses were playing ball. The restaurant offered its cosy atmosphere, varied menu, and rich choice of beverages. And Mr. Turtle's spirits were rising.

It is very pleasant here, he said. You are lucky to have this mountain so near Sofia.

We have much nicer mountains, I said. We have mountains that can rival the Alps!

Later we got up and walked in the woods. The spirits of Mr. Turtle continued to rise. Now we even felt friends. We had drunk perhaps half a pint of spirits during lunch.

Very, very charming, repeated Mr. Turtle. An excellent place for a rest.

Wait until you see our sea! I continued.

Yes, I have read about the resorts on the Black Sea coast, he said. In the West they are known as the 'Red Riviera'. I intend to stay there for some time.

You will be able to make comparisons, I said.

Do you know, I have an idea! he said.

What?

I'll ask my sister to join us.

Very nice!

Yes, he said, Horatia now lives alone. I'll cable her first thing tomorrow morning. We shall spend this little holiday together. You don't object, do you?

On the contrary, I said. I shall be absolutely delighted!

In my post-prandial imagination there appeared a Northern beauty—fair, tall, slim, and green-eyed. But Mr. Turtle quickly destroyed this image.

She is a little old for you to court her, he said and giggled. She is only two years younger than I and has a son in the Navy. But otherwise she is full of life.

Later I was to see for myself that Mr. Turtle was speaking the truth: his sister was really full of vitality, sometimes more full than I could have wished. But at this moment we were still by ourselves and we were returning to the city in the best of moods. In front of the hotel I wished Mr. Turtle good-night and stayed to settle the bill with the driver. He surprised me with a sum which made a great impression on me; I even experienced a strange feeling of guilt. But later I learnt to accept such expenses with complete equanimity. I think everyone will agree that a country cannot develop its tourist trade only with smiles and handclapping.

* * *

In a few hours we were in Zheravna. We parked in front of the People's Council and this made a big impression in the quiet square. In the Council we were met by a short, kind, middle-aged man. He was called Uncle Philip.

The comrade is a well-known English writer, and this is his sister, I introduced my fellow travellers. We have come on important business. Our distinguished guest has decided to translate Yovkov's Balkan Legends into English.[1] For this purpose he must see the places which inspired the legends, and so we shall need your co-operation.

Of course, said the man. He seemed glad and a little confused at the same time. We shall visit the village, the houses, and the museum of Yovkov.

We shall do that too, I said. But we would like something more. It is necessary that the guest should, so to speak, be imbued with the spirit of Zheravna. He should feel the Balkan breezes, drink water from the limpid mountain streams, walk in the Old Forest and Razboyna under the centuries old beech trees, in a word, he should breathe in deeply the romantic atmosphere of Yovkov. Only in this way will he be able to get the right feeling for a poetic translation of the legends!

Correct, said Uncle Philip. We shall help you also in this!

I have yet another idea, I continued. Let's organise an outdoor feast like the Bulgarians used to do in the olden days. Let's take a lamb and roast it in the Haïduk way in the open air, somewhere on Iglikina Meadow.[2] Let us make ourselves comfortable, let us sing, let someone play the flute or the pipe. Thus

[1] Yordan Yovkov (1881–1937), famous Bulgarian short story writer born in Zheravna. (Translator.)

[2] Famous spot in Yovkov's stories.

only will our guest be able to get a direct impression of how our people used to make merry amidst nature, of their deep feeling for nature, and so he will grasp the typically Bulgarian local spirit, which is necessary for the translation.

Hm! said Uncle Philip. Lambs are not easy to find now, and Iglikina Meadow is rather far, but we shall fix something.

You understand, don't you, I said pointedly, that this task is of national importance. It is a question of popularising one of our great writers throughout the world. This is a mission with which we have been entrusted from the centre and we must use all efforts and means to fulfil it.

Uncle Philip said he would do everything possible to arrange such a feast for the next day, and we departed to have a look at Zheravna. A young man caught up with us, terribly thin, but with a huge mane of hair and a big open coat.

Are these the English writers? he asked. His expression was tense like an ancient mask, and his words sounded like a solemn chant.

And who are you? I asked him.

I am a local and occasionally I occupy myself with art, he said with great dignity. I simply wanted to see the English writers. Uncle Philip told me.

At this moment Uncle Philip himself joined us. His kindly face was suffused with joy.

Oho! he said. Peyo has already found you. Let me introduce him—he is our Zheravna painter. I said to myself, since he too is a man of the arts and even writes a little poetry, it might be a good thing if he and the guests met.

Of course, I said, especially as I noticed that Archie and Horatia were observing the newcomer with interest.

Let me introduce myself, he said and shook hands with sad gravity. My name is Voyvodov.

I introduced the visitors, while Horatia whispered in my ear: He is a genuine artist, isn't he?

I haven't seen any of his things, I replied. But I suppose he is genuine.

He looks genuine, she said and gave him a hooded look, while he, who seemed only then to notice her, fixed her with his big eyes.

Everything is in order, said Uncle Philip cheerfully. Tomorrow at lunch we shall have our picnic as you suggested. There are no lambs, but I have found a young kid and Baba (Granny) Neda will prepare it so that our mouths will water!

Who is this Baba Neda? I asked.

The best cook in the village! We have also a little wine, that will not put us to shame!

It must be in the Haïduk way! I said. On some meadow among the woods.

Everything is fixed, said Uncle Philip. I have the musicians too. A fiddler, a pipe player, and a flautist. The best in Zheravna!

The main thing is to fulfil our mission. I said. To create the right conditions, so that the guest can translate the legends well.

And so the next day we started out towards the forest. We formed a whole procession. Uncle Philip walked in front, after him came Archie and I, after us Voyvodov and Horatia, whom he assisted with gallantry over the steeper places, after them Baba Neda and her husband with the forks, knives, and glasses, after them our driver and two strong lads, who carried the wine flagons and the kid, and finally the fiddler, the piper, and the flautist. We walked quite a long time and even got out of breath on the steep climb, but I was in no hurry to stop, because I was looking for a meadow with the typical Yovkov atmosphere. At last we found the very thing. On the left there was a beautiful view towards the mountain ridges opposite, on the right there were massive old grey beech trees, beside us ran a clear mountain stream. Grass as thick and luscious as a carpet resisted the pressure of our heels.

Here, I said. This is it!

This is really nice, said Uncle Philip, only it is within the area of the Pioneer holiday camp.

Only now did I notice that beyond the trees one could see some tents and smoke, and hear the faint sound of voices.

Let us warn them, I said. But at that moment two men came out on the meadow and walked towards us.

What do you want here, comrades? asked one of them.

And what do you want? I said.

We are the leaders of the Pioneer Camp.

And I am the guide of an English writer, guest of the government. We have come on an important cultural mission.

And I introduced Archie, explaining why we had come and asking them to allow us to settle for a few hours on their territory. They agreed readily. They even seemed glad. Of course, they both said. We shall be happy to know that we have made our little contribution to Yovkov's translation into English. . . .

Meanwhile Baba Neda had spread out a long cloth on the ground and made all necessary preparations. We sat down on the grass. The roast kid had a crunchy golden-brown skin and Baba Neda had stuffed it with rice and liver. I had never eaten anything tastier in all my life. At first we only munched in silence, but gradually the conversation became animated. Archie was talking to Uncle Philip.

You Bulgarians, he said, have managed to preserve some things which our civilisation has ruined. Sometimes I envy you for this.

We live as we can, said Uncle Philip. . . .

The trouble is, said Archie, that civilisation is going to corrupt you too. I see you building, catching up. Factories, roads, new houses, holiday resorts! This is all right, but it also brings its own evils. I would like to see Bulgaria in twenty years from now—with hot running water, processed foods, cars and refrigerators.

We shall strive to develop our techniques, said Uncle Philip, but also to preserve that which deserves preservation.

Archie gave a wave of his hand.

Romance is dying, dying! Look at your village. What else is it but a museum show-window!

We shall strive to create a new romanticism, said Uncle Philip. . . .

Although they were looking at each other amiably, both had got quite red in the face. I was afraid they might quarrel, so I said that it was quite normal for people to hold different views and that the important thing was to understand each other despite the differences. . . .

After that the atmosphere grew calmer, the general conversation got under way once more, we passed on to the second flagon, the kid was nearly finished, and we were all very content. The beech trees rustled in the breeze, the stream gurgled soothingly, the Balkan range opposite was soft and gentle in outline and verdant nature was all around us. Voyvodov clinked glasses with Horatia more and more frequently, while his face grew paler and paler and his eyes more solemn. We sang 'You are lovely o my Forest' and 'He Lives Forever', and when we intoned 'O Balkan mountains of our birth' even Archie joined in, humming the melody out of tune. . . .

Meanwhile the piper and the flautist were having a rest and only the fiddler continued to play, sadly and monotonously. Voyvodov had got exceedingly pale.

Stefan, he called out to the fiddler. Play the other one!

Which one, Peyo?

You know, the beautiful one, about the haïduks that were impaled on the stake! The terrible one, my song, the one that you have always played for me!

The fiddler played and sang, a slow and monotonous song, full of gore and pain. Voyvodov covered his eyes with his hands, while Horatia watched him with great compassion.

Oh, what pain there is in you, my people! he groaned. What sea of pain is hidden in your bottomless heart!

What is he saying? What is he saying? asked Horatia.

I translated. Voyvodov was very moved and continued:

What other country has known so much suffering? Blood! Everywhere blood! With eyes popping he stared at us and turned with a theatrical gesture to the fiddler. Play on, Stefan, the devil take you, pluck the tragedy of Bulgaria from your strings!

What is he saying? What is he saying? Horatia asked again.

I went on translating. Suddenly Voyvodov fixed his eyes on the guests and spasms ran across his face.

And you, who have come here from I don't know where! he cried. What do you understand of all this?

We all caught our breath.

What can you understand, continued Voyvodov, of the suffering of these slaves throughout the centuries, of their despair? You have come here, smug, cold, passionless! Who are you? Englishmen! Europeans! For a moment wild hatred flashed in his eyes and he shook his fists. Oh, if only I could. . . .

What is he saying? asked Horatia.

I was very embarrassed, but I took hold of myself and replied:

He was very moved and recited a verse from one of his poems.

Oh! said Horatia.

Most interesting! said Archie.

Tell him to recite some more, begged Horatia.

Yes, do, said Archie.

Voyvodov had calmed down a little, but continued to frown and wave his hand.

What have they got in common with my art? he said. How can they see into the Bulgarian soul?

But after we begged him repeatedly, he consented at last and recited a few stanzas. I don't recall them very clearly now, but there was something in them about black fate and icy camellias. We all applauded and he said that he would improvise in honour of Horatia, then he got very excited and started talking about the burning copper in her hair, about the Northern radiance, and finally even called her Isolde. And so we sat a long time and sang songs, and nearly finished the second flagon, and the fiddle sobbed, and the pipe and flute joined in, and everything merged into a mellow sweetness, and I was happy, because we had been able to conjure up the romantic atmosphere which was necessary and which we now inhaled with full lungs.

At one moment I got drowsy, but I decided that I must not fall asleep. Baba Neda and her husband were stretched out with their eyes shut; the two lads, who had carried our food and drink, were snoring lustily. Archie's head was nodding, Voyvodov had gradually let himself slip down until now, I don't know how, his head was resting in Horatia's lap, while she was bending sleepily over him. He looked at her with wide-open but unseeing eyes and from time to time made a movement as if to caress the flaming red curls, but at the last moment checked himself and stopped.

He is very sweet, said Horatia. He reminds me of my son.

I had a different idea of a lieutenant in the British Navy, but did not say anything. I said to Archie, Do you want to go for a little walk? We shall climb to the top of the ridge and look at the other side of the mountain. It will do us good.

Archie agreed, Uncle Philip also got up, but no one else followed our example. We are staying here, said Horatia. She looked at Voyvodov and winked gaily at me.

The three of us started climbing. At first we dragged our feet a little, but soon the breeze refreshed us and we felt better. We reached the top and looked at the view, then turned to descend. But when we got back to the meadow, I immediately knew that something was amiss. Horatia and Voyvodov were still sitting on the grass, but not on the spot where we had left them. The others had formed a group a little aside from them; they were tidying up the remains of our feast and looked frightened. At the edge of the forest I was surprised to notice the two camp leaders, who seemed engaged in an argument with our driver. When they saw us, they stopped. The driver was the first to reach us.

A nice mess, he said sourly.

Why, what's the matter?

The comrades are protesting about something!

Meanwhile the two of them approached slowly. Their faces were like stone masks and they looked so merciless that they reminded me of judges about to pronounce the death sentence.

Is there a Party member amongst you? said one of them.

What has happened? I said. I am responsible for. . . .

I am a member of the Party, said Uncle Philip.

Comrades, said the other one. This is a disgrace! We do you a favour and let you into the precincts of the Pioneer Camp, in order to help you in your cultural mission, but cultural mission my foot! Before you started to eat and drink, the children began to giggle: this English writer, they said, will make some translations of Yordan Yovkov!

I did explain . . . I began.

And what happens? the first one chipped in. Not only do you indulge in a drunken bout in the middle of the day under the eyes of innocent children, but you allow the foreigner to go into the bushes with his wife!

What? I exclaimed.

We shall not tolerate this, said the second one. He is not in his own country, here we have different morals!

Comrades, you are mad! I shouted. The English visitor was with me the whole time and anyway, he hasn't got a wife!

I can corroborate this, said Uncle Philip firmly.

We saw them with our own eyes, they said. This red-haired comrade and a man. We thought it was the foreigner, but it may have been someone else. They waded across the stream and sat down in the grass on the other side. . . .

Uncle Philip gave me a look.

Voyvodov, he said slowly.

I grew pale and took the driver aside.

Tell me what happened!

Well, I was dozing, he said, and it all seemed like a dream. This bloke, Voyvodov, began acting silly and at one time both of them got up without saying a word. How they understood each other beats me, but they took off their shoes, took each other by the hand, waded into the river laughing like children, and crossed over to the other side. Well, I thought to myself, there is a limit to everything, look at their age! They didn't stay long, came back almost immediately. Then these two arrived!

My head started aching. What on earth made me go on that walk! If we had stayed behind nothing would have happened! But who could have imagined that things would take such a turn! Curse Voyvodov! I felt like throwing something at his head.

I turned to the two leaders.

Look here, I said. There must be a misunderstanding! This comrade is the sister of the writer, she is an elderly woman, and the man you saw with her is a Bulgarian half her age. He has an amazing resemblance to her son!

And to make it sound more convincing, I even added that her son had been killed in the war, and that when she saw this Voyvodov here, she had been deeply moved by purely maternal feelings. However, they did not believe me.

Maternal feelings my foot, comrade, said the first camp leader. Didn't we see it all from the camp? They sat down on the grass and started kissing.

No, hissed his colleague fiercely. I will not let this matter rest. I shall report it to the highest authority. What kind of example is this? And you, instead of remaining at your post and showing vigilance, you let this disgraceful thing happen!

My headache got worse. What if this man really made a report! Of course I would be blamed for everything.

Come, come, said Uncle Philip conciliatingly. They had a little to drink, they had a kiss and cuddle, well, it is not such a great matter. . . .

What? shouted the other. It is no great matter to corrupt innocent children in broad daylight! To stain the prestige of our regime, which admits such guests!

Comrade, Uncle Philip interrupted calmly. What happened here was quite unforeseen and should not have occurred. You are right to be indignant, it was ugly and unpleasant. But do not exaggerate it. No purpose will be served by making a row.

We argued a long time and finally Uncle Philip managed to quieten them down. Nevertheless, they left dissatisfied and frowning, declaring that they would think it over and perhaps still send in a report. We too made ready to go. . . .

* * *

The send-off was very heartwarming. Tachev, Adriana, and I went to the airport and we had a long talk with Archie, who ended up by saying that he was pleased with his stay in Bulgaria. He mentioned also the translations from Yovkov—we had already supplied him with rough translations into English—and said that immediately on his return to London, he would get in touch with his publisher and try to bring our project to fruition. After that he invited us all, if we ever came to England, to visit him, while we expressed the wish to see him again amongst us. He thanked us and said he might return one day, one never knew. Horatia chipped in to say she would never forget the lovely time at the seaside and in Zheravna. Then the passengers were asked to take their seats, we all got up, Adriana and I handed the guests huge bouquets, we shook hands and Horatia grew sentimental and embraced me, saying that I reminded her of her son. . . .

Later Archie sent me a post-card from London with a view of the House of Commons. I replied immediately, but he did not answer and I did not write again, deciding that he was probably very busy and that it would be nice to send him a Christmas card. Then I was immersed in my daily routine and gradually the memories of our nice journey began to fade. . . .

But one morning Adriana rang me and asked me to go to her office. Tachev was there and a big illustrated magazine lay on the desk.

This is *Ambassador*, Mr. Turtle's magazine, said Adriana. We have just received the latest issue, with his travel notes! Come on, translate, let's see what he writes!

The notes, together with two or three photographs, took up several pages. The title was 'Bulgaria—land of slivovitz, sea, and communism'. To begin with, Archie explained where our country was situated and gave some summary information about its climate and history. Then, for some obscure reason, he wrote that we hated the Turks. 'Bulgarians can't stand the Turks'—he said—'I visited a village, where during the last century much blood was shed between the two nations. They showed me the church whose walls are still bloodstained, but as usually happens in such cases, nobody could prove whose blood it was and whether the Turks had butchered the Bulgars or the Bulgars the Turks'.

Here I stopped in amazement. Tachev and Adriana had turned to stone. I took a deep breath and continued. . . .

'The Bulgarians', wrote Archie further on, 'like to show off, to talk about culture and to boast that they have a culture. They are like children who run to you and proudly show you their toys. Their old houses, which have a quaint charm, are made out to be the height of world architecture. In one of the villages I visited, I met a raving idealist who wanted to produce *King Lear* on the local stage. My guide, a young man who constantly amused me with his naivety—here I swallowed hard and stopped for a while, but recovered and went on—took me to some little church not far from Sofia and tried to prove to me that in comparison with its frescoes the Italian Renaissance wasn't worth a dime. He lectured me at great length and while I listened to him, I wondered whether he really believed in his words or whether he had been ordered to talk like that in front of foreigners. I also had the occasion to acquaint myself with the works of one of the older Bulgarian writers whom they value very highly; at one time there was even some talk of my translating some of his tales into English. At first I accepted this offer, thinking that perhaps the stories would have something primitive and interesting in them, but later when I read the text, I discovered that with a few exceptions, these Legends offer an old-fashioned, idealised picture of humanity that was not at all to my taste and only politeness prevented me from admitting this to my hosts'.

Tachev and Adriana were still stunned.

'What is undoubtedly good in Bulgaria'—Archie went on—'is the food and the drinks. For connoisseurs I would especially recommend that beverage which they call slivovitz—a superb amber-coloured spirit, which lies smoothly on the palate and is an admirable morale-raiser. I would go as far as to say that in the hierarchy of drinks, it comes immediately after Scotch whisky. It has left me with excellent memories and I would gladly return to it. It is perhaps the first thing that comes to my mind when I hear Bulgaria mentioned . . . and the Bulgarians themselves are kindly and hospitable people. In a word'—Archie concluded his impressions—'I would advise every Englishman to visit Bulgaria and acquaint himself with an interesting country, which, though it may have communism, also has good cooking, a beautiful sea, and lovely slivovitz, for the sake of which one might forgive all other defects'.

I put the magazine down. We all three looked at one another.

Hm! said Adriana. There are some positive things in it, but the whole is, what shall I say, so inconclusive.

We can't really expect him to have our outlook on the world, said Tachev.

I suppose you are right, said Adriana. But, all the same, it is so condescending!

Yes, said Tachev gloomily. And what does he write about Yovkov? How is it possible not to like Yovkov? No—he suddenly turned to me—probably you translated the legends so badly that you gave him a wrong impression.

I beg your pardon, I protested. Didn't you arrange for him to have rough translations before he left? Didn't he take them with him to London?

True, said Tachev. Unpleasant affair! How can he say that he is old-fashioned! Didn't he tell us himself that he preferred something older to something contemporary . . . and now that he has publicly expressed such a disparaging view of Yovkov, how could he translate and popularise him?

It wouldn't do at all, said Adriana.

In this case, I think we should give up the idea of these translations, said Tachev. After all, we too have our dignity, haven't we? If you don't like Yovkov, goodbye and good riddance, don't you agree?

Oh, quite, said Adriana. Only it is a pity that now the Balkan Legends won't be published in English.

We shall find another translator, said Tachev. There is no shortage of them, so many writers and such-like come here, we are bound to find someone who will like them and translate them willingly.

All the same, all that trouble for nothing, said Adriana. Not to speak of the expense. . . .

It is our duty to receive everyone well, said Tachev. Afterwards they can do as they please. And besides Mr. Turtle is not the British nation; if he turned out to be a fraud, it doesn't mean that they are all like him. Well, never mind, Adriana, you will write a letter to Mr. Turtle. Tell him, since you etc., etc., don't like Yovkov and find him old-fashioned, we, in these circumstances, etc., etc., don't want to trouble you and consider our agreement cancelled and so on. You lick it into shape, only be polite and courteous, there is no need to appear uncultured. . . .

I started walking home, and I was so livid with Archie that I decided not to send him a Christmas card. Suddenly someone called my name. I turned round. It was our driver, the one who had taken us to Zheravna.

Hullo! he said. How are you? Do you hear from our friends in England?

Don't talk to me about them! I said and told him everything.

What a rascal!—he was indignant. I wouldn't have believed it of him! And so now he isn't going to translate Yovkov after all, is he?

Of course not, I said.

And all the big to do, Sunny Shore, Zheravna, the feasting, the drinking, the songs, all this was a waste?

A complete waste, I said.

He made us look pretty silly, he said. Then suddenly he grinned. Never mind, that bloke, what was his name, Voyvodov, had his fun with his sister. That at least was one up to us!

We both burst out laughing and I must admit I felt a little better.

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REVIEWS

The Bulgarian Communist Party

Joseph Rothschild

THE present volume,[1] a Russian translation of the official Bulgarian history of the Bulgarian Communist Party originally prepared by the Bulgarian *Institute for the History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, deals with the history of that party from the founding of the first socialist discussion groups by Bulgarian intellectuals in the early 1880s to the combined communist insurrection in and Soviet Army invasion of Bulgaria on 9 September 1944, which 'opened to Bulgaria the path towards the construction of socialism' (p. 386). Most of the critical turning points in the party's history are discussed quite frankly. In 1903 the infant Social-Democratic party split into Narrow (leftists) and Broad (moderate) wings on the issue of political collaboration with other radical movements, especially the Bulgarian Peasant Union, for the purpose of limiting royal dictatorship and extending parliamentary democracy, as well as on the issue of the proper degree of control which a socialist party ought to exercise over its corresponding trade union movement. The Narrow wing, led by Dimitar Blagoev, opposed collaboration with other groups as threatening the ideological purity of the young Marxist party, and insisted on rigid organisational control by the political leader over the trade union movement which, left to its own devices, would otherwise, it was feared, become apolitical and develop a mere wages-and-hours policy.

The Narrows, having vehemently opposed Bulgarian involvement in the Balkan wars and First World War, though without adopting Lenin's strategy of 'transforming' the latter war from an 'imperialist' to a 'civil' one in each belligerent country through revolutionary action, transformed themselves into the Bulgarian Communist Party at war's end and affiliated to the Communist International upon its founding in 1919. It is a matter of great pride to the Bulgarian communists that their party, which had ejected its moderate (Broad) elements in the same year of 1903 in which Lenin had provoked the Bolshevik-Menshevik split in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, should in 1919 have joined *en masse*, without serious defections or expulsions, the Communist International, thereby bringing into that body its only mass party, other than the Bolsheviks, at that early date (p. 174).

The glitter of these items for self-congratulation is, however, tarnished by the Party's and Blagoev's refusal to become involved in the Radomir rebellion of 1918, when mutinous peasant soldiers, led by members of the Peasant Union, marched on Sofia, the capital, to overthrow the royal regime. Regarding this affair as a struggle within the bourgeoisie in which the proletariat had no stake, Blagoev committed his about-to-become Communist Party to a policy of abstention, thereby unappeasably

[1] *Istoriya Bolgarskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii*, Moscow, 1960, 392 pp.

infuriating Lenin. This 'error', a consequence of Blagoev's and the Narrows' sectarian contempt for the peasantry, was repeated five years later when the Communist Party adopted a policy of passivity and neutrality at the time of the successful bourgeois-military *coup d'état* of 9 June 1923 against the radical agrarian government of Alexander Stamboliski. Once again the Soviet leaders in Moscow were outraged by this dogmatic refusal of their Bulgarian disciples to ally themselves with the peasant movement against the urban middle class. On Moscow's instructions, the Bulgarian communists belatedly attempted their own abortive insurrection against the new bourgeois-military regime in September 1923 and were decimated in the subsequent White Terror.

In recounting these events in considerable detail and with ample documentation, the authors of the present volume retrospectively adopt the political assumptions of the contemporary Soviet critics of Bulgarian communist conduct. In other words, the Bulgarian communist policy of neutrality in 1918 and 1923 is condemned as catastrophic on the basis of the simple *a prioristic* assumption that had they collaborated with the peasant movement, this coalition would undoubtedly have triumphed over the urban-bourgeois forces of Bulgaria (pp. 152, 202). This assumption, which to the outside observer appears questionable and requires at least an attempted demonstration, is here presented as absolute.

Indeed, the major intellectual shortcoming of the first half of this history of the Bulgarian Communist Party, up to the mid-1920s, arises from the fact that the only style of 'analysis' which its authors permit themselves is to measure Blagoev and the Narrows against Lenin and the Bolsheviks, only to find the former wanting. On such issues as the Bulgarians' catechistic preparations for and consummation of their 1903 split with the Broad socialist moderates, their stubbornly negative attitude towards the peasant movement, their quasi-pacifist but unrevolutionary anti-war positions between 1912 and 1918, and their sectarian lack of interest in the 'intra-bourgeois' conflicts of 1918 and 1923, their alleged (and real) ideological and political inferiority to their Russian counterparts is crushingly argued. But this finding, though valid in your reviewer's opinion, is here presented quite unconvincingly, since the analysis is pre-rigged and the comparison rendered dishonest by the initial presumption of Lenin's superiority as a definitional constant. It follows that the 'criticism' of Blagoev's and the Bulgarian Party's 'inadequacies' rings hollow. Indeed, to be compared in communist historiography with Lenin and found just short of his stature is really to be praised with faint damns, since Lenin alone of his generation is presumed to have been without the taint of original sin.

As the narrative proceeds to the two decades of the underground existence of the Bulgarian Communist Party, from 1924 to 1944, it continues to present the issues and problems raised by the Party's attempts to adapt itself to conditions of illegality. The Party's initial response to the twin disasters of June and September 1923 was the 'ultra-left', quasi-anarchist, aberration of assassination and terror, culminating in the dynamiting of the Sofia cathedral on 14 April 1925 on an occasion when it was packed with government personnel. The regime's survival against such tactics forced the Party to abandon them and opt instead for 'front' activities, such as the organisation of the Labour Party as its

legal 'cover' in February 1927. The economic hardships brought on by the great agricultural depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s enabled the Communist Party, through such organisations, to reknit its ties to the masses by capitalising on the resultant discontent.

When the parliamentary system was overthrown by a military *coup d'état* on 19 May 1934, the Bulgarian communists were once again caught napping and found themselves driven by events rather than mastering or initiating them. They were thereupon simultaneously subjected to an internal purge executed by a new Moscow-imposed leadership and to renewed external repression by the government. From the mid-1930s on the party's main functions were first to articulate the 'Popular Front' line and then to sabotage Bulgaria's war contribution to the Axis coalition.

In recounting these and other developments, the authors once again, as in the first half of the book, present an array of data which is quite astonishing to those who recall the thin and exclusively polemical fare of Stalinist historiography, but their interpretation still echoes retrospectively the Comintern line in its last Stalinist phase.

Some interesting concessions are, nevertheless, obliquely introduced in the course of this narrative. Thus, without ever saying so explicitly, the authors repeatedly hint (Chapters 10 and 11) that until his brilliant propaganda performance against the Nazis at the Reichstag fire trial in 1933 and his subsequent assumption of the secretary-generalship of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov had consistently played second fiddle in the Bulgarian Communist Party—second to Dimitar Blagoev, to Vasil Kolarov, and even to the various 'deviationists' whom he eventually purged. Also intriguing are the many favourable references, buttressed by quotations from Lenin (Chapter 5) to the theme of Balkan federation, a subject which had been taboo in the communist world since the Titoist crisis in 1948.

The ideological and logical imperatives of dialectical materialism occasionally either induce communist historians crudely to dispose of an extremely subtle problem, or else impose upon them the obligation to regard as major difficulties certain points which to the outsider appear secondary or trivial or irrelevant or non-existent. Thus, for example (Chapter 5), 'subjectively' the Balkan rulers and bourgeois circles who unleashed the First Balkan War against the Ottoman Empire in 1912, were allegedly acting as robbers and agents of the Great Powers in the imperialist scramble for control of the world. 'Subjectively', also, Blagoev and the other Balkan socialists were correctly defending the interests of the toiling masses in opposing this war. 'Objectively', however, the First Balkan War, resulting in the expulsion of the moribund Ottoman Empire from all but a corner of south-eastern Europe, represented a progressive step forward along the road of the socio-economic development of this part of the world from feudalism to capitalism (p. 109). These 'subjective' and 'objective' factors are then ambiguously balanced against each other.

Apart from such politically and ideologically caused idiosyncrasies, the book also suffers considerably from simple, undialectical, unscholarly slovenliness in research of the kind which, alas, knows no political boundaries. Thus the transposition of dates from the old (Julian) to the

new (Gregorian) calendar for the years before 1916 (when Bulgaria adopted the latter) is erratic. The dating of party and other congresses and conferences is occasionally wrong by weeks and months. Statistics of wartime mortalities, economic curves, election returns, parliamentary representation, are frequently inaccurate. These errors do not fall into a pattern of the kind which would entitle one to ascribe them to a politically-motivated attempt at distortion of the facts. They appear to be simply evidence of sloppy work.

The Industrialisation Debate

Alfred Zauberman

THE SHADES of the contestants in the great debate which preceded Stalin's industrialisation drive have every reason to rejoice at Dr. Erlich's performance.[1] They could not be given a fairer chance to address posterity. Systematised and polished with consummate scholarship, their arguments have acquired a new power of persuasion and eloquence. Placed within the frame of neo-classical and partly post-Keynesian concepts, not only has their reasoning become intelligible to an interested Western student, it has also gained in rigour and elegance. Indeed, the Western reader may be left with an impression of greater cohesion and sophistication, of closer kinship with his own way of looking at the problems of economic growth than is in fact warranted by what was said and done on the Russian stage.

Dr. Erlich's work sheds new light on words said and attitudes taken by the main actors in the drama, even if they are familiar to students of that momentous episode in Soviet history. By uncovering assumptions and giving proper weight to qualifications, he has shown how, towards the end of the twenties, the warring schools of thought tended to converge, the rightists conceding the inevitability of a discontinuous industrial growth, and the leftists admitting the risks entailed in their policies. Hence, as the author argues, logic suggested at that stage a movement towards some middle-of-the-road solution, perhaps somewhere around the position of Bazarov and his friends. Why did this not happen? Why did Stalin of all people, the man known for his inclination to play safe, embark on a gamble with high stakes, one fraught with dangers recognised by all the debaters? This is the puzzle confronting Dr. Erlich as he approaches his last chapter. His inquiry disposes of the suggestion that the alternative to the course adopted was necessarily stagnation at an intolerably low level. Nor does he accept as plausible the attempt to justify the path chosen by a genuine fear of imminent aggression: the social and economic tensions to be expected on this path would, if anything, help the invader. Stalin's reasoning, Dr. Erlich suggests, was on these lines: with the existing agricultural system, fairly rapid industrialisation would have to rely on the peasants' readiness to expand their

[1] Alexander Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924–28*. Harvard University Press, 1960.

sales of food and agricultural raw materials faster than their purchases of industrial products; although theoretically feasible, this would necessitate a very delicately balanced combination of direct controls and incentives; and the peasantry could be expected to resist the first, and fail to be effectively guided by the second. Hence industrialisation with a strong emphasis on a capital-goods sector, called for a preventive attack, a counter-offensive against the peasantry. The 'removal of barriers to the tempo of socialist accumulation' entailed the dual policy of depriving the peasant of the power to resist, and suppressing the trade unions as a protector of wages. In this context a radical change in the agrarian structure would serve political as well as economic purposes: the elimination of private farming was Stalin's insurance of his political flanks against the peasantry's bid for political power, a bid they were virtually certain to make if economic policies left the regime to their mercy. 'Collectivisation', exclaimed Preobrazhenski, when called upon to criticise his errors, 'collectivisation, this is the crux of the matter. Did I have this prognosis of the collectivisation? I did not.' On which Erlich comments that 'he was wise not to point out that the decision to collectivise hinged not on superior intellectual perspicacity but on the incomparably higher degree of resolve to crush the opponent with utter disregard of the staggering human costs of the operation' (p. 177). If Dr. Erlich's hypothesis is adopted, a number of elements fall into place. For once the *smychka*—previously accepted as essential by both the Left and the Right—was abandoned, the idea of industry lifting itself from stagnation by its own boot-straps could go overboard. In other words—in Preobrazhenski's famous terms—the centre of gravity of 'primitive socialist accumulation' could be shifted to the village, no longer protected by the fences of private property. Moreover, it was collectivisation which would make the economic environment suitable for the switching-off of the market mechanism. In any case this mechanism could not be expected to work under the acute strains and stresses inseparable from the over-rapid, self-financed industrialisation of a semi-pauper country. Hence the shift to a siege-type command system was related to the choice of tempo for the process no less than to its patterns. Why did Stalin adopt the 'stormy' pace? Why did he decide to build today's factories with tomorrow's bricks? Why did he out-industrialise the most radical of industrialisers? These are questions which will probably never be fully answered in rational terms only. But Dr. Erlich's masterly study at least marshals and analyses all the rational elements in the decision.

The editors regret having made two errors in the article by Professor Schurmann in our last issue, p. 157, line 18: the date of the eighth Party Congress was 1956, not 1958; p. 164, para. 2, line 3 should read: 'the power of the centre had been closed with the demise of Chang Kuo-t'ao'.

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